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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the last two decades, ethnic identities have played an increasingly important 
role in Latin American politics. This trend is part of a global phenomenon, in which 
ethnic identities, for many decades lying dormant, have become politically activated; 
political movements and parties have been forming along – and reinforcing – ethnic 
cleavages throughout the world. In the Latin American region, indigenous movements 
have emerged as relevant political actors, substantially altering the political arena in 
many countries. On some occasions, indigenous politics have challenged the institutional 
status quo, jeopardizing democratic stability (as in the cases of Ecuador in 2000 or 
Bolivia in 2003). In other cases, these movements have played alongside democratic 
rules, forming political parties and participating in local and national elections; the results 
of this participation have varied substantially from case to case. Viewed from any 
perspective, the emergence of indigenous movements is a central aspect of modern Latin 
American politics (Sieder 2002; Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005). 
Electoral participation of indigenous movements has taken place in the two 
countries with the largest share of indigenous population in Latin America, Bolivia and 
Guatemala. According to most accounts, at least 50% of the population could be coded as 
indigenous in these two nations. These two countries are also among the least developed 
and most unequal in the region.  
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The results produced by this participation have been as different as they could 
possibly be. In Bolivia, the Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS), an indigenous and neo-
populist party, obtained 54% of the national vote in the presidential election of 2005, 
placing Evo Morales, a Cocalero leader, in the country’s presidency (Deheza 2007; 
Romero Ballivian 2007). Guatemala held national elections in 2007, and Rigoberta 
Menchú, a Nobel Prize recipient and a very conspicuous leader in Guatemala, obtained a 
meager 3% of the vote; Menchú was the only indigenous candidate running for national 
office in those elections. 
What factors can explain this enormous difference in the political performance of 
indigenous people in two countries with noticeable similarities? Answering this question 
is one of the goals that this dissertation pursues.  
But ethnic identities are not only a relevant explanatory factor of national politics 
in different countries; they can also be a product of political processes. Political scientists 
have recently made efforts to explain how political factors influence identities (Chandra 
and Laitin 2002; Hoddie 2006); however, the explanation of how ethnic identities are 
produced by politics is still a poorly understood within in the discipline (Smith 2004).  
The two cases studied here provide a valuable comparison for processes of 
identity change which appear to be related to national politics. Data available suggest that 
the proportion of people who identify as indigenous has been growing in Bolivia over the 
last decade; in Guatemala, the case seems to be the opposite: the proportion of citizens 
who claim to be indigenous appears to be in decline, though this evidence is not as clear 
as in the Bolivian case. 
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Is there a relationship between the success of indigenous politics and the evident 
changes in ethnic identification in the two countries? This dissertation asserts that there 
is, in fact, a direct relationship between the two processes. 
Any study of ethnic identities, either at the left or the right side of the equation, 
requires that the concept of ethnic identity be clearly defined and that the measure 
employed to operationalize the concept be a valid and reliable variable. The 
conceptualization of ethnic identities has been an area of particular obscurity in 
comparative politics (Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Chandra 2006; Fearon 1999). 
Likewise, the way of appropriately measuring ethnic identities has been contested in the 
discipline, and a common standard has yet to emerge (Abdelal, et al. 2006; Brady and 
Kaplan 2000; Brubaker 2004). 
A crucial task for this research, then, is to clearly conceptualize and adequately 
measure its key concept: ethnic identity. This is the first challenge faced in this 
dissertation, in which a definition of ethnic identity is produced and different empirical 
measures are discussed in a multi-method research setting that highlights the importance 
of combining qualitative and quantitative approaches for the study of ethnic identity. 
One of the implications of the constructivist definition of ethnic identity 
employed here is that ethnic identification would not necessarily be stronger than any 
other type of identity, such as the national one. In order to be accepted as valid, a 
theoretical definition requires empirical evidence backing it. The challenge of finding 
empirical evidence supporting the definition of ethnic identity is also assumed in this 
dissertation, and this theoretical assumption is put to test in a multi-level statistical 
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analysis which combines individual level data with the characteristics of 22 countries in 
the Americas.  
The different pieces of this dissertation give an account of the way in which 
indigenous identities relate to the national political arena in Bolivia and Guatemala. 
These two cases are relevant examples of countries in which colonial histories of ethnic 
classification and segregation have put large portions of the population in a 
disadvantaged position, both in socioeconomic status as in the exercise of citizen rights. 
The fact that there are no large differences in the attachment of indigenous people to the 
national political community in the two countries with other ethnic minorities in the 
region, suggests that the learnings obtained from this study could apply to ethnic 
minorities in the Americas in general. 
 
Relevance of Indigenous Participation for the Quality of Democracy 
The importance of this research is linked to the quality of democracy. Indigenous 
people in Bolivia and Guatemala have occupied a disadvantaged position in terms of 
socioeconomic development and in the exercise of citizenship rights. Most indigenous 
people in the two countries live below the poverty line, and their access to education and 
other public services is significantly lower than the one registered for mestizo and ladino 
populations (Adams and Bastos 2003; Pascharopoulos 1993; Pascharopoulos and 
Patrinos 1994; PNUD 2004). 
It is in the political sphere where differences between indigenous people and 
mestizos, ladinos, and ‘whites’ are most relevant for the quality of democracy. 
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Indigenous people have traditionally been excluded from direct political participation as a 
consequence of the Spanish colonial domination reproduced in the post-colonial 
Republican states. Until the mid 20th century, voting was restricted for indigenous people 
in the two countries1, and until the last decade of the century, only a few indigenous 
individuals had participated as candidates for public office in the two countries. 
The problem of systematic under-participation of a particular social group in 
democracy, is fundamentally a problem of justice (Young 1997; Young 2000); the quality 
of democracy suffers under these conditions, producing first and second class citizens. 
The systematic under-participation of a particular segment of society feeds a vicious 
circle in which their disadvantaged position is reinforced and becomes a pervasive feature 
of society. 
Multiculturalism is an answer given to these unjust conditions of democracy. The 
basic multicultural precept is the recognition of differences based on ethnic and cultural 
identities (Taylor and Gutmann 1994); the recognition of these difference is the basis for 
policies which give some special faculties to minority communities and groups oriented 
to solve their disadvantaged societal position (Kymlicka 1995; Kymlicka 2001); these 
faculties range from some level of autonomy and self-determination, to consociational 
government, to special taxation status, to the adequation of citizenship rules. 
In Latin America, most countries introduced at least some multicultural reforms 
during the last two decades of the past century (Van Cott 2000a). These reforms, 
                                                 
1 Voting was restricted to literate male owning some property; which excluded de facto most indigenous 
individuals, largely illiterate. Universal suffrage was not approved in Guatemala until 1946 during the 
Government of the military Junta led by Arbenz (Yashar 1997); in Bolivia, universal suffrage was adopted 
in 1952, after the national revolution of the same year (Campero 1999). 
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produced with the influence of international actors (Brysk 2000), seem to have had, in 
general, a positive effect on the level of participation of indigenous peoples in the region, 
particularly with the organization of several ethnic parties in countries as diverse as 
Colombia, Bolivia, and Argentina (Van Cott 2005). 
By having their bases on the recognition of the difference, identity claims (which 
are the origins for multiculturalism) reinforce the idea of ‘sameness’, of continuity of a 
subject, of a particular identity across time (Booth 1999); in our case, the idea of 
indigenous people refers to the descendents of those people who inhabited the Americas 
before the Spanish conquest. But as part of this research shows, ethnic identities can also 
be shaped by political processes; the availability of particular categories, and the 
identification of individuals with these categories, are contingent upon the sociopolitical 
context. 
Does this mean that justice claims based on identities are invalidated by the 
politically constructed character of identities? I believe that this line of argument is 
incorrect. Ethnic identities are part of a socially constructed system of classification; but 
this classification also represents some order, a hierarchical organization of society. All 
individuals live the implications of having the repertoire of ethnic identities that they 
have, and the implications of identifying with one or more of these categories. In other 
words, the fact that ethnic identities are socially constructed does not mean that they are 
not objective realities with concrete implications for people. 
 7
Multiculturalism and indigenous politics in Bolivia and Guatemala 
Bolivia is among the countries in the Americas to have experienced the most 
abundant state reforms during the 1990’s; the Constitution was amended in 1994, and 
multicultural reforms included an explicit recognition of the multi-ethnic and multi-
cultural feature of Bolivian society (Komadina 2001). This symbolic recognition is part 
of a series of achievements of indigenous politicians and activists, which culminated with 
the election of Evo Morales in 2005.  
However, it would be inaccurate to claim that the political success of Evo Morales 
was a result of the Constitutional reforms of 1994; in fact, the causal arrow might be 
going in the opposite direction. Indigenous movements and organizations in Bolivia 
began producing a distinctive ethnicist discourse in the 1970s; before that, class-based 
cleavages were hegemonic in the country (Rivera C. 2003). This ethnic emergence 
coincides with the decline of military dictatorships which ruled the country until 1982, 
but started showing signs of caducity in 1978. During the 1980s and early 1990s, an 
increasing number of indigenous political organizations appeared in Bolivia (Strobele-
Gregor, Hoffman and Holmes 1994). 
 I argue in this research that if a single factor had to be pointed out as the cause 
for the success of Morales’ Movimiento Al Socialismo, this would have to be the process 
of municipal decentralization adopted by the country in 1994 under the Law of Popular 
Participation. The Law of Popular Participation was particularly important for promoting 
the participation of indigenous and peasant organizations in local politics (Albó 2002a; 
Calla and Molina B. 2003), and transformed the political scenario of the country injecting 
in it the massive participation of grassroots organizations.  
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In Guatemala, on the other side, a clear ethnic discourse was absent from popular 
organizations until the 1990s. It is possible that the identity debate was present in the 
political organizations of the 70s, but this debate was not settled, leaving behind different 
and sometimes contradictory positions; during the high polarization environment of the 
civil war, the ethnicist position always fell behind class based cleavages (Esquit Choy 
and Galvez Borell 1997). 
Guatemala’s move to democracy, which concluded with the election of 1986, was 
in part a consequence of global forces acting in national politics, not necessarily because 
democratic forces had emerged in the country  (Booth 2000; Seligson and Booth 1995). 
Decades of armed conflict and state-sponsored violence had decimated civil society, 
particularly indigenous organizations and communities, and civil and political 
organizations were generally weak. 
After the peace accords were signed on December 28, 1996, a referendum was 
called in 1999 in Guatemala to approve a series of constitutional amendments, which 
would implement a series of multicultural reforms and were seen as highly beneficial for 
indigenous communities and organizations; but the referendum was defeated and the 
reforms did not pass (Cojti and Fabian 2005; Warren 2002). 
In fact, the quality of democracy seems to have improved in Latin America with 
the emergence of indigenous actors in national political systems. In Bolivia, legitimacy of 
the democratic system has increased significantly after the triumph of the Movimiento Al 
Socialismo in the 2005 elections (Seligson, et al. 2006), and voter turnout has also seen 
an increase from previous elections (Romero Ballivian 2007). The political system seems 
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now to be more accountable to the majority of the population, and exclusion based on 
ethnic lines is receding (Albro 2006; Van Cott 2006). Despite any flaws that the Morales 
government might have in its administering of the Bolivian government– and the 
potentially negative effects it has on the country’s democratic institutions, the political 
inclusion of marginalized sectors of the population can only be seen as a positive change 
for democratic systems. 
Besides its positive effect in the Latin American case, ethnic politics also has a 
potentially negative side for democracy. The combination of politically activated ethnic 
identities and democratic government has been signaled as a cause of political instability 
and violence, particularly in less consolidated democracies (Chua 2003; Snyder 2000). 
The formation of ethnic parties can exacerbate ethnic conflict (Horowitz 1985), but 
ethnic parties are also likely to produce democratic stability in the long run (Chandra 
2005). The potentially harmful consequences of ethnic politics on democratic institutions 
is another reason pointing to the relevance of this research. 
 
Research Strategy  
This research is based on the study of public opinion, explicitly survey data, to 
advance the understanding of the relationship between indigenous identities and national 
politics in Latin America; however, different methodological approaches are combined 
with the analysis of survey data in order to gain explanatory capacity of the phenomena 
under study. The methods employed here are selected and designed accordingly to their 
possibilities of contributing to the understanding of the research question. This relative 
methodological eclecticism places the goals of the study before methodological loyalties. 
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Design type and case selection 
The project is based on a most similar system design (Lijphart 1975; Przeworski 
and Teune 1970), selecting the two countries with the largest share of indigenous 
population in the Americas, Bolivia and Guatemala, as the units of a focused comparison. 
The national census offices estimate that 62% of the approximately 9 million Bolivians is 
indigenous, and in Guatemala this figure is estimated at 40% of its 13 million citizens. 
However, these estimations are greatly contested in the two countries (as chapter II of 
this dissertation shows), and the indicators seem to be highly unreliable.  
These two countries are not only similar in terms of ethnic composition of the 
population, but also in reference to socioeconomic factors. Bolivia is placed at number 
115 in the Human Development Index2 rank done by the United Nations Development 
Program, in which Guatemala ranks as number 118 out of 177 nations in the world 
(Bolivia’s Human Development Index is .692, while Guatemala’s is .673). Guatemala’s 
gross domestic product (GDP) is higher than Bolivia’s ($4,313 per capita, PPP, vs. 
$2,720 respectively), but the adult literacy rate is higher in the South American nation 
than in the Central American one (86.7 vs. 69.1%). Income inequality is also similarly 
high in the two countries, with the Gini index at 55.1 in Guatemala and 60.1 in Bolivia 
(UNDP 2006). 
A potential problem for comparison between the two countries is the issue of 
ethnocultural fragmentation, which is larger in Guatemala than in Bolivia (Alesina, et al. 
                                                 
2 The Human Development Index is a measure of socioeconomic development that combines gross 
domestic product with education and life expectancy indicators (UNDP 2006). 
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2003; Fearon 2003). The fact that a very large proportion (43%) of those individuals who 
identify as indigenous are Mayan-language monolingual3 seems to reinforce the idea of a 
large ethno-linguistic fragmentation of the indigenous population of Guatemala. 
Alternatively, Bolivia shows an indigenous population much more integrated in cultural 
and linguistic terms; despite the existence of at least 36 different indigenous languages, 
most indigenous people in Bolivia speak Spanish, and the proportion of people who are 
monolingual in one of the native tongues is rather small (Molina B. and Albó 2006)4. 
Despite the appropriate setting for comparative analysis that they offer, the 
comparisons between the two countries are scarce. Among the few examples, Andersson, 
Gibson and Lehoucq studied the effect of municipal decentralization on sustainable 
management of natural resources (2006); Moreno studied the relationship between 
ethnicity and attachment to the national political community (Moreno 2008); 
Pascharopoulos looked at the relationship between ethnicity and education 
(Pascharopoulos 1993); and Thorp, Caumartin and Gray-Molina looked at the 
relationship between ethnicity, inequality and violence (2006). 
 
Level of analysis 
What is the best level of analysis for understanding the political success or failure 
of indigenous participation in national politics? To me, this is not an either-or problem; 
                                                 
3 In the 2002 Census, 68.3% of indigenous people lived in rural areas; 43.6% of them were Mayan 
monolingual. 1 in every 3 women and 1 in every 4 men were illiterate. 
4 For the effects of this research, the main point is the polarization between indigenous and non-indigenous 
in the two countries, as chapter II discusses. Even though fragmentation is higher in Guatemala, 
indigenous, as the category grouping the distinctive particular identities is a relevant category in both 
countries. That means that we can speak of a single indigenous category in both countries. This is a way of 
getting around the issue of differences in fragmentation at the linguistic level. 
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considered separately, neither the aggregate nor the individual levels of analysis can 
provide us with an adequate explanation of such a complex phenomenon. This research 
requires that both the individual and the national level of analysis be considered. By 
focusing on the relationship between ethnic identification and national politics, the 
research question itself combines the two levels of analysis. The individual level, where 
ethnic identification takes place, allows us to observe the relationship between ethnic 
identification and political factors independently from other socioeconomic factors. The 
national level is the scenario of success or failure of indigenous politics, and is useful in 
finding general patterns in the relationship between ethnic minority identities and the 
national political community.  
This research transits from the individual to the national level of analysis and 
back to individuals as a strategy for making cross-level inferences. This strategy allows 
for the consideration of individual’s characteristics which might also assist in explaining 
phenomena at the national level. I also employ multi-level statistical analysis, which 
combines individual and country level characteristics in a single model. 
 
Data 
Survey data employed here come from Vanderbilt University’s Latin American 
Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). LAPOP has an amazingly rich database with survey 
studies conducted in Bolivia since 1998 and in Guatemala since 19945. Decades of 
                                                 
5 For more information on the Bolivian studies see (Ames, et al. 2004; Seligson 1999; Seligson 2003; 
Seligson, et al. 2006; Seligson and Moreno 2006; Seligson, Moreno and Schwarz 2005); on the 
Guatemalan surveys see (Azpuru and Pira 2006; Seligson, Joel Jutkowitz and Lucas 1995; Seligson, et al. 
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experience designing and conducting surveys are involved in the production of these 
data, guaranteeing the quality of the product. Data are comparable cross-nationally (a 
total of 22 different countries were included in the project in 2006-7) and also are 
comparable across time, providing a useful instrument for studying political processes 
diachronically and across different contexts. 
Aside from survey data, I employ qualitative information gathered during 
fieldwork activities in Bolivia and Guatemala between 2006 and 2007. This information 
was obtained through interviews and focus groups meetings held with different types of 
respondents. The complementation of survey data treated quantitatively, and qualitative 
information gathered in the field allows for the development of explanations that without 
losing their scientific appeal through generalizability, are also ‘thick’ enough as to 
account for contextual particularities. 
 
Description of chapters 
The second chapter of this dissertation proposes a working definition of ethnic 
identity and compares and discusses different empirical measures of ethnic identity 
employed in the LAPOP surveys. Ethnic identities are conceptualized as social constructs 
which are fluid and malleable, and are not necessarily stable across time. The focus of the 
empirical comparison of this chapter is identification with the indigenous category in 
Bolivia and Guatemala. Ethnic identities seem more stable and consistent across 
measures in Guatemala, while in Bolivia different measures produce large differences in 
                                                                                                                                                 
2000a; Seligson, et al. 1998; Seligson, et al. 2000b). For more information on LAPOP, visit the center’s 
website at www.lapopsurveys.org.  
 14
the results. The necessity of adding a qualitative component to quantitative survey studies 
is highlighted in this chapter as a strategy for understanding identity contents, or what 
identity categories mean for people. A methodological tool developed as part of this 
project and tested in the field is proposed as an alternative for bridging quantitative and 
qualitative methods in the field. Appendix A of this dissertation presents a detail of the 
instrument employed and the results obtained. 
The third chapter focuses on patterns of ethnic identification across time in the 
two countries; data show that the proportion of people who identify as indigenous has 
been growing consistently in Bolivia during the last decade, while the relative number of 
indigenous in Guatemala seems to be decreasing. The hypothesis discussed in this 
chapter is that it is the political success of the indigenous movement in Bolivia which 
makes the indigenous category appealing for individuals, and that people enter and leave 
the mestizo category depending on the sociopolitical context. Case selection offers a 
quasi-experimental design, which allows for the minimization of variance in the 
independent variables while the dependent variable, identification as indigenous, varies 
across countries and across time. Data from LAPOP’s surveys are used to show that there 
is, in fact, a correlation between political engagement variables and indigenous 
identification in present time Bolivia which is absent in Guatemala and was much weaker 
in previous studies in the Andean nation. 
The causes for the success of indigenous politics in Bolivia and its failure in 
Guatemala are discussed in chapter four of this dissertation. Two historical factors are 
hypothesized to be behind this difference in political performance: First, the armed 
conflict in Guatemala which negatively affected civil society in that country, and had a 
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particularly pernicious effect on indigenous organizations and their leaders; second, the 
municipal decentralization process in Bolivia, which opened the opportunity for landslide 
participation from grassroots organizations into local politics, and finally contributed to 
the political consolidation of the Movimiento Al Socialismo. Qualitative data gathered in 
the field in the two countries, and survey data from LAPOP’s databank, suggest that this 
explanation is at least plausible. 
The fifth and final chapter takes on the complete 22 country database of LAPOP’s 
2006 AmericasBarometer, exploring the relationship between ethnic minority status and 
the national political community. Different hypotheses are tested at the individual and the 
national level, and the findings suggest that, with the exception of a very few countries, 
individuals who identify as part of an ethnic minority do not have a weaker attachment to 
the nation than do other individuals. This finding supports the constructivist definition of 
ethnic identity employed in this research. A multi-level analysis is employed to test for 
interaction terms between national and individual level variables. Results suggest that the 
effect of ethnic minority status on attachment to the national political community is 
conditioned by the level of ethnocultural fractionalization existent in each country. 
 
 
 16
CHAPTER II 
 
THE MEASUREMENT OF ETHNIC IDENTITY IN SURVEY 
RESEARCH 
 
What is the best way of measuring ethnic identity? A critical step for this 
dissertation is to adequately conceptualize and measure its central variable: ethnic 
identity. This chapter explores different measures of ethnic identity employed in survey 
studies, focusing on their empirical correlations in the case of indigenous identity in 
Bolivia and Guatemala. A methodology that combines survey data and focus groups is 
presented as an alternative which combines quantitative and qualitative methodological 
approaches.  
The theoretical conceptualization and empirical measurement of ethnic identities 
is a subject of much debate and argumentation in the social sciences. The lack of clarity 
in this crucial methodological issue has significant implications, binging along confusion 
and contradicting evidence resulting in policy decisions and academic conclusions 
likewise faulty and contradicting. An initial primordial understanding of ethnicity as a 
basic and thus more profound loyalty between individuals is currently being challenged 
by a conception of ethnicity as a social construct, with much more nuanced relationships 
within the political sphere. However, virtually all sources of quantitative information 
(e.g. census data) still use simple ‘labels’ as ethnic categories; this limitation adds to the 
confusion and makes the development of an empirical measure of ethnicity coterminous 
with the theoretical concept a cry-out need for the advance of knowledge in the field. 
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This section tries to contribute to this problem by analyzing the meanings and 
implications that different measures of ethnicity have for people. This is done by 
combining high quality quantitative information (i.e.: survey data from the Latin 
American Public Opinion Project at Vanderbilt University) with qualitative data 
produced by the researcher in focus groups conducted with people of different ethnic 
identities in Latin America.  
 
Measuring Ethnic Identity 
 
Measuring What? On the Concept of Ethnic Identity 
 
By definition, any valid measure requires that the concept which is being 
measured be defined previously in a clear way; no measure can be established without the 
existence of at least a basic theoretical construct. Even nominal categories require the 
assumption of some underlying concept (Graham 1971; Peters 1998). In fact, the 
existence and use of measures without clear concepts was one of the most relevant 
problems that the sub-field of comparative politics had three or four decades ago (Sartori 
1970), and conceptual definition was, more generally, problematic throughout the social 
sciences (Sartori, Riggs and Teune 1975). While there are still ‘gray areas’ of conceptual 
obscurity, major improvements have been made since then, and the capacities of social 
scientists for building concepts that are consistent and coherent have developed greatly6. 
                                                 
6 On the process of concept construction see, among others, (Goertz 2006; Sartori 1984). 
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One of these remaining obscure areas is the study of identity. There is a 
multiplicity of meanings attributed to the word ‘identity’, resulting in notorious confusion 
(Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Fearon 1999). Correspondingly, the number of ways of 
empirically registering phenomena that are characterized as ‘identity’ is also abundant; in 
the social sciences identity is usually related to categories (or ‘labels’) in which 
individuals are grouped (so in the social sciences we almost invariably refer to social or 
collective identities). 
Adjectivizing identity, adding ‘ethnic’ to identity, restricts the scope of the 
concept to identity categories related to ethnicity, simplifying things greatly. The concept 
of ethnicity evolved from an initial understanding of ethnicity as natural and primordial 
characteristic of people, to an almost generalized constructivist consensus7. 
Primordialism implies identities in which people are born into and which define stronger 
loyalties than other potential identities, such as the national one (Rabushka and Shepsle 
1972; Stack 1986; Van Evera 2001); this theoretical approach derives initially from the 
work of anthropologist Clifford Geertz (Geertz 1963; Geertz 1973), but gained wide 
popularity in the social sciences, and particularly in political science. Also, ‘common 
knowledge’, or the way in which common people usually think of ethnic identities, is 
basically primordialist, as certain behaviors are usually expected from people according 
to their visible ethnic markers. 
                                                 
7 A third alternative, ethno-symbolism, as it is usually termed, is the theoretical perspective developed by 
Anthony Smith, is sometimes considered as a mid-point between primordialism and constructivism 
(Malesevic 2004; Smith 1986; Smith 1991). However, this perspective also departs form traditional 
primordialist positions and contains at least some element of constructivism in it, so I also consider it as a 
rejection of the primordial understanding of ethnic identity. 
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Primordial understandings of ethnic identities have been increasingly discredited 
in the social sciences, and the way in which we now understand these identities is as 
social constructs8. Identities are not ‘natural’, but socially constructed; relatively arbitrary 
markers or attributes are employed by people as identification criteria, and this 
identification is contingent to the historical context (Abdelal, et al. 2006; Chandra 2001; 
Chandra 2006; Laitin 1998). As chapter III of this dissertation shows, the constructed 
nature of ethnic identity results in that identities are not necessarily stable over time, and 
that political factors also play a relevant role in defining identification with a particular 
characteristic9. 
Accordingly to the evolution of the concept in the field of comparative politics, 
the definition of ethnic identity refers to identity categories in which membership is 
defined on the basis of descent. Chandra analyzes the way in which the term is used in 
comparative politics, and her definition aims at seeking disciplinary consensus; in her 
own words, ethnic identities are: 
“a subset of identity categories in which eligibility for membership is 
determined by attributes associated with, or believed to be associated with, 
descent” (Chandra 2006:398). 
This wording reflects the basic definition of ethnic identity that I employ in this 
chapter. The emphasis added (by me) to the fact that there are attributes relevant to the 
formation of ethnic identities that are not necessarily associated with descent but believed 
to be associated with descent is particularly relevant by adding an explicit socially 
constructed element to the definition. A particular attribute (such as regional origins, 
                                                 
8 For a good review of the idea of construction of identities see (Cerulo 1997). 
9 On how identities change over time see also (Chandra and Laitin 2002; Hoddie 2006). 
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religion, language, physical appearance, or culture) does not necessarily need to be linked 
to descent (in which case the concept would resemble a primordialist definition), but has 
to be thought of by people as linked to descent. 
The problem with this definition is that eligibility for membership does not 
necessarily mean membership; we are talking about ethnic categories, not about social 
groups (as in the old class-for-itself vs. class-by-itself in Marxian theory) (Brubaker 
2004), but in order to make categories operationlizable, we need to transform them into 
groups.  
This definition seems more useful for the aggregate-level analysis (in the study of 
categories themselves) than for individual level analysis (in which membership to groups 
is a characteristic of individuals). Adding complexity, ethnic identity of any given 
individual can be subjective, i.e.: assumed by the individual, or attributed by others. 
There is nothing in the definition that restricts membership to identity categories as either 
self-ascription or as categorization by others. In consequence, Chandra’s definition 
describes what constitutes ethnic identity categories, but falls short of specifying who 
actually belongs to a given category. 
In order to make it operationalizable, it is necessary to specify in the definition 
who defines membership. Three possibilities emerge: a) imposed identity, i.e.: letting 
other people define the membership of any given person to a category based on his or her 
attributes; b) letting some of the attributes define membership; and c) allowing each 
individual to identify herself.  
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Imposed or attributed identity (a) is entirely dependent on how other people 
perceive a person; while this mechanism of classification is likely to have some effect on 
individuals’ interpersonal relations, it is obviously unviable in operational terms (at least 
for medium and large N analyses). Defining identity on the basis of attributes themselves 
(b) poses the problem of a lack of direct correspondence between attributes and identity 
categories (not all speakers of any given language are part of the ethnic group who speaks 
it generally); this possibility is discussed more thoroughly in the empirical section of this 
chapter, when the measurement of ethnic identity is considered. The only viable 
alternative seems to be c), letting the individual declare his or her own membership to 
some identity category; that is, to identify herself with one or more categories. 
The definition of ethnic identification, this self-ascription to an ethnic identity, 
can be written paraphrasing Chandra in light of what has been discussed in the following 
way: 
Ethnic identification is the self-ascription of individuals to identity categories 
determined by attributes associated with, or believed to be associated with, 
descent. 
Some caveats have to be pointed out in relation to this definition. First, the 
definition of categories is a particularly sensitive issue. There are a number of relevant 
ethnic identity categories in each country or region, and the sets of categories are 
products of social and political processes. Defining these categories is usually a 
prerogative of the State based on the existence of self-recognized groups, but this process 
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is not value-free or politically neutral (Nobles 2000). So definition of categories itself is 
part of the sensitive – and political – process of construction of ethnic identities. 
Secondly, ethnic identities are highly relational: How any given person self-
identifies depends greatly on the context in which the act of self-identification takes 
place. Someone can feel part of her town or tribal origins when interacting with someone 
from another similarly local space; the same person can feel part of a regional or cultural 
identity which includes two different tribes or villages when interacting with someone 
from another region; the same person can also recognize her national origins when facing 
people from different nations; and the same individual can also appeal to a larger regional 
identity (such as African or Latino) in a context such as the streets of any large occidental 
city in the world. Appiah gives a good example of the multiplicity of ethnic identities 
available to people when he discusses his own matri-lineal versus patri-lineal origins, his 
identity as Ghanaian, as African, and as a person of mixed-blood (Appiah 1992). 
Measurement of this contested concept has been heterogeneous. Most data, 
including most nationally representative data (e.g., census data) use simple labels as 
ethnic categories; these labels can become unquestioned ‘facts’ in domestic and 
international contexts and can be more the product of political decisions than the result of 
the scientific process of categorization. The result of using these simple labels is that 
scholars and policy makers often have a fundamentally flawed foundation on which to 
build their analyses (Chandra 2005; Laitin 2000). 
This approach for measuring ethnic identity is consistent with a primordial 
understanding of identities, and not with the more nuanced understanding of identities 
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preeminent in contemporary social science. We have learned that identities are not fixed 
‘natural’ categories, but social constructs, however, this finding has not been incorporated 
into the habitual practice of social scientists through empirical measures (Chandra 2001). 
The effort by Mozaffar, Scarrit and Galaich (2003) to develop constructivist measures of 
identities, the development of diversity indices capturing different dimensions of 
ethnicity (Fearon 2003), or the attempts to ‘model’ their change in time (Lustick, 
Miodownik and Eidelson 2004) are very interesting contributions, but do not fully 
resolve this issue given their focus on aggregate levels of analysis. The challenge for 
social sciences seems to be in transiting from essential (or primordial) categories of social 
grouping to constructivist categories that are operationally useful to capture reality 
without losing their theoretical appeal.  
 
Ethnic Identity Categories in Bolivia and Guatemala 
The definition of ethnic identity employed here is based on the existence of 
relevant categories into which individuals identify themselves. Pointing out the most 
relevant categories in the two countries studied is pertinent; the strategy of identifying 
politically relevant ethnic groups is suggested by Posner (2004). Of course, the level of 
aggregation employed for determining relevant categories is extremely important, as the 
discussion in the previous section makes clear; only the categories that are usually spoken 
of at the national level in Bolivia and Guatemala are discussed here. It is also important 
to make clear that the description of the categories presented does not imply any 
judgment about their legitimacy or any assertion about their origins; I simply give a brief 
description of the categories most commonly used at the national level in both countries. 
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Guatemala 
Two central ethnic identity categories appear as relevant in Guatemala, ladinos 
and indígenas. These two categories represent most of the population in the country, and 
form a bi-polar scenario with only two main ethnic identity categories (Adams and 
Bastos 2003). A third category, garífunas, composed of descendents of the African slaves 
brought to the Americas, compose a minimal proportion of the country’s population (less 
than 1%), so this category will not be considered in detail in this section. 
Guatemala’s indigenous population, (the indígenas category) are descendents of 
the different Mayan groups living in the territory of the country before the Spanish 
conquest in the 16th Century. According to the latest national census (2002), they make 
up for 39.3% of the national population. Currently, the census office recognizes 22 
different indigenous groups as census categories (Achi, Akateko, Awakateko, Ch'orti', 
Chuj, Itza', Ixil, Jakalteko (Popti'), Kaqchikel, K iche', Mam, Poqomam, Poqomchi', 
Q'anjob'al, Q'eqchi', Sakapulteko, Tektiteko, Tz'utujil, Uspanteko, Xinka). Many 
indigenous people live in relatively closed and isolated rural communities, what 
anthropologists have called ‘closed corporate communities’ (Wolf 1957). 
Ladino on the other hand, basically means ‘non-indigenous’. 'Ladino' meant 
Spanish speaking Indian during the colonial period; ladinos were Mayans who 
assimilated national language and culture. By the time of independence, the term meant 
'mestizo'; after that it meant only non-culturally indigenous; the castas system, which 
established a system of differentiation based on percentage of Indian blood, became 
unviable after a few centuries because of mixing. Indians and ladinos were significant 
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categories throughout Central America, but persisted only in Guatemala (Smith 1990a). 
Ladino is an identity category constructed officially by the State and linked to citizenship 
privileges (Rodas Nuñez 2006).  
Guatemala has notorious differences between indigenous and ladinos in terms of 
socioeconomic status. Indigenous individuals and communities are usually amongst the 
poorest in the country, and their levels of access to education and other services, and 
more generally, access to the benefits of the modern Guatemalan State, is significantly 
lower than those of average ladinos; indigenous women have particularly low levels of 
education (Adams 2005; Adams and Bastos 2003; Pascharopoulos 1993). Ladino and 
indígena, then, are ethnic identity categories which also imply strong differences in 
socioeconomic status; they are categories which not only name, but also stratify 
Guatemalan society. 
These categories are assumed to be cultural, but also racial; people usually think 
of ethnic differences in Guatemala both as cultural differences and as racial differences 
(Smith 1998). There is also some correspondence between area of residence and ethnic 
identity; indigenous people are geographically concentrated in some areas, particularly in 
the country’s western territories.   
Some observers have noticed an activation of the Maya identity during the last 
two decades. This also created a negative reaction among many ladinos, who felt in risk 
of being discriminated and treated unfairly with the emergence of a potentially powerful 
political movement (Hale 2005; Warren 1998). Claims of the sort of ‘no hay indios ni 
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ladinos, todos somos guatemaltecos’ (there are no indigenous nor ladinos, we are all 
Guatemalans) (Esquit Choy and Galvez Borell 1997) are part of this response.  
In Guatemala, until the 1994 census, ethnic identity was defined by the 
interviewer during the data gathering process (Adams 1996). Only since the 2002 census 
have citizens had the opportunity to identify themselves with some of the available 
categories (a list of all indigenous groups is presented to the respondent). 
 
Bolivia 
In contrast with the Guatemalan case, Bolivia shows three major ethnic identity 
categories: indígena u originario (indigenous), mestizo (mixed), and blanco (white). 
While indígena is the word which refers to indigenous people in the Eastern region of the 
country, originario is the equivalent used in the Andes (Calla 2003; Molina B. and Albó 
2006). A fourth category, afroboliviano, or African-Bolivian, applies to the black 
community living mainly in the Yungas area of La Paz, but their share of the national 
population is minimal. 
According to the latest national census (2001), 62% of the national population 
should be coded as indigenous. However, this figure results from the use of a question 
which does not offer the categories mestizo and blanco as options, but are included in the 
option ‘none’ (the exact wording of the question and the national figures are discussed in 
detail in the next section of this chapter). This methodological decision has received a lot 
of criticism in the country, and has generated a long lasting debate on how the census 
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question should be asked and what proportion of the national population should be coded 
as indigenous10. 
There are about 30 different ethnic groups coded as indigenous, but only two of 
them, Quechuas and Aymaras, have more than a million members out of a population of 
approximately nine million Bolivians. The census question offers Quechua, Aymara, 
Guarani, Chiquitano, Mojeño, and other native ethnicities as response options for 
citizens. 
White, or blanco, is a category employed by people who assume to be 
descendents of the Spanish conquerors or of migrants who arrived from Europe. As 
chapter III of this dissertation shows, the proportion of people who identify as whites in 
the country has been declining during the last years11, which seems to be related to the 
political success of the indigenous movement in the country. 
Mestizo is an ethnic identity category which implies that the person has both 
white (Spanish) and indigenous blood; the origins of this question are clearly racial, 
though some observers have attempted to imply cultural mixture. The classification from 
which mestizo comes from is the castas system imposed by the Spanish colony, which 
organized society along hierarchically distinct ethnic categories. Mestizo has traditionally 
meant a departure from the indigenous category, and has been employed often as a 
category that allows people to socially ascend through hierarchically distinct ethnic 
categories anchored in the colonial horizon (De La Cadena 2000; Harris 1995; Rivera C. 
                                                 
10 This national debate has been taking place in different periodical publications and books. For some 
examples of the debate see (Albó 2004; Laserna 2004; Lavaud 2007; Lavaud and Lestage 2002; Moreno 
2006; Moreno 2007b; Seligson, et al. 2005). 
11 On this particular issue see (Moreno 2006). 
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1993). Additionally, the national project that emerged from the national revolution of 
1952 was based on the universality of the mestizaje (in a similar sense as in Mexico). 
The existence of the mestizo category in Bolivia makes a difference in relation to 
Guatemala’s bipolar ethnic categorization; the existence of the mestizo as a majority 
category is similar to what Degler has named the ‘mulatto escape hatch’ in his 
comparison of Brazil and the United States (Degler 1971). Mestizo offers the possibility 
of being neither white nor indigenous, paraphrasing Degler’s title. 
 
Indigenous as the focus of the analysis 
The analysis of different measures employed for measuring indigenous ethnic 
identity in Bolivia and Guatemala is employed as a strategy for discussing measures of 
ethnic identity in general. I have selected the indigenous category as the focus of analysis 
of this research for several reasons. First, the emergence of indigenous politics has been 
particularly relevant in the region during the last couple of decades, as the introduction of 
this dissertation explains. Second, the proportion of indigenous people in both countries 
is subject of debate and discussion in academic and political circles. Third, indigenous is 
the only category present in both countries, so this category allows for a full comparison 
between the two cases of study. 
The definition of who is indigenous has received a lot of attention from 
academics, international organizations, and from indigenous communities themselves 
(Anaya 1996; Brysk 2000; Corntassel 2003). Most of the definitions are based on the 
ideas of ancestry and cultural differences and historical sequences (Corntassel 2003; Gurr 
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1993; Riggs 1998; Wilmer 1993), but also on the idea of being conquered by another 
society (Riggs 1998; Wilmer 1993); for some others, the debate on what is indigenous is 
a matter of justice, by identifying people who have been wronged by colonialism (Metz 
2006).  
This research does not attempt to discuss the different definitions of indigenous 
nor to define the term itself. Indigenous is a relevant ethnic identity category, and what 
matters is self-identification of individuals into this category. The last section of the 
chapter, however, discusses the qualitative results from the fieldwork activities, in which 
the idea of what is to be indigenous was discussed with people who identify as such. 
 
Measuring Indigenous Identity in the LAPOP Studies 
Using data from the 2006 round of surveys conducted by LAPOP in Bolivia and 
Guatemala, different approaches for the measurement of indigenous identity are 
discussed in this section. Surveys were conducted over nationally representative samples 
in both countries, resulting in a database of 4,506 observations, 3,008 interviews in 
Bolivia and 1,498 in Guatemala. Results presented in this section include information on 
the characteristics of the sample for adequate calculation of standard errors and 
confidence intervals. 
 
Categorical measures 
The first measure considered is a categorical measure that derives from a simple 
survey question in which the respondent chooses an identity category from a list. Do you 
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consider yourself ‘white’, ‘black’, ‘indigenous’, or ‘mixed’? With some variations in the 
possible categories and the way in which the question is framed, this is the most common 
way in which survey research measures ethnic identity12.  
The proportion of people who identify as indigenous in this question is 39.2% in 
Guatemala, and 20.2% in Bolivia (which combines the indígena and originario options). 
Results are presented in Table 1 under categorical variable 1. 
A different question was also asked in the two countries, one that asks about 
particular indigenous identity categories, specifying the ethnic group13. The wording in 
each case followed exactly the wording used by each national census office. In 
Guatemala, the proportion of people who could be coded as indigenous under this second 
measure (33.2%) does not differ drastically from what had been found using the basic 
categorical measure described above. The correlation between the two variables is large 
and statistically significant (r=.84, p<.001), as Table 1 shows. 
It is in Bolivia where the results vary in a dramatic way. Under the basic 
categorical measure, almost 20% of all Bolivians identify as indigenous, while 66.6% 
classifies themselves as mestizos; under the question that specifies the ethnic group (and 
excludes the mestizo option), almost 72% of all Bolivians identify as indigenous. As 
could be expected by these drastic differences, the correlation between the two variables 
is low (r=.25). 
                                                 
12 In Guatemala, the question asked was: ¿Usted se considera ...? Indígena, Ladino, Garífuna, Otro. In 
Bolivia, the exact wording was: Ud. se considera una persona de raza blanca, chola, mestiza,  indígena, 
negra u originaria. 
13 In Guatemala, the question asked was: ¿A qué grupo étnico (pueblo) pertenece?, offering a list of 22 
possible indigenous plus ladino, none, and other. In Bolivia, the census question asks: ¿Se considera 
perteneciente a alguno de los siguientes pueblos originarios o indígenas? Offering 5 indigenous identities, 
plus other native and ninguno (none). 
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Table 1. Percentage of people coded as indigenous in Bolivia and Guatemala 
according to two different categorical variables 
 Categorical 
variable 1 
Categorical 
variable 2 
Correlation between 
variables 
Guatemala 39.2% 33.2% .84 
Bolivia 20.2 72% .25 
 Source: LAPOP 2006 
 
The use of different questions has an enormous effect on the results obtained 
using two different questions in Bolivia, but not in Guatemala, where the two measures 
appear to be more robust and mutually reinforcing. The absence of the mestizo category, 
added to the direct reference to specific ethnic groups, impact drastically the 
measurement of ethnic identity. 
 
Language Spoken as a Measure of Ethnic Identity 
One of the cultural attributes usually related to ethnic identity is language. 
Members of an indigenous group are usually assumed to be speakers of the group’s 
language. Language is often used as an indicator of ethnic and cultural diversity, and as a 
marker of ethnic identity categories (See, for example, Alesina, et al. 2003; Fearon 2003; 
Horowitz 1985).  
The LAPOP 2006 survey asks the respondent about his or her mother tongue, the 
language in which he or she first started communicating14. The use of indigenous 
languages is, in general, more common in Bolivia than in Guatemala, as Table 2 shows. 
Indigenous languages are spoken in Bolivia by both indigenous and non-indigenous 
                                                 
14 Respondents were asked what language they spoke at home during childhood. 
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people; around half of all Bolivians are bilingual, while less than one in five Guatemalans 
speak both an indigenous language as well as Spanish.  
 
Table 2: Languages spoken during childhood, 
by indigenous identification and by country 
 Guatemala Bolivia 
Indigenous ID* Indigenous Non-
indigenous 
Total Indigenous Non-
indigenous 
Total 
Only indigenous 
language 17% 1% 7.3% 18.9% 5.4% 8.1% 
Spanish and 
indigenous language 39.9% 3.3% 17.6% 65% 46.3% 50.1% 
Only Spanish 43.1% 95.7% 75.2% 16.1% 48.3% 41.8% 
* Groups defined based on categorical variable 1 in Table1. 
Source: LAPOP 2006 
 
The relationship between ethnic identity and language spoken during childhood 
shows ambiguous patterns. In Bolivia, more than half of those who identify as non-
indigenous speak an indigenous language (around 52% speak either only an indigenous 
language or both indigenous language and Spanish). In Guatemala, on the other hand, the 
use of indigenous languages is restricted almost exclusively to individuals who identify 
as indigenous; only 4.3% of those who identify as non-indigenous speak a Mayan 
language. Figure 1 below shows the relationship between language spoken and 
indigenous identity (measured with categorical variable 1). 
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Figure 1: Relationship between language spoken and indigenous identity in Bolivia 
and Guatemala 
 
The relationship between language spoken and indigenous identity varies 
significantly between the two countries. In Bolivia, the effect of the three-point language 
scale is lineal on identification as indigenous, and being bilingual is a mid-point between 
Spanish and indigenous language monolingual speakers. Alternatively in Guatemala, 
speaking an indigenous language seems to be linked in a much more direct way with 
indigenous identity. 
 
Graded Measure of Indigenous Identity 
Measuring identity through a graded measure has been proposed as an alternative 
in the literature, under the theoretical assumption that identities can be thought of as a 
continuum between being part of that category and not being part (Brady and Kaplan 
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2000; Kaplan and Brady 2004). The LAPOP 2006 surveys included a question which 
asks how strongly the respondent identifies with the country’s indigenous culture15. 
The average value for this measure is higher in Guatemala than in Bolivia (73.5 
versus 48.1), but the standard deviation is also larger (32.8 and 28.6 respectively). This 
suggests that there is less variation in this variable in the Andean country when compared 
to the Central American one. If this variable would measure indigenous identity 
consistently with categorical measure of identity, we would expect high variability, with 
high values for some people (the individuals who identify as indigenous), and very low 
average values for non-indigenous.  
Figure 2 below suggests that the relationship between this graded measure and the 
first categorical variable discussed in this chapter is clearer in Guatemala than in Bolivia. 
 
                                                 
15 In Guatemala, the Mayan culture was the term employed. In Bolivia, respondents were asked about the 
Quechua and the Aymara cultures separately; I averaged the two questions for producing the national 
measure of identification indigenous culture. Questions were originally coded on a 1 to 7 scale, in which 1 
meant ‘very little’ and 7 ‘very much’; I recoded the variables into a 100 point scale for easier presentation. 
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Figure 2: Relationship between graded and categorical measures of 
indigenous identity in Bolivia and Guatemala 
 
A perfect relationship between a binary categorical measure and a graded measure 
would resemble a sigmoid curve (an S shaped curve). Despite being far from perfect, the 
relationship appears in a much clearer way in Guatemala than in Bolivia. Additionally, 
the correlation that this variable has with the linguistic indicator is much higher in 
Guatemala (r=.55; p<.001) than in Bolivia (r=.29; p<.001). Guatemala shows once again 
a higher consistency between measures than Bolivia. 
Another possibility of establishing a graded measure of ethnic identity is the 
construction of multi-dimensional scales that combine different ‘dimensions’ of identity 
into a single indicator. A good example of this methodology is given in the scale that 
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combines self-identification and language spoken using census data in Bolivia (Molina B. 
and Albó 2006); along those lines, it is possible to think of an indigenous identity scale in 
the two countries of attention which combines self-identification and language spoken.  
The ordinal variable resulting from this exercise has a 4 point scale with the 
following values: identifies as indigenous and speaks an indigenous language; identifies 
but does not speak; speaks an indigenous language but does not identify; and does not 
identify nor speak an indigenous language. The order of the second and third categories is 
not self-evident (who is more indigenous? someone who identifies as such but does not 
speak the language, or someone who speaks the language since childhood but does not 
identify as indigenous); however, I assume that self-identification is a more relevant 
indicator of identity than language, so I put those who identify as indigenous but do not 
speak an indigenous language closer to the indigenous extreme in the scale. Figure 3 
below shows the proportion of people coded into each category in both countries. 
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  Source: LAPOP 2006 
Figure 3: Distribution of the bi-dimensional scale of indigenousness in 
Bolivia and Guatemala 
 
The distribution varies substantially between the two countries. The most 
noticeable difference is in the proportion of people who speak an indigenous language 
but do not identify as indigenous, which in Bolivia is the largest category, while in 
Guatemala it is the smallest.  
The relationship of this variable with the other measures of indigenous identity 
discussed so far is consistently strong, though it also presents some variation between the 
two countries (being stronger in Guatemala than in Bolivia). This bi-dimensional scale of 
indigenousness has a correlation of .33 with the grade measure of indigenous identity in 
Guatemala, while this correlation is .32 in Bolivia. With the language variable, the 
correlation is .74 in Guatemala and .65 in Bolivia; the correlation with the first 
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categorical measure of indigenous identity is .96 in Guatemala and .89 in Bolivia (all 
correlations significant at the .001 level). 
 
Discussion 
Different measures of indigenous identity have been presented in this chapter. Out 
of these, which one better measures the concept of ethnic identity as defined here? It 
seems that, just as in the measurement of many other concepts through surveys, no 
measurement is perfect, though they all capture some element of the concept. 
Despite its limitations, survey research has some advantages in relation to other 
forms of studying ethnic identity. First, asking the respondent about his or her 
identification in a survey setting greatly reduces the relational differential by which 
contextual features determine ethnic identification. All respondents are asked the exact 
same question and face a similar type of interviewer (i.e.: someone from a socioeconomic 
background as close to the respondent’s as possible) in or near the respondents’ place of 
residence. In other words, all observations are treated similarly, with no particular bias 
resulting from the interview process. 
Second, survey research captures conscious identification, and not latent identity. 
I have defined the concept of ethnic identity not in objective terms, but in relation to a 
conscious decision of individuals of identifying as part of some category. In this sense, 
asking individuals about how they identify themselves is one of the few viable 
alternatives for measuring this explicitly conscious identification to which the concept 
refers. 
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And that takes me to discussing the measures treated here, particularly the one 
that employs language as measure of identification. Looking into an objective attribute 
(language) does not refer directly to how individuals identify themselves, so language 
could not be considered as a valid measure of indigenous identity. The relationship 
between language and ethnic identity is problematic; since early studies it has been 
shown that there is no direct connection between objectively defined cultural traits (such 
as language) and ethnicity (Barth 1969)16. For example, in the particular case of Central 
America, it has been demonstrated that there are native speakers of Mayan languages in 
Mexico’s Yucatan peninsula who reject being called indigenous and who do not identify 
as Maya (Gabbert 2004). 
Language could be employed as a proxy for indigenous identity in some cases. 
Though this could be an acceptable strategy in Guatemala where the relationship between 
self-identification and language is closer than in Bolivia, it is important to highlight the 
fact that language does not measure identity per se, but that in some contexts could be 
correlated with it. 
Part of the previous argument could be applied to the bi-dimensional measure 
discussed here, insofar as it combines language as an indicator with self-identity. 
However, the fact that this variable includes self-identity (and as a result of this its 
correlation with that variable is very high) suggests that this variable could be used as an 
alternative which combines objective and subjective elements; the definition of ethnic 
                                                 
16 On the normative side, see the persuasive work by Appiah in which the relationship between culture, 
ethnicity, and identity is discussed (Appiah 2006). 
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identity based on self identification, though, would have to be reconsidered in order to 
employ this measure. 
Graded measures seem to work well as measures of identification with an 
indigenous culture. They capture the self-identification dimension clearly, and they 
correspond to a gradual understanding of identity, consistent with the constructivist 
definition of the concept. There is, however, a validity problem that would have to be 
addressed before using this type of graded measure as valid measures of ethnic identity: 
The wording of this question implies identification with some indigenous culture, and 
this does not necessarily mean identification with an ethnic category; i.e.: someone can 
by sympathetic with some culture without feeling part of the group who practices it. The 
fact that the graded measure discussed here does not behave as expected in relation to 
categorical variables in the particular case of Bolivia could be a manifestation of lack of 
validity of the measure. 
Finally, categorical measures of ethnic identity seem to simultaneously solve the 
problem of self-identification existent in the language measures and the problem of 
inclusiveness in the identity category existent in the graded measure discussed here; the 
respondent identifies with a particular category in a subjective way, and this 
identification is determined in terms of being part of.  
There are two problems with this approach. First, the high sensitiveness to the 
categories offered to the respondent; the Bolivian case shows the enormous effect that 
adding or removing options in the wording of the question can have for the results. 
Second, that this measure defines belonging to identity categories in either or terms, 
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which is more consistent with the primordial understanding of ethnic identities than with 
the modern definition of the concept. These problems, however, seem to have somewhat 
easy solutions. The sensitiveness to the categories problem could be ameliorated by 
including as many relevant identity categories as options for the respondent. The second 
problem could be solved by not making options mutually exclusive, so the respondent 
can chose to identify with more than one category, if he or she has such a desire. This 
strategy has been employed successfully in the US and the Canadian census17, and has 
proven to be empirically viable. 
As a conclusion, it might be advisable for researchers interested in measuring 
ethnic identity in survey research to focus carefully on defining the categories available 
as options for the respondent in categorical measures, and designing the items as multiple 
response questions; this should be understood as the minimum requirement for measuring 
identity in survey settings. The inclusion of language items and graded measures of 
cultural belonging is also advisable if the researchers are interested in wider aspects of 
identity. 
Additionally, research strategies that combine survey data analysis with some 
form of qualitative research that allows us to better understand the pros and cons of each 
measure of ethnic identity seems highly desirable; during my field research, I have 
developed a strategy which allows for the combination of quantitative and qualitative 
methods. This strategy and its results are described in detail in the section below. 
                                                 
17 On the evolution of the census measurement in the United States see (Snipp 2003). 
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Articulating Quantitative and Qualitative Methods in the Study of Ethnic 
Identity 
After the consolidation of quantitative research in mainstream political science in 
the mid 1990s with the publication of Designing Social Inquiry (King, Keohane and 
Verba 1994), several authors have pointed to the importance of ‘rescuing’ qualitative 
methods as a central component of the discipline, and the discipline as a whole seems to 
have acknowledged this necessity (Brady and Collier 2004). The importance of 
articulating quantitative and qualitative research is at the core of the current disciplinary 
debate in Political Science. It is increasingly recognized that both approaches are 
necessary for the production of good quality social science, and that in many cases, the 
use of only one of them can provide inaccurate or incomplete explanations (Brady, 
Collier and Seawright 2006). 
Despite this growing agreement, the actual existence of methods that effectively 
combine quantitative and qualitative approaches is rare (Tarrow 2004). In many cases, 
multi-method research ends up being no more than an addition of bits and pieces of 
different methodological approaches. In other words, truly multi-method research 
strategies and tools are scarce. This scarcity is related to the great epistemological 
differences between quantitative and qualitative approaches. 
The combination of quantitative and qualitative research should be understood not 
in the framework of methodological orthodoxies, but on the face of the requirements of 
the object of study. Some research problems are better addressed with quantitative 
approaches which are able to provide evidence of causal inferences; while others may be 
better understood via ‘thick’ explanations, or the articulation of theory and evidence from 
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one or a few cases into a profound description of the mechanisms that guide social and 
political processes. Other research questions, probably most of them, require that at least 
some quantitative and qualitative information be combined into an explanation that is 
able to give an account of the particular specificities in a generalizable argument. How 
much of each methodological approach is employed in a research strategy means, at the 
end exists a trade-off by the researcher between width and depth; this trade-off can also 
be thought of as a compromise between richness in the contextual description and 
generalizability of the causal inference in a Popperian sense. 
My research question implies understanding what indigenous identity means for 
people; this is the identity content pointed out by some authors as a central element of 
identity categories (Abdelal, et al. 2006). Quantitative analyses of survey data allow me 
to identify patterns and relationships across countries and across time; but this approach 
does not provide the more interpretative perspective required for understanding what 
those identity categories and relationships mean for people. 
Considering this requirement of the research, I developed a methodological 
strategy which produces qualitative information based on quantitative data and patterns. 
As Sidney Tarrow puts it, this task consists of ‘putting qualitative flesh on quantitative 
bones’ (Tarrow 2004:176).  
This strategy, which could be termed Survey Responses Interpreted by Groups 
(SRIG), can be employed for different research projects based on survey data that are 
concerned with understanding what people mean when they answer survey questions 
without abandoning the generalizability potential of Large N analyses. In my own 
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research, SRIG was employed in the understanding of what identity categories employed 
in the statistical analyses of survey data really mean for people. 
Basically, the methodology consists of discussing with people how they 
understand the questions being asked during a normal survey interview, as well as the 
answers given by them in comparison with results from the population on which the 
survey was administered. Four steps are involved in the strategy: 1. Organization of the 
focus group; 2. Gathering data from participants of the group; 3. Presenting results to 
participants; and 4. Discussing results with them. These steps are described in detail 
below. 
 
Implementing the methodology in the field: The Bolivian experience 
 
Resources 
The resource requirements of this methodology are not very demanding. Having 
good contacts in the field, which allow for the selection of participants for the focus 
groups and for creating a sense of confidence between participants, is imperative. The 
presence of at least one research assistant in the field is also necessary, particularly for 
the phases of gathering data and presenting it to participants. Technologically, a laptop, a 
data projector, and a recorder are necessary for the implementation of the strategy. 
Additionally, this strategy implies a lot of on-the-go work entering data and producing 
charts and graphs quickly; therefore, a good and agile use of adequate software is also 
necessary. The actual meetings using this methodology last between 4 and 6 hours, so 
this time should be planned ahead. 
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Step 1: Organization 
The focus groups conducted in Bolivia were organized in municipalities with 
sizable proportions of indigenous population; additionally, each of the groups represents 
a different indigenous people (or represents large differences within an ethnic group as in 
the rural and urban Aymara groups). A total of 4 in-depth focus groups were conducted; 
the four groups conducted were: 1. Aymara speaking people in a rural setting in 
Yanacachi, Provincia Sud Yungas, La Paz. 2. Aymara speaking individuals in an urban 
setting in El Alto, Provincia Murillo, La Paz. 3. Rural Quechuas in Tapacarí, Provincia 
Tapacarí, Cochabamba. 4. Rural and urban Guaraní people in Camiri and Charagua, 
Provincia Cordillera, Santa Cruz. A map detailing the location of each municipality is 
included in appendix A of this dissertation18, which also includes a detailed account of 
the results produced in each session (in Spanish language). These municipalities were 
selected considering: a) the relevance of their population for the research in terms of 
quantity of mestizo and indigenous population; and b) the possibility of conducting 
research there given the accessibility and institutional contacts. 
With the support of Ciudadanía19 I contacted different local organizations in order 
to prepare the meetings and gather some potential participants for the working sessions. 
In Yanachachi, the focus group was organized with the support of Fundación Takesi, an 
NGO investing in local development in the Yungas region in La Paz. Work in El Alto 
was organized with the kind help of Asamblea Permanente de Derechos Humanos – El 
                                                 
18 All focus groups were conducted and summarized with the generous help of Miguel Villarroel in 
Cochabamba. 
19 Ciudadanía, comunidad de estudios sociales y acción pública, is a local Bolivian NGO based in 
Cochabamba with which I am associated. The support of Ciudadanía, with its institutional contacts, was 
crucial for the implementation of the SRIG focus groups in Bolivia. For more information on Ciudadania 
visit www.ciudadaniabolivia.org.  
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Alto, a human rights activist organization. The Tapacari focus group was conducted in 
Cochabamba with support from Ayllu Majasaya, the traditional indigenous authority, and 
Alex Fernandez, an economist and advisor to the ayllu. The work in Camiri was 
conducted with help from the Asamblea del Pueblo Guarani, the supra-communal 
organization of the Guarani people. 
The selection of participants attending each workshop was done considering the 
quality of the information that could be provided (local leaders were preferred, but I also 
insisted on having some non leader participants as a balance); after I had established 
contact with each of the local organizations that helped in the process, we discussed what 
kind of people were required for the process considering gender and geographic 
representation balance. 
 
Step 2: Gathering data from participants 
During the focus group, a set of questions from the 2006 national survey was 
administered to all participants as they arrived to the venue where the meeting would be 
held20. The presence of at least one research assistant is necessary here, for data have to 
be gathered from different individuals simultaneously. It is important to carefully select 
the questions to be administered, and the process should take at most 10 minutes per 
person; for example, if the focus group has 10 participants, a researcher and two 
assistants would take around half an hour to interview them. 
                                                 
20 The list and format of the questions used and the focus groups results are presented in appendix A.   
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During the time when participants introduce themselves and the methodology and 
goals of the meeting are explained to the participants, data are entered in the computer; 
while this could sound a little demanding for the team, entering 200 data points (20 
closed-ended questions administered to 10 participants) should not take more than a few 
minutes for a researcher experienced in tabulating data. Graphs and charts are produced 
immediately after the data have been entered running syntaxes previously written and 
tested.  
 
Step 3: Presenting information 
Graphs are presented to the group comparing their results with the national 
averages obtained for the same items; the researcher ‘reads’ the graph for the participants, 
who become used to the graphical presentation of the results. Graphing the question in a 
simple and intuitive way is crucial for getting participants motivated and willing to talk 
about the meaning that their answers have for them. A data projector is used for this part 
of the activity. Some of the graphs presented to participants are shown in the results 
section below. 
 
Step 4: Discussing results  
Immediately after each series of results are presented, participants are asked to 
explain why they had chosen the answers they chose; this triggers the dialogue between 
researchers and participants of the session. This methodology gets most participants 
deeply involved in the process, explaining and defending their responses and suggesting 
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different interpretations to the results and the questions themselves. An added value of 
this methodology is that participants compare their responses with the national averages 
presented to them, trying to explain the differences and also offering explanations for the 
national results. 
 
Results 
Among the most important results that I obtained from this research is the finding 
of empirical evidence that suggests that indigenous identity has, in fact, a very strong 
political content in Bolivia. I identified political references in 4 types of identity content 
(normative, purposive, relational, and cognitive content). This finding suggests the 
existence of a very strong link between the national political process and ethnic 
identification. 
For example, when asked to explain a stronger identification with the Aymara 
culture than the national average (see appendix A), participants to the Yanacachi meeting 
claimed that the Aymara culture is linked to using the Aymara language; and this use is 
also understood as a means of ‘resistance against the system’, understanding for that, 
resistance against the Bolivian State. Along the same lines, participants of the El Alto 
meeting go even further and claim that the Aymara Nation has never participated in the 
creation of the Bolivian State, and that is why an identification with Bolivian citizenship 
and Bolivian institutions is low among them. 
The idea of discrimination was also widely present in the meetings; indigenous 
are discriminated by blancos and mestizos, and this idea seems to be stronger in the 
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Aymara communities than among Quechuas and Guaranies. Participants in the El Alto 
group also often claim that, indigenous people exercise discrimination against blancos 
and mestizos, as a response to the discrimination suffered constantly by them. 
Identification as mestizo in the Aymara areas is seen as negative; mestizos are the 
ones who practice discrimination against the indigenous population, and are the visible 
representatives of the Bolivian state with its unjust and discriminatory practices. On the 
other side, Guarani and Quechua communities identify as mestizos, assuming that there is 
no blood purity in Bolivia and that most Bolivians are in fact a mix of indigenous and 
white ancestors; however, they feel that it is in their culture where their indigenous 
essence prevails.  
Identification with other indigenous cultures (such as the Quechua culture for the 
Aymara) is usually strong because they believe in a larger identity as indigenous, an 
identity by which they shared the same struggle against domination and they face similar 
discrimination and mistreatment in the country. Indigenous seems to exist, indeed, as a 
relevant category for the people beyond their particular ethnic identities. 
The difference between the terms indígena and originario are, as mentioned 
above, geographical. Indígena is the expression used in the eastern region, while 
originario refers to indigenous from the Andes. Both terms mean that the person 
descends directly from the people who lived in the same place since ancient times. The 
idea that the person is still linked to the local community and participates from the duties 
and responsibilities conferred by it is also a condition for being thought of as indigenous; 
those who emigrate from their communities cannot be considered indigenous anymore, 
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because they have broken their links with the land and the community. Guaranies, 
however, have a different point of view on this issue, claiming that most Guaranies, even 
when they emigrate, maintain their culture and world views; that is why, for them 
Guaranies are Guaranies anywhere they might be. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE POLITICAL CONSTRUCTION OF ETHNIC IDENTITY: 
INDIGENOUS IDENTITY IN BOLIVIA AND GUATEMALA21 
 
This chapter focuses on correlates of indigenous identities in Bolivia and 
Guatemala, paying special attention to political factors. In contrast to most political 
science research to date, this research focuses on ethnic identity as the dependent 
variable, and hypothesizes that political factors (and their absence) might help explain 
different patterns in ethnic identification over time. To do that, I use statistical methods 
applied to survey data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 
comparing results for the two cases in the study, and also comparing results across time 
in the case that currently presents the strongest example of a country with a politicized 
ethnic identity. 
 
The Puzzle 
The evidence that inspires this research shows that identity is in fact fluid and that 
it changes more rapidly than it is usually assumed. Figure 4 shows the percentage of 
people self-identifying as indigenous over a period of time in Bolivia and Guatemala. 
Data come from surveys applied on nationally representative samples that are comparable 
across time and cross-nationally, conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion 
Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University and described in the methods section. 
                                                 
21 Previous versions of this chapter were presented at the Midwest Political Science Association conference 
in Chicago, in April of 2007, where it benefitted from comments by Donna Lee Van Cott and other 
participants, and at the graduate seminar organized by the Center For the Americas, in March 2007, where 
it received comments from Vera Kutszinski and participants of the seminar. 
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Figure 4:  Percentage of people identifying as indigenous in Bolivia 
and Guatemala, 1998-2006 
 
Changes in the sample design were introduced in Guatemala in 2004 (so 2001 and 
2004 are not fully comparable). However, 1999 and 2001, and 2004 and 2006 are fully 
comparable and the differences are substantively relevant and statistically significant 
(p<.001) in the most recent comparison. Likewise, changes in the design of the question 
were introduced in the 2004 Bolivia questionnaire; however, 2004 and 2006 are fully 
comparable, and the difference is also large and statistically significant (p<.001). 
There is an additional piece of information that seems to confirm the trend in 
Bolivia. Figure 5 below shows the proportion of Bolivia’s national population that 
identifies as indigenous and as white between 1998 and 2006. It is evident that the 
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positive trend for indigenous identifications is linked to a negative one for identification 
as ‘blanco’ or ‘white’; at the same time, the ‘mestizo’ category has remained 
proportionally unchanged during this time period, with around 60% of respondents 
identifying with it22. 
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Figure 5: Percentage of people identifying as indigenous and white, Bolivia 1998-
2006 
 
What can explain ethnic identification and its changes across time? What can 
account for the differences in the patterns of ethnic identification in the two countries? 
                                                 
22 I have presented this evidence previously (Moreno 2006). Figures for the indigenous population do not 
correspond exactly to the Bolivian 2001 census results because the question used here is different from the 
census question; however, when the Bolivian Census Bureau (INE) question was applied to the LAPOP 
sample, results where similar to the official ones (Seligson, et al. 2006; Seligson, et al. 2005); chapter II 
discusses this issue more thoroughly. 
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My central hypothesis is that political factors related to the relative success of the 
indigenous movement are central for explaining these different patterns: In Bolivia, the 
proportion of people who identify as indigenous grows as a consequence of the success of 
indigenous politics (which is discussed in detail in chapter IV of this dissertation); many 
individuals who used to identify as white now identify as mestizo (a category which can 
be thought of as a middle path between white and indigenous), and many mestizos now 
identify as indigenous. In Guatemala, in contrast, a decrease in the proportion of 
indigenous identifiers can be explained by the lack of a successful politicized indigenous 
identity. 
 
A Working Definition of Ethnic Identity  
 
The definition of ethnicity that I employ in this research, i.e., a socially 
constructed system of differentiation based on descent (or in the belief of it) (Chandra 
2006; Gabbert 2006), implies that individuals can ‘choose’ their ethnic identity from a 
menu of possible options available to them. My central argument is that under some 
conditions that make an identity category contextually desirable, identification with this 
category will have a stronger political component than under the absence of these 
conditions.  
In the concrete settings of this study, I expect indigenous identity to have clear 
connections to political factors when the indigenous movement is politically successful 
and a much weaker or even negative effect when the movement is weak. Simply put: 
people choose their ethnic identity based also on political considerations about the 
context in which they live and the opportunities it offers them. My theory of ethnic 
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identification and identity change grows out of the  recent work of political scientists also 
concerned with this issue, particularly Madrid (who also analyzed data for one of the 
cases in this study) (Madrid 2006), Chandra (Chandra 2004), and Hoddie (Hoddie 2006).  
Scholars often assume that ethnic identities are uncomplicated, unidimensional 
and fixed.  Or so it would seem based on a review of questions in dozens of surveys that 
have been used world-wide that ask respondents a single-response ethnic self-
identification item to measure the concept of ethnic identity. 
Social sciences have advanced in the conceptualization of ethnic identity over the 
last few decades: The “primordial” understanding of ethnic identities as fixed entities that 
create immediate and strong loyalties among their members (Geertz 1963; Geertz 1973; 
Stack 1986) has been replaced by an almost consensual definition: ethnic identities are 
socially constructed23: Most researchers agree that a person’s identification as part of an 
ethnic group is contingent upon the socio-historic context. Moreover, most researchers 
today accept the notion that identities are ‘chosen’ from within a menu of possible 
options, and that this choice does not necessarily remain permanent (Cerulo 1997; 
Chandra 2001; Chandra and Laitin 2002; Gutmann 2003; Laitin 1998); demonstrating 
this theoretical standpoint, different recent empirical studies have shown that ethnic 
identity changes over time (Chandra 2004; Craemer 2006; Hoddie 2006; Posner 2005). In 
sum, there is a near-consensus in the social sciences with at least some ‘soft’ 
constructivist theoretical standpoint regarding ethnic identity. Even the ethno-symbolist 
approach (developed by the theoretical contributions of Anthony Smith) (Malesevic 
                                                 
23 For very clear reviews of the discussion between primordialism and constructivism see Chandra (2001), 
Yashar (2005), and Posner (2005). On the construction of identity see the review by Cerulo (1997). 
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2004; Smith 1986; Smith 1991), which argues that ethnic identities are based on cultural 
traits, particularly on the existence of a myth of common origin, recognizes that identities 
are invoked or can be promoted by the political work of elites (Lambert 2006). 
In order to operationalize this concept, it is important to distinguish between 
identity dimension, identity category, and identity attributes (Chandra 2006; Chandra and 
Laitin 2002). Identity ‘dimension’ is one of the cleavages existing in a society which can 
become salient under particular circumstances (e.g., ethnicity, religion, class)24. Identity 
‘category’ is one of the possible options in one dimension and it is assumed to be rational 
and strategic (e.g. African-American, Catholic). ‘Attributes’ are the features that are 
assumed to be characteristic of these categories (e.g. skin color, language, faith).  
Additionally, identities have content; they have a meaning for people for whom 
they are relevant. In contrast with most instrumentalist conceptions of ethnicity, I 
explicitly recognize that identity categories have content, and that it can be observed and 
studied, though it is permanently contested (Abdelal, et al. 2006). The inclusion of this 
dimension implies that the strategic choices of identity that a person can have are 
restricted to what is culturally meaningful to them. 
By conceptualizing identity ‘categories’ nested in ‘dimensions’ and dependent on 
‘attributes’, this definition recognizes the chosen character of identity and the dynamics 
of the space from which the person gets to choose an identity category, but also implies 
that the choice is restricted to a limited set of options available to the individual and 
                                                 
24 Daniel Posner has convincingly argued that there is no single ethnic cleavage, but that they vary and the 
relevance of a particular one also determines the possible identity categories available to the person (Posner 
2005; Posner Forthcoming). I acknowledge these different dimensions, but the fact that people identify as 
part of one ethnic category implies that a particular cleavage has been activated over other possible ones.  
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defined by attributes. Recognizing the existence of the ‘content’ implies acknowledging 
that there is a relevant cultural dimension in identity.  
 
Research on Ethnic Identity in Political Science 
Traditionally, most studies concerning ethnic identity in political science have 
considered it as a variable on the right side of the equation; ethnic identity, or more 
broadly ethnicity, has been treated as an objective explanatory variable, a fact that 
precedes and is exogenous to political phenomena.  
Even if identities are assumed to be at least in part constructed, the explanation of 
the origins of ethnic identity for many researchers seems to be found exclusively in 
characteristics such as psychological and social features (as in the socio-psychological 
tradition started by Tajfel 1978), shared history, memories and culture (Smith 1991), an 
‘imagined’ sense of community (Anderson 1991), the myth of collective ancestry 
(Horowitz 1985), language (Laitin 1998; Laitin 2000), and geographical location (as in 
the very interesting computer-based models developed by Lustick, et al. 2004). A recent 
evaluation of the disciplinary interest explaining identity, points to this lack of attention 
and calls for more efforts to understand identity formation from a political perspective  
(Smith 2004).  
On theoretical grounds, the discipline seems very comfortable accepting the 
constructed character of identity, but that has not yet been completely translated into 
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empirical research (Chandra 2001)25. That explains why only recently political scientists 
have placed ethnicity on the left-hand side of the equation, attempting to explore the 
formation and dynamics of ethnic identity using political concepts and testing them with 
empirical evidence.  
Recent ‘political’ explanations for ethnic identity include: Public policies that 
favor some ethnic groups have been signaled as a relevant factor that explains identity 
change (Hoddie 2006); the proximity of elections can increase the strength of ethnic 
identities and the likelihood that the person identifies in ethnic terms (Eifert, Miguel and 
Posner 2007); decisions taken at the government level can produce particular identities 
(Brown 2005); participation in political organizations seems to partially explain 
identification with some particular ethnic categories (Madrid 2006); institutional settings 
seem to favor the creation of ethnic groups as a component of coalition building (Posner 
2005), and that also seems to explain the success of ethnic parties (Chandra 2004). 
Sociologist Joane Nagel showed that the renewal of the American Indian identity over the 
last few decades was linked to several political facts, including the role of ethnic 
movements (Nagel 1995). My research builds on those approaches by hypothesizing that 
ethnic identities find at least some of their origins in political factors, particularly on the 
political success of ethnic based movements. 
 
 
                                                 
25 As an example of this acceptance, Sidney Verba when interviewed about the advances of knowledge in 
the discipline of Political Science states that ‘we have learned that identities are not primordial. They may 
be created. Or, more likely, preexisting identities may be invoked by the action of strategic elites seeking 
support in democratic elections or nondemocratic struggles for control’ (Hochschild 2005: 324). 
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Research Strategy and Design 
 
The cases 
An ideal experimental setting for analyzing how political factors affect ethnic 
identification would be to have very similar cases and expose some of them to the 
‘treatment’, or the presence of the political variables hypothesized to be relevant, and 
then to measure the dependent variable (identification) and compare results between the 
two groups. It is well known that these types of designs are rarely possible in the social 
sciences; however, sometimes reality produces a combination of cases and outcomes that 
can be considered as ‘natural’ experiments and can provide information that, in 
combination with other methods, can produce knowledge about a certain topic 
(McDermott 2002). 
My research design capitalizes on the presence of two similar cases in which 
ethnic identity shows very different patterns: Bolivia and Guatemala. These countries, 
with the highest levels of ethnic diversity in the Latin American region (Fearon 2003), 
are cases usually assumed to have large indigenous populations (Gurr 1993; Yashar 
2005) and are countries in which the indigenous movement has had at least some 
significance (Yashar 2005). What changes dramatically between the cases is the level of 
success of this movement, as chapter IV makes clear. 
There are relevant differences in the degree of success of indigenous movements, 
an element that I argue is central for indigenous identification. Bolivia has had a very 
successful indigenous movement, particularly since 2000, that has become stronger and 
achieved power via democratic means (Albó 2003; Postero 2007a; Van Cott 2003) and 
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has improved the relationship between the State and indigenous citizens significantly 
(Seligson, et al. 2006). This process has been coupled with the already noted increase in 
the relative number of people who self-identified as indigenous in recent years. 
Guatemala has also developed a very visible indigenous movement (with one of its 
leaders winning a Nobel Peace Prize), but with much less political success, becoming 
relevant at local and regional level politics but hardly making an impact at the national 
level (Yashar 2005). The creation of a Pan-Maya identity (Seligson 2005; Warren 1998) 
has also been a recent process that might be pointing out the emergence of a stronger 
identity-based political movement. Moreover, Guatemala has suffered from decades of 
political violence that was particularly vicious against indigenous groups, and the 
challenges the country faces emerging from the peace process have set a political 
scenario with much uncertainty. 
 
The comparative design 
This research design presents two levels of comparison that together provide 
considerable strength for the causal argument. First, I compare the effect of different 
variables on indigenous identification in the two countries using the latest survey data 
available (2006). This cross – sectional synchronic comparison gives information on 
whether the effect of political variables varies across countries with different levels of 
success of the indigenous movement. Second, I compare data from Bolivia in 2006 with 
data from a previous year (1998). This cross – time diachronic comparison allows me to 
see if there have been changes in the relationships between identity and politics during 
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the last eight years, an answer that can be linked to the role of the recent success of the 
indigenous movement. 
The first step in analyzing the factors that could be related to identification as part 
of an identity category is to establish the group of people that could identify as members 
of that category. The definition of ethnic identity that I employ emphasizes the existence 
of attributes or conditions that a person must possess in order to identify as part of a 
particular category; this is equivalent to saying that not anybody can simply identify with 
just any ethnic category, but that the available options for each person are determined by 
some objective characteristics. Even if these attributes are permanently contested they are 
nonetheless objective and act effectively in the delimitation of social groups. 
My hypothesis implies that, controlling for all other things, the presence or 
absence of certain political factors will affect the chances that individuals with similar 
socioeconomic and cultural characteristics identify as part of the indigenous category. 
Who then, could potentially identify as indigenous in the context of this study?  
One obvious response refers to language. Language is often used as a marker of 
ethnic and cultural differences in a country; since the Atlas Nadorov Mira, different 
measures of ethnic and cultural fractionalization have been based on language (Alesina, 
et al. 2003; Fearon 2003). One would expect that, in order to identify as part of an ethnic 
category, a person is required to speak the language associated with it and believed to be 
spoken by most of its members (if different from that of the rest of society). However, 
data presented in Table 3 suggest that this assumption does not hold for indigenous 
identity in Latin America. 
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A second alternative is a cultural approach; under this perspective, somewhat 
closer to the ethno-symbolist approach, the central attribute for ethnic identity would be 
shared culture. Only those who share some particular culture could become members of 
the identity category related to this culture. This approach seems to fit the data in a better 
way, as it is shown in the section below. 
 
Data and Methods 
Data for this project come from the AmericasBarometer 2006 round of surveys 
carried out by the Latin American Public Opinion Project – LAPOP – at Vanderbilt 
University. The pooled two-country database has a total of 4,506 observations, 3,008 of 
them from Bolivia, and the remaining 1,498 from Guatemala. Surveys were conducted 
over a nationally representative probability sample in each country, and they are part of a 
series of survey studies conducted by LAPOP over time. Along with Spanish, five 
different Mayan languages were used for the interviews in Guatemala, while in Bolivia, 
Quechua, Aymara, and Spanish were used. For more information on LAPOP, the 
surveys, and for more details on the sample designs see www.lapopsurveys.org.  
Table 3 shows that the proportion of people identifying as indigenous who spoke 
an indigenous language during their childhood is relatively small. Language, so often 
viewed as a quintessential marker for ethnic identity, seems to be a poor predictor of 
ethnic identification, or at least does not seem to work for defining the ‘pool’ of 
individuals who could potentially identify as indigenous in Latin America. 
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Table 3. Percentage of people who identify as indigenous by language spoken during 
childhood 
 Guatemala Bolivia 
Spanish only 43.1 (243) 16.1 (94) 
Spanish and indigenous language 39.9 (225) 65.0 (379) 
Indigenous language exclusively 17 (96) 18.9 (110) 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 
Source: LAPOP 2006; Ns in parentheses 
 
In the pooled two country database, 70% of those individuals identifying as 
indigenous spoke an indigenous language (either exclusively or combined with Spanish) 
at home. A sizable 30% of those who identify as indigenous only spoke Spanish during 
their childhood.  
A second possible criterion for defining who could identify as indigenous is 
cultural identification. In 2006, respondents were asked how strongly on a 1 to 7 scale 
they identify with the country’s largest indigenous culture26. I recoded this variable into a 
categorical variable with two groups: identifies with more than half of the scale (5, 6 and 
7) or not. The resulting subset contains 2,677 observations; this is the group of 
respondents that were defined as potential identifiers with the indigenous ethnic category 
and are represented by oval B in Figure 6 below. 
 
                                                 
26 The question used is ‘How strongly do you identify with the (e.g. Quechua) culture? In Guatemala, the 
available option was Maya, and in Bolivia two different questions were used for Quechua and Aymara; I 
coded 1 if the respondent chose more than 4 in either of them. I decided to recode this variable because it 
can produce two groups of respondents, those who strongly feel part of an indigenous culture and those 
who do not, which is in turn useful for this study for establishing the set of individuals who could 
potentially identify as indigenous. As any other, this is a relatively arbitrary methodological decision based 
solely on the mid-point of the scale for separating one group (those who could potentially identify as 
indigenous) from the other; I am confident, however, that this decision being applied equally to both 
countries does not bias my results in any way. 
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Table 4. Composition of the subset of observations for the analyses 
 Guatemala Bolivia 
Total pool of potential indigenous identifiers (B) 1,041 (69.5% of 
national sample) 
1,636 (54.4% of 
national sample) 
Cultural identification and self-ID as indigenous (B 
and C) 
499 (33.3% of 
national sample) 
459  (15.3% of 
national sample) 
 Source: LAPOP 2006 
 
The largest oval (A) in Figure 6 corresponds to the national population in each 
country; the surveys employed are representative of this population. The second oval (B) 
gathers all individuals who identify with an indigenous culture in more than half of the 7 
-point graded scale used for that question; that is, it represents people who, according to 
my argument, could potentially identify as indigenous. The smallest oval (C) represents 
respondents who positively identified as indigenous in the categorical question for 
ethnicity. Ideally, C is a subset of B which in turn is a subset of A; empirically, 83% of 
all observations in C are also in B. 
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Figure 6: Subsets of observations for the study 
 
This grouping is not perfect for the analytical aims of this chapter (i.e., all positive 
indigenous identifications are not a perfect subset of the group defined as potential 
identifiers as indigenous); however, it is much more accurate than the language 
classification and it contains most of the indigenous identifications. It is still necessary to 
understand what larger subset of each country’s population comprises the remaining sixth 
of all individuals who identify as indigenous. With this caveat, I will use this 
classification for the construction of the subset of observations that could potentially 
identify as indigenous. 
As stated above, I expect to find a weaker relationship between indigenous 
identity and political factors in those countries and moments in time in which indigenous 
movements are relatively weak. In the concrete settings of this comparative design, I 
A. National population 
B. Potential indigenous 
identification 
C. Identifies as 
indigenous 
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expect the effect of political variables in identification as indigenous to be stronger in 
Bolivia 2006 than in Guatemala in the same year or than in Bolivia in 1998. 
 
Variable description 
The dependent variable is Indigena, a binary variable that assumes the value of 1 
if the person identifies with the indigenous ethnic category, and 0 if he or she identifies as 
part of a different category in the ‘how do you identify yourself’ question27.  
With regards to the explicitly ‘political’ explanations for ethnic identity, I focus 
on political and civic engagement as variables that refer to how active individuals are in 
the public sphere of their local communities. Political engagement refers to the exercise 
of political rights by citizens, particularly to: a) having an ideological position (ideology); 
b) knowing about politics (political knowledge); and c) having interest in politics. Civic 
engagement refers to some elements of social capital, and is measured by d) involvement 
in community activities, and e) talking about politics with other people. The relevance of 
these factors on the exercise of citizenship rights has been treated previously in the 
literature (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Galston 2001). 
If the hypothesis which holds that identification as indigenous has a strong 
political component particularly in the case of Bolivia 2006, the variables that measure 
political and civic engagement should have a strong relationship with identification as 
                                                 
27 The question used for self-identification is “How do you identify yourself?” with two wordings in 
Spanish, “Usted se considera…” (Guatemala) and “Usted se considera una persona de raza…” (Bolivia 
and Ecuador), offering options such as ‘blanco’, ‘mestizo’, ‘indigena’, ‘negro’, ‘ladino’, and other relevant 
categories for each country. Figures presented here represent the proportion of people identifying as 
indigenous (includes originario in Bolivia). 
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indigenous. The logic behind this is that, ceteris paribus, people who identify as 
indigenous do so because they are actively exposed to political practice at the local level. 
Ideology refers to the political positioning of a person in relation to the ‘left’ and 
the ‘right’, and might be a good reference for comparing the overall political position of 
some individuals versus others. The question used for measuring this asks the respondent 
to place herself on a 1 to 10 scale in which 1 means ‘left’ and 10 means ‘right.’ Not all of 
the respondents find it easy to position themselves on this ideological scale: 
approximately 28% of all cases in the pool of potential indigenous identifiers used here 
could not give an answer to this question, and were coded as ‘missing’. 
Political knowledge is a variable that measures the level of knowledge that a 
person has about international politics. This is a variable composed of two questions in 
the questionnaire: does the person know who the presidents of the US and Brazil are28; if 
the two answers are correct, the variable takes a value of 2, 1 if only one is correct, and 0 
if none. I expect that this variable should have a positive effect on indigenous 
identification in the cases in which indigenous self-identification is on the rise. 
Involvement in community activities is a variable coded 1 if the person responded 
positively to a question that asks whether he or she has contributed to the solution of a 
problem in his or her community during the last year, and 0 if the person has not 
participated in such an activity. This variable is a proxy for active participation in public 
                                                 
28 This question is not a perfect measure for political knowledge, and the definition of the two reference 
countries is based only on the assumption that these are the two most powerful countries in the hemisphere; 
however, this measure is a useful proxy to how much the person knows about international politics. 
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activities at the local level, and a positive answer implies that the person is concerned and 
involved in the public sphere. 
Interest in politics is a variable resulting from a question that asks the respondent 
how strongly he or she is interested in politics. The variable is coded 0 for ‘none’, 1 for 
‘some’, 2 for ‘much’, and 3 for ‘very much’. 
Talking politics comes from the question ‘How often do you speak about politics 
with other people?’; it assumes a value of 0 if the person answered ‘never, 1 if ‘rarely’, 2 
if ‘a few times a month’, 3 if ‘a few times a week’, and 4 if ‘daily’. This is a 
measurement of active involvement in the discursive practice of politics and thus a direct 
indicator of involvement in politics. 
Other variables included in the analysis as socioeconomic controls are: 
• Female, coded 1 for female and 0 for male. 
• Age, expressed in years. 
• Education, the education level the person obtained, with a value of 0 if no 
education, 1 if elementary education, 2 if high school, and 3 if the person 
attended at least some university. 
• Wealth measured by number of capital goods in the household, with a maximum 
value of 9 and a minimum of 0. Items include phone, washing machine, water 
service in the house, among others. 
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• Rural, a dummy variable coded 1 if the person lives in an area populated by less 
than 2,000 inhabitants. 
• Exposure to media, from four questions that ask the respondent how often does he 
or she consume news on the radio, television, newspapers, and the internet, with 
values 1 for ‘daily’, 2 for ‘once or twice a week’, 3 for ‘rarely, 4 for ‘never’. 
• Indigenous language, coded 0 if the person spoke only Spanish during her 
childhood; 1 if she spoke both Spanish and an indigenous language; and 2 if her 
home was monolingual in one native language. 
 
Statistical models and methods 
Given the binary nature of the dependent variable, a series of logistic regression 
models were fitted for the analyses; these models calculate the change in the probability 
that the outcome of the dependent variable is positive with a variation of one point of the 
scale in the independent variable. These models are particularly sensitive to the 
specification, and all results are conditional to the inclusion and the values of the other 
independent variables (Hoffmann 2004; Kleinbaum, et al. 1998; Long 1997). Results are 
presented in terms of odds ratios, which represent the ratio of the probability of the 
outcome with a positive increment in the independent variable in reference to the base 
group (Hoffmann 2004). 
The analyses were conducted using the appropriate calculation for the standard 
errors considering the sample specifications in each case; this implies that observations 
are not independent of each other, but they are clustered in the Primary Sampling Units 
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that form each of the strata defined for each probability sample design (Kish and Frankel 
1974; Rust 1985; Skinner, Holt and Smith 1989). Stata 9.2’s SVY commands were used 
for computations. 
 
Results 
 
Differences between countries 
 Is the effect of the different independent variables the same across the cases 
selected for the study? Table 5 below presents the effects of each independent variable on 
the probability that a person in the potential pool of indigenous identifiers actually 
identifies as indigenous.  
 
Table 5: Results of the logistic regression for indigenous identification in each country 
(odds ratios and t statistic in parentheses) 
Variable Guatemala 2006 Bolivia 2006 
Female .944 (-.28) .618 (-2.68) * 
Age .991 (-.96) .986 (-2.01) * 
Education .565 (-3.16) * .637 (-3.83) * 
Wealth .981 (-.24) .708 (-3.30) * 
Rural .981 (-.07) .996 (-.01) 
News: Radio .745 (-2.81) * 1.05 (.59) 
News: TV 1.280 (1.60) .896 (-1.08) 
News: Newspapers 1.023 (.24) 1.177 (1.21) 
News: Internet 1.791 (2.09) * 1.087 (.46) 
Language 16.989 (6.16) * 1.854 (3.71) * 
Ideology 1.001 (.02) .926 (1.90) + 
Political knowledge .621 (-2.40) * .908 (-.84) 
Involvement in community .955 (-.19) 2.179 (3.91) * 
Interest in politics 1.317 (1.13) .965 (-.31) 
Talking politics .583 (-2.71) * 1.008 (.09) 
N 651 1,163 
    +: p<.1; *: p<.05 
   Dependent variable: Indigena, identification as indigenous 
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It is useful to keep in mind that the reference group is not the national population, 
but the people who feel part of an indigenous culture, as represented by oval B in Figure 
6. The group with a positive response in the outcome encompasses those individuals who 
actually identify as indigenous (oval C in Figure 6). 
The differences between the effect of each independent variable in the two 
countries are evidence of the existence of different constructions of indigenous identity. 
A detailed examination of the results for each variable yields surprising results: 
First, the odds that a female respondent from the pool of individuals who could 
potentially identify as indigenous actually identifies as such are almost 40% smaller than 
those of a male in Bolivia. Thus, controlling for all socioeconomic and political factors 
already specified, being female significantly reduces the chances that a person identifies 
as indigenous in Bolivia, but seems to be statistically irrelevant in Guatemala. 
Age also has a significant negative effect on indigenous identification in Bolivia: 
every additional year of age reduces the chances that a person identifies as indigenous by 
approximately 3%. All other things being equal, younger individuals are more likely to 
identify as indigenous in Bolivia, but not in Guatemala. Higher levels of education and 
wealth have a generally negative effect on indigenous identification in both countries, 
though the differences are not always significant.  
Contrary to what could be expected, living in a rural area does not increase the 
chances that a person in the subset of observations considered here identifies as 
indigenous in any of the two cases. 
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With reference to exposure to the news, Guatemala shows two significant 
relationships: First, individuals who identify as indigenous are more likely to consume 
news via the radio than similar people who do not identify as indigenous. Second, 
controlling for socioeconomic and political variables, individuals with indigenous 
identity use the internet as a source of news less than other respondents. In Bolivia there 
are no apparent differences in the source of consumption of news. 
The effect of speaking an indigenous language at home during childhood is 
significant and positive. However, in substantive terms, the effect is much greater in 
Guatemala than in Bolivia. In Guatemala, the odds that a person who spoke a native 
language during childhood identifies as indigenous are 17 times those of someone who 
spoke only Spanish (related findings are discussed in chapter II); in Bolivia the effect 
seems to be much milder: the odds of identifying as indigenous for indigenous language 
speakers are only twice the odds of non indigenous language speakers identifying as 
indigenous. 
Turning now to the analysis of the results for the political variables considered in 
the model, they show, in general, the effect that was expected from the hypothesis 
discussed in this chapter. 
Ideology has an effect such that a position further to the right negatively affects 
the chances that a person identifies as indigenous in Bolivia, but not in Guatemala. That 
means that, other things controlled for, indigenous identity seems to be associated with a 
leftist ideological position in Bolivia, but not in Guatemala. 
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Political knowledge: Respondents who identify as indigenous know significantly 
less about the international political sphere than other individuals who do not identify as 
indigenous but feel part of the Mayan indigenous culture in Guatemala. This difference is 
non-existent in Bolivia, where identification as indigenous does not seem to be associated 
with a lack of political knowledge once it is controlled for socioeconomic factors. 
Involvement in community: Participating in community activities greatly 
increases the chances that a person identifies as indigenous in Bolivia, where people who 
participate in community activities are 2.2 times more likely to identify as indigenous 
than those who do not get involved in solving the problems of their communities. In 
Guatemala, in contrast, this participation has no effect whatsoever on identification as 
indigenous. 
Interest in politics: Contrary to what I had expected, the level of interest in 
politics does not seem to matter in either country. What has a very clear negative effect 
on indigenous identification in Guatemala is ‘talking’ politics; individuals who often talk 
about politics are far less likely to identify as indigenous than respondents who very 
rarely or never express their political opinions in public.  
The implications of the evidence presented here are discussed thoroughly in the 
discussion section of this chapter. 
 
Differences across time within Bolivia (1998 and 2006) 
For this comparison, I used the complete national sample to establish the 
correlates of indigenous identification. This procedure is less efficient than the one used 
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in the previous section because it lacks the definition of the ‘pool’ of individuals who 
could potentially identify as indigenous; this is because the question on how strongly the 
person identifies with an indigenous culture was not present in the Bolivia LAPOP 
questionnaire until 2006. The statistical analyses conducted here, then, compare the 
features of those who identify as indigenous with the rest of the Bolivian population, and 
not with a subset of it who could potentially identify as indigenous as in the previous 
analyses.  
In statistical terms, unsystematic error is included in the analysis by changing the 
reference group from ‘potential indigenous identifiers’ to any individual in the sample. 
However, as the model is the same for the two years, this technique is useful in 
identifying changes in the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. 
All tests were conducted using the appropriate standard error calculations for complex 
sample data.  
Given that not all variables used in the previous models were present in the 
Bolivia 1998 questionnaire, models have a different specification than the ones used in 
the between-country comparison. One variable that had not been used before is employed 
in these models: Income, an ordinal variable with 8 possible values corresponding to total 
family income last month (0=no income, 7=more than 20,000 bolivianos). 
There is another difference in the dependent variable in these equations compared 
to the between-country tests: In Bolivia, the ‘originario’ category was included as an 
option in the questionnaire since 2004; before that, the question only included ‘indígena’. 
‘Originario’ is a category that has been commonly used particularly in the Western 
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region of the country as a synonym of indigenous, with which some people find easier to 
identify with given the negative connotation of ‘indio’29 (see chapter II). Table 6 presents 
the results for the variables included in the model. 
 
Table 6: Results of the logistic regression for indigenous identification,  
Bolivia 1998 and 2006 (odds ratios and t statistic in parentheses) 
Variable Bolivia 1998 Bolivia 2006 
Female .630 (-2.67) * .632 (-2.27) * 
Age .980 (-2.32) * .984 (-2.31) * 
Education .537 (-4.68) * .586 (-3.01) * 
Income .765 (-2.26) * .670 (-3.65) * 
Rural 1.519 (1.43) .916 (0.19) 
Involvement in community 1.829 (3.03) * 1.902 (2.51) * 
Ideology .933 (1.63) .826 (-4.11) * 
N 2,139 1,881 
*: p<.05 
Dependent variable: Indigena, identification as indigenous 
 
Results for both years are very similar, despite the differences in the political 
strength of indigenous movement between 1998 and 2006 in Bolivia. The only noticeable 
difference is the coefficient for ideology. Ideology shows a very relevant effect on 
indigenous identification in Bolivia in 2006, but not in 1998. In 2006, each ‘step’ to the 
right in the 1 to 10 left to right ideological scale significantly reduces the odds that a 
person identifies as indigenous by approximately 17% (with a probability of error of less 
than 1 in 1,000); in other words, the further to the right a person is the less likely he or 
she is to identify as indigenous. In contrast, the effect of ideology in identification in 
1998 was not significant at all. 
                                                 
29 ‘Originario’ can be translated as ‘original from the land’ and it is used to refer to the peoples that were in 
the country before the Spanish conquest. This category was amply used during the colonial period and it 
was relevant for taxation purposes (Platt 1982). 
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Discussion 
Several findings point out that the construction of indigenous identity in 2006 was 
different in Bolivia than in Guatemala, and that political factors have also significantly 
different effects on indigenous identification. The socioeconomic variables considered 
yield results that contribute to the argument provided here. First, the effect of gender. 
Why are women less likely to identify as indigenous in Bolivia but not in Guatemala? A 
possible explanation has to do with differences in gender roles associated with 
contrasting experiences of political socialization and participation. My hypothesis here is 
that Bolivian males are more exposed to spaces in which political issues are discussed, 
particularly at the grassroots level, and that it is this political socialization what reinforces 
identification as indigenous. If this argument holds, the implication would be that those 
spaces for political socialization are either inexistent in Guatemala, or that they are 
equally available for men and women. As a complementary explanation, previous 
literature has pointed out that ethnic mobility is particularly difficult for indigenous 
women (De La Cadena 1995); it seems possible that less women identify as indigenous 
precisely because doing so is more ‘expensive’ for them than for males, and that not 
identifying as indigenous is a way of escaping from the bottom of the social hierarchies 
established on the basis of gender and ethnicity. 
The difference in the coefficient for age tells a similar story. The fact that in 
Bolivia younger individuals are more likely to identify as indigenous than older people is 
evidence that directly contradicts the assimilation claim that privileges a culture-based 
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definition of ethnic identity over the more political one I use here30. Age does not have 
any effect on identification in Guatemala, and that suggests the existence of different 
processes in the two countries.  
Education and wealth decrease the chances that a person identifies as indigenous 
in the three countries; this could very well be a result of the already documented 
disadvantaged socioeconomic conditions for people of indigenous descent in the region 
(Pascharopoulos and Patrinos 1994). After centuries of colonial and post-colonial 
regimes of exploitation and exclusion loosely based on ethnicity (Hale 2005; Rivera C. 
1993), indigenousness has been so deeply intertwined with poverty that the causal 
relationship between these socioeconomic controls and indigenous identification is not 
straight forward. 
Speaking an indigenous language at home during childhood has a clear and 
positive significant effect on indigenous identification. However, the effect is much 
smaller in Bolivia, while maintaining very high levels of statistical significance. This 
suggests that the construction of indigenous identity is less associated with the cultural 
factor of speaking a particular language in Bolivia than in Guatemala. It could also mean 
that indigenous identity in Bolivia is in general less determined by cultural factors than in 
Guatemala, and that these attributes are weaker requisites of identification. 
Ideology is the first explicitly political factor that was included in the analysis. 
Identification with the indigenous category seems to be associated with a leftist 
                                                 
30 The assimilation argument of ethnic identity contends that there is a process of cultural assimilation by 
which new generations of people who come from ‘traditional’ cultures are assimilated into the mainstream 
culture, resulting in weaker identification with the native culture among youths than among older people. 
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positioning on this scale in Bolivia, though the coefficient is only marginally significant. 
In Guatemala, ideology does not seem to have any effect at all on identification, and that 
can be understood as a signal of weaker influence of political factors on identity. 
The emergence of Evo Morales as the most conspicuous leader of both the new 
left and the indigenous movement in Bolivia signals the ‘marriage’ of indigenousness and 
leftist ideology in that Andean nation. This relationship is relatively new; while 
indigenous leaders have recently publicly embraced a leftist ideology, during the 1960s 
and early 1970s the pro-US right-wing military governments relied heavily on their 
support from the campesino movement as their social bases. More recently, during the 
‘golden’ years of the neoliberal modernization project, Victor Hugo Cárdenas, an 
Aymara leader, was Vice President to Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in an administration 
responsible for a series of reforms that, after the privatizations and free trade agreements, 
directly benefited indigenous people (like the Participación Popular, or the INRA law). 
Paradoxically, these ‘neoliberal’ reforms seem to have opened the opportunities 
for the success of the indigenous movement and for Evo Morales’ Movimiento Al 
Socialismo (MAS). These constitutional reforms and laws promoting institutional change 
in the region established new mechanisms of participation, both at the local and the 
national levels, which were crucial for the emergence and consolidation of the indigenous 
movement (Albó 2002b; Assies, van der Haar and Hoekema 1999; Van Cott 2005). 
Chapter IV covers this subject in depth. 
In Guatemala, on the other hand, the indigenous movement has not been under a 
unified leadership with the political left (Esquit Choy and Galvez Borell 1997); 
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indigenous political organizations appear, in large part, to be fragmented, disarticulated 
from larger political organizations, and seem to lack the organizational capabilities for a 
more successful participation in the national political scene (Cojti and Fabian 2005). The 
fact that in Guatemala people who identify as indigenous are less knowledgeable about 
the international political sphere than non-indigenous identifiers also suggests the 
absence of a relevant role of politics on indigenous identity in the country. 
People who identify as indigenous in Bolivia tend to participate more in activities 
oriented toward the solution of problems in their communities than other individuals. The 
general level of participation is not very different when the national samples are 
considered. The usual explanation for this difference would probably suggest that 
indigenous people in the Andes have a strong culture of participation and stable local 
organizations that contribute to the materialization of this participation, and that these 
organizations were seriously damaged in Guatemala by political violence. While I do not 
reject this explanation, I would argue that it is likely that the opportunity of participating 
in these activities increases the chances that a person identifies with the indigenous 
category. 
Perhaps the element that most clearly portrays the unpoliticized status of 
indigenous identity in Guatemala is the strong negative effect that talking politics has on 
indigenous identification, a  variable that is irrelevant in Bolivia; the more frequently a 
person talks with other citizens about politics, the less likely he or she is to identify as 
indigenous. In general, Guatemalans talk about politics less frequently than Bolivians, but 
Guatemalans who identify as indigenous are even less likely to talk about politics. A 
logical explanation points again to the recent history of armed conflict in Guatemala; 
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more than three decades of war and state-sponsored violence that was particularly vicious 
within indigenous communities seems to have left a long lasting fear toward public 
involvement in political activities among ordinary citizens. This idea is explored more in 
depth in the following chapter. 
The additional piece of information with which I build my case is the difference 
in the effect of ideology in Bolivia in 2006 compared with 1998; a coefficient that 
previously was not significant is now very strong and beyond reasonable statistical doubt. 
Identity as indigenous seems to have gained a lot of ideological weight in less than a 
decade, becoming very much linked to being ‘on the left’ of the political spectrum. This 
change shows first that identity changes over time, that the contents and meaning of 
being indigenous is different now than eight years ago; this finding supports the theory 
that ethnic identity is fluid, that its contents are permanently contested, and that it is more 
dynamic than what we usually think. Second, the change also shows that identity in 
Bolivia has become more political during the last few years, and this finding supports the 
hypothesis that the dynamics of identity change that inspire this research might be caused 
by political factors in a context of a very successful indigenous movement.  
The possibility that this political process increases the proportion of people 
identifying as indigenous has previously been suggested by anthropologist Andrew 
Canessa (2006). This chapter has found support for this hypothesis.  
Is it possible to infer from the results presented here that some people may have a 
purely instrumental use of identity? In other words, do some people say that they identify 
with an identity category only because it is circumstantially convenient for them? In 
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order to claim this it would be necessary to have information on whether people who 
started identifying as indigenous actually obtained some benefit from the State or other 
source as a result of that identification, and those data are currently not available; besides 
that, the Bolivian Government does not keep any record of people’s ethnic identity as a 
tool for policy implementation. What seems more likely is that people get a psychological 
benefit from having a person with similar ethnicity as president, as Chandra suggests 
(Chandra 2004).  
Finally, the fact that not all positive indigenous identifications are part of the pool 
of potential indigenous identifiers defined here raises a question about the nature of the 
subset of observations that should be considered as the baseline for similar analyses. It 
seems clear that people can ‘choose’ what identity category they feel part of if they have 
or if they acquire the necessary attributes associated with that category. But, what does it 
take to identify as part of an identity category? What exactly are these attributes? 
Evidence shows that language is not the most important one, and it is very likely that 
dress, skin color or phenotypical characteristics are not definitive either. I have defined 
the potential pool of identifications by cultural affinity, and this decision is empirically 
more accurate than the others, but it is still not perfect.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
EXPLAINING SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF INDIGENOUS POLITICS 
IN BOLIVIA AND GUATEMALA 
 
In December 2005, Evo Morales, an indigenous leader from the Bolivian 
highlands, won the presidential election with an unprecedented 54% of the national vote 
in an election with the highest historical turnout in Bolivia’s history. In striking contrast, 
in September 2007, Rigoberta Menchú, a Guatemala Mayan Indian recipient of the Nobel 
Peace prize and one of the most internationally and nationally visible Guatemalan 
personalities, obtained 3% in a presidential election in which she, the only indigenous 
candidate, finished seventh among 14 candidates. Given that at least 50% of the 
population in both countries could be considered indigenous under most criteria (though 
see the discussion about this in chapter II of this dissertation), the differences in the 
political success of indigenous people between the two countries are, to say the least, 
dazzling. What are the factors that contributed to the political success of the indigenous 
movement in capturing the commanding heights of political power in Bolivia but not in 
Guatemala? This chapter attempts to answer this question using a combination of survey 
data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project, and qualitative information 
gathered during fieldwork in both countries during 2006 and 2007. 
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Studying the Success or Failure of Indigenous Politics in Latin America 
 
The study of the indigenous movements 
Different approaches have been used for attempting to explain the political 
performance of indigenous people in Latin American democracies. One of them is 
defining the indigenous movement as the unit of analysis itself, constructing a narrative 
of the macro-historical path that each of them followed until their current success or 
failure. The information produced from this perspective is mainly qualitative, as is its 
analysis, and has very much in common with the sociology of social movements31. This 
methodological approach has been employed by different studies that give an account of 
the state of the indigenous movements all over the continent.  
For example, Deborah Yashar has shown authoritatively how the indigenous 
movements of Bolivia and Ecuador flourished during the aftermath of the neoliberal 
reforms in the region, but failed to do so in Peru (Yashar 2005; Yashar 2007); Van Cott 
has shown how the same movements became political parties, participating in elections 
and winning several of them (Van Cott 2003; Van Cott 2005). Bastos and Camus have 
made note of the path followed by the indigenous movement in Guatemala, highlighting 
its prospective for the future (Bastos and Camus 2003b) (see also (Warren 1998)); Lucero 
has given detailed account of the trajectories of the Bolivian and Ecuadorean movements, 
focusing on the internal competition for representation (Lucero 2002; Lucero 2006). The 
                                                 
31 On the discussion of different methodological approaches in political science see, among others, (Brady 
and Collier 2004; King, et al. 1994; Martin and McIntyre 1994). 
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list of good qualitative studies about the indigenous movements in the region is not short 
and has very strong exponents. 
By focusing on the indigenous movements and organizations themselves, this 
type of research is useful in the identification of key features and circumstances that 
define the organizational maturity of the movement and its contextual opportunities. By 
focusing on the role of indigenous leadership, this line of research can identify the crucial 
decisions that conjugated organizational characteristics and contextual opportunities into 
more or less successful political outcomes. 
The main disadvantage that this line of research has consists in ignoring the 
individual by looking only at the aggregate unit of analysis. The problem with this 
approach is that it assumes a priori that indigenous people act organically, as a group32, 
and that ethnic categories such as ‘indigenous’ can be equated to individuals and their 
behaviors. This is a problem termed in the statistical literature as the ‘ecological fallacy’, 
an error of interpretation produced by assuming that individuals share the average 
characteristics of the group (King 1997; Seligson 2002); the inferences over individuals 
produced under these circumstances can be problematic. The problem is then, one of 
levels of analysis.  
 
Party systems and electoral behavior 
The second approach, less well developed in the literature on indigenous 
movements in Latin America, is the study of the relationship between ethnic cleavages 
                                                 
32 On the criticism to the view of ethnic categories as ‘groups’ see (Brubaker 2004; Chandra 2006). 
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and party systems in the region, using mainly national and sub-national units of analysis. 
In the general body of the party system literature, party stability is usually explained by 
the stability of the cleavages on which the party system is based; ethno-cultural cleavages 
are usually considered as very stable and can act as cues for voting and party 
identification (Horowitz 1985; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). This relationship has held 
constant in most advanced democracies, but is not at all smooth and clear in 
consolidating democracies (Birnir 2007a). 
Ethnic cleavages have not produced stable party systems in Latin America, or at 
least the small number of studies concerned with this issue have not found empirical 
support for the theoretical expectation. Instead of stable parties resulting from societal 
cleavages, ethnic diversity appears to have generated even more instability and electoral 
volatility, mainly because political parties traditionally did not cater to ethnic groups 
(Birnir 2007b; Madrid 2005a; Van Cott 2000b). It has also been shown that, at least in 
Guatemala, the inexistence of an indigenous party does not seem to be product of the 
institutional design (Instituto Interuniversitario de Iberoamérica 2005). 
During the past decade, a wide variety of  ethnic parties have been emerging in 
Latin American countries, with a performance that has varied substantially from country 
to country (Van Cott 2005). Some evidence shows that, under conditions of high 
politicization, ethnicity can work as a stable reference for voting behavior in the region 
(Birnir 2007a). It is likely that the emergence of new ethnic parties will play a role in 
decreasing electoral volatility and increasing the stability of the party system in the 
region (Madrid 2005a; Madrid 2005b); in fact, the emergence of the Movimiento Al 
Socialismo (MAS) as a competitive political party in Bolivia suggests that this is the 
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trend at least for the Bolivian case. At the regional level, this line of research might 
become more relevant in the future, but the results obtained so far show a weak 
relationship between ethnic cleavages, party system, and voting behavior. 
 
Seeking answers in public opinion research 
The approach that I use in this chapter differs from the two approaches discussed 
above, but it feeds from elements distilled from both. Based on a most similar system 
design (Lijphart 1971; Lijphart 1975; Peters 1998), I look at the individual level of 
analysis in the two countries using public opinion data, in the understanding that it is at 
this level where manifestations of the actual determinants of success and failure of 
indigenous politics can be found. 
In the vein of the Causal-Process Observations suggested by advocates of 
qualitative research (Brady and Collier 2004), I use qualitative data produced during my 
fieldwork to identify two crucial differences between the two countries which could 
explain the differences in the outcome of indigenous politics. One of them, the heritage of 
violence and fear left by the armed conflict in Guatemala, is derived from the first line of 
research discussed here, i.e., the process study of indigenous movements themselves. The 
second, the profound process of municipal decentralization that took place in Bolivia 
since the mid 1990s, is related – though somewhat loosely – to the institutional 
dimension existent in the electoral behavior studies. 
The explanation that I offer for the differences in the political success of the 
indigenous people between the two countries consists of two elements. First, the armed 
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conflict that Guatemala went through during decades of civil war; I argue that this 
conflict decimated civil society, particularly indigenous organizations, and left people 
disenfranchised from public activities and fearful of participating in them. Indeed, the 
military targeted such organizations, in the end murdering some 200,000 people over the 
course of a decade. Second, the process of municipal decentralization that Bolivia 
experienced since the mid 1990s opened spaces for political participation and allowed for 
the existence of cohesive indigenous organizations networked at the national level. 
As it is not possible to directly observe in the present two events that took place 
decades ago (the armed conflict and the municipal decentralization), I look at public 
opinion data in an effort to find empirical evidence of their effects. While causality 
cannot be directly proven (as is usually the case in the social sciences), different pieces of 
information put together in a coherent way can provide a solid explanation. 
 
Hypotheses 
 
In order to make it empirically testable, this explanation can be formulated into 
two main interconnected hypotheses which, combined, provide practical evidence of the 
plausibility of the explanation. 
H1: Violence and fear reduce participation in local politics and also in national-
level politics. Individuals who experienced political violence or who fear getting involved 
in different public activities will also tend to participate less in politics both at the local 
and at the national level. 
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H2: Participation in local politics increases the likelihood that a person will also 
participate in political activities at the national level. Individuals who are actively 
engaged in public activities in their communities and municipalities will also tend to be 
more interested in and to participate more in national level political activities. 
This chapter also tests other hypotheses implied by different theoretical 
approaches and cited in the literature. These alternative hypotheses are: 
H3: Protestantism weakens indigenous organizations and disenfranchises 
indigenous people of their political participation. As Guatemala has had a larger 
proportion of the indigenous population converted into non-Catholic Christian religious 
groups, indigenous people have weaker organizations than in traditionally Catholic 
Bolivia, and tend to participate less in both local level and national level activities. 
H4: Indigenous people in Guatemala have a weaker attachment to the nation than 
members of other ethnic groups in the country, and that results in a reduced participation 
in politics. The generally disadvantaged position of indigenous people in the Guatemalan 
society generates a weaker attachment to the nation than that of other ethnic groups, 
discouraging them from participating in activities of the national political community. 
Two assumptions are crucial for the logical coherence of this explanation. While 
these two assumptions remain untested in this chapter due to the impossibility of 
obtaining adequate data, they are fairly obvious and do not require a great leap-of-faith of 
the reader. First, ‘fear’ of participating in different public activities in present-time 
Guatemala is a consequence of  La Violencia, or the State-sponsored violence 
experienced by the Guatemalan people for decades, but particularly during the notorious 
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1980s. While it is true that violence now is not currently exercised by the State as it was 
during the violent period  (Seligson and Azpuru 2001), the widespread presence of guns 
in the streets, as well as the large number of people trained to use them, are direct 
consequences of the armed conflict. 
Second, relevant institutional changes can increase levels of social and political 
participation at the national level. Changes in the institutional design, as those introduced 
in Bolivia since the implementation of the Law of Popular Participation, can boost 
participation at the local level and strengthen civil society and social capital. The impact 
of institutional design and changes on ethnic mobilization has been discussed in the 
context of Africa by Posner (2005). 
 
Armed Conflict vs. Strong Unions 
 
Guatemala: A history of violence 
Guatemala has witnessed State organized violence for decades. In her excellent 
work explaining the violence prevailing in Guatemala versus the more pacifist and 
democratic Costa Rica, Yashar traces back the violence in Guatemala to a response from 
the elites to the radical reforms made by the progressive governments that the country 
had during the 1940s and 1950s (Yashar 1997). Popular organizations resisted that 
violent reaction, and, with the influx of other Latin American countries a guerrilla 
movement was established. During the 1970s and early 1980s, clashes between the 
guerrillas and the government forces became a constant. So did the ‘dirty war’, or the 
systematic kidnapping and murdering of people suspected to be involved with the 
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guerrillas. Entire communities, most of them rural and indigenous, were wiped off the 
map by the belligerent forces, in most cases by the Army or by related armed groups 
(such as the Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil). The final death toll was calculated by the 
Comisión de Esclarecimiento Histórico in 1999 at 200,000 people, 93% killed by the 
State; 85% of the killed were indigenous (Bastos and Camus 2003a). 
During this period, the ‘official’ representation of the indigenous movement was 
more concerned with cultural demands rather than with the political change sought by the 
guerrillas (Esquit Choy and Galvez Borell 1997; Esquit 2004). That is why some 
observers argue that indigenous people were trapped between two fires (Stoll 1993), the 
one established by the guerrillas and the one by the Government military action. Other 
authors claim that the participation of indigenous groups in the guerrilla forces during the 
armed conflict was more organized and systematic than it is was widely thought to be. 
Indigenous communities and organizations are not only innocent ‘victims’ of the conflict, 
but also direct participants of it (Bastos and Camus 2003b).  
Independent of how the participation of the indigenous movement in the armed 
conflict is characterized, most voices agree in that the violence was particularly severe 
against indigenous individuals and communities. Different authors have argued that the 
violence occurred during the civil war, or La Violencia as it is locally known, was 
particularly vicious against indigenous individuals and communities. La Violencia 
eliminated leadership and organizations in indigenous communities (Adams and Bastos 
2003) and it left a long lasting scar on people, leaving indigenous people “apprehensive” 
about being politically conspicuous (Adams 2001). 
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During the fieldwork performed in Guatemala, most of my interviewees pointed 
to the armed conflict and the State sponsored violence that prevailed in Guatemala during 
the 1970s and 1980s as the explanation for the lack of organization among indigenous 
people and for the weakness of the country’s civil society in general. For example, 
indigenous leaders and activists understand the civil war as a descabezamiento 
(beheading) of the indigenous movement (Tecpan meeting); while others go further and 
mention genocidio (genocide) and exterminación (extermination) of the indigenous 
population. 
 
Bolivia: The strength of social movements 
Bolivia, in marked contrast to Guatemala, has never in its republican history faced 
an armed conflict to the degree experienced in Guatemala. Even the national revolution 
of 1952 was relatively short and did not produce a large number of casualties (Malloy 
1970). Social movements have traditionally been strong, and unions show very high 
levels of internal cohesion and strength. The strength of the civil society has made some 
authors refer to the existence of a ‘dual power’ (state and civil society) as the political 
conditions of government in Bolivia (Zavaleta 1987).  
One of the apparent causes for the strength of unions and social movements in 
Bolivia is the organizational inheritance received from the mining working class, which 
almost disappeared from the country when international prices of minerals collapsed in 
the mid 1980s. After most jobs in the State owned mining industry closed, former mine 
workers emigrated from the Altiplano to the Chapare region, where they organized 
themselves into sindicatos campesinos (peasant unions), and started producing Coca 
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leaves and other crops. These organizations proved to be particularly strong defending 
the Coca cultivation, and made alliances with other indigenous and campesino 
organizations, culminating with the organization of a political party (first, the Asamblea 
para la Soberanía de los Pueblos (ASP), then the Instrumento Político para la Soberanía 
de los Pueblos (IPSP), and after that the Movimiento Al Socialismo) (Van Cott 2005), 
whose candidate, a Coca grower who emigrated from the Altiplano, is now the president 
of the country33. During my fieldwork, most indigenous people I spoke with identify 
clearly with the president, using phrases such as ‘he is one of us’, or ‘now we can really 
expect changes’. 
Indigenous communities in Bolivia have adopted different types of organizational 
forms during the years. During the Agrarian Reform of the 1950s, most Andean 
indigenous communities organized themselves into sindicatos campesinos (peasant 
unions), which were later networked into a larger nationally-based organization, the 
Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB) 
(Calderón and Dandler 1984; Rivera C. 2003). CSUTCB was the basis for the formation 
of the ASP. CSUTCB has also been part of the larger Central Obrera Boliviana (COB); 
while the campesino and indigenous organizations had a secondary role in this 
organization during the preeminence of the mine workers, during the late 1990s they 
began having an increasingly important role in the organization. The strength of Bolivian 
unions is directly related with the strength of the indigenous movement in the country. 
                                                 
33 On the path of success of the Movimiento Al Socialismo, see, among others (Van Cott 2003; Van Cott 
2005; Yashar 2005) 
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During this same period, indigenist discourses begun to be more common, and the 
campesino organizations claimed their indigenous origins. The crisis of the Bolivian 
representation system between 2000 and 2005, with 6 different presidents in office and 2 
national elections, contributed to the activation of the ethnic cleavage and to the 
emergence of the two new ethnic parties (Evo Morales’ MAS and Felipe Quispe’s 
Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti – MIP). 
 
Municipal Decentralization 
 
The Ley de Participación Popular in Bolivia 
In 1994, the Bolivian Government passed the Ley de Participación Popular, or 
Law of Popular Participation. This law established municipalities in the whole country, 
determining that all the territory of the country be part of some municipio (until then, 
only urban areas where part of the municipios). The municipio was defined as the 
territorial basis for local government, transferring significant resources and 
responsibilities to municipalities, which were also open for electoral competition. For a 
good initial description of the process see (Rojas 1996; SNPP 1996; SNPP 1997). 
The process was quickly embraced by indigenous organizations and individuals, 
who started participating directly in the municipios and obtaining electoral wins 
throughout the country (Albó 2002a; Albó, Rojas and Ticona 1995). Participation in 
municipal elections was still restricted to political parties (in the 2004 amendment to the 
constitution, other forms of citizen organizations were allowed to participate in 
elections), so most indigenous candidates participated in the lists of existing parties. 
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The Law of Popular Participation meant a dramatic change in Bolivia’s 
citizenship: the inclusion of indigenous and rural people into the political life of the 
country from which they had been historically excluded (Calla 2003; Calla and Molina B. 
2003; Moreno 2000). Many citizens in rural areas had, for the first time in their lives, the 
possibility to interact with the Bolivian State (in its local form), which in turn had now 
the presence, the resources, and the technical capacities to take care of people’s demands.  
This extension of citizenship increased the legitimacy of the Bolivian political 
system as a whole, but also raised the expectations that citizens had from it. It has been 
shown that good performance of local institutions can bolster support for the political 
system at the national level (though a poor performance can hurt it) (Hiskey and Seligson 
2003). Along these lines, the Law of Popular Participation was, for some, ‘insufficient’, 
and the subsequent crisis of the political system was in part evidence of the limitations 
that ‘neoliberal multiculturalism’ had  (Postero 2007b).  
A particularly relevant feature of the decentralization process in Bolivia is that, 
through the Law of Popular Participation, the State legally recognized all existent local 
organizations, either sindicatos campesinos and comunidades indígenas, in rural areas, as 
well as juntas vecinales in the cities. While the latter had already been previously 
recognized and played some role in the life of their municipios, the former had never 
been recognized formally before. Suddenly, thousands of indigenous and other local 
organizations became political actors in a new scenario with resources, potentialities, and 
significance; this created an avalanche of participation at the local level, which began to 
network into trans-municipal organizations (mancomunidades municipales). The 
municipio appeared as a scenario where the practice of politics was valid and interesting.  
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It is hard to tell how many of the municipal seats were occupied by indigenous 
leaders in the first municipal election of 1995, though the two indigenous parties obtained 
4.4% of all votes cast. In the latest municipal elections Bolivia held in 2004, MAS won 
18.6% of total votes with 452 of the total 1,804 available municipal seats in the country. 
This was also the first year in which indigenous peoples were allowed to participate 
directly in elections, presenting their candidates; these organizations obtained a total of 
105 municipal seats. These figures show clearly the high political performance of the 
indigenous movement in the context of the Law of Popular Participation. 
 
Slow process in Guatemala 
The local level has historically been relevant in Guatemala. For different authors 
and observers, the most relevant type of identities in Guatemala is locally based. 
Municipal boundaries are usually coincident with ethno-cultural distinct populations, 
creating strong local level identities, with the resulting fragmentation present at the 
national level (de Paz 2007; Smith 1990b). This idea was widely mentioned during the 
interviews performed in Guatemala as part of the fieldwork activities. 
Inspired by a region-wide trend, Guatemala has also recently started a 
decentralization process which places more resources at the municipal level and 
highlights the potential of this level for promoting human development34. The 
implementation of the new legal framework aims to generate a process of development 
                                                 
34 In 2002, the Guatemalan government passed the Ley del Código Municipal, the Ley de los Consejos de 
Desarrollo Urbano y Rural, and the Ley General de Decentralización. 
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based on the municipalities, changing the fact that Guatemala spends very little on local 
government, less than most other countries in the world (Seligson 2005)35.  
However, the implementation of the decentralization process has shown to be 
particularly slow and marked by a very limited participation of local and communal 
organizations. A possible explanation for this is that, in contrast to the Bolivian 
experience, the Guatemalan process lacks the legal recognition of local territorially-based 
organizations. The Ley de Consejos de Desarrollo Urbano y Rural promotes the creation 
of new organizations (the Consejos Municipales de Desarrollo) instead of legally 
recognizing local organizations as the basis of active citizen participation in municipal 
activities36. 
Two elements seem to determine the limited breadth of municipal decentralization 
in Guatemala. First, the limitations in the legal framework itself, which transfers a limited 
amount of resources to municipios and fails to recognize existent local organizations. 
Second, the weakness of civil society, which does not seem to possess the levels of 
organization and participative political culture to make optimal use of the opportunity and 
take over the process as happened in the Bolivian case. The novelty and limitations of the 
decentralization process in Guatemala impede the activation of an already weak civil 
society, missing the opportunity to develop politically and to integrate into a nation level 
political movement. 
                                                 
35 In fact, low State investment is a characteristic of Guatemala; the country has a very weak state measured 
in terms of expenditure of Gross National Product on government programs (Seligson 2005). 
36 The Guatemalan law recognizes pre-existent local organizations, such as the Alcadías Comunitarias and 
Alcaldías Indígenas, which are indigenous forms of representation but not of communal organization. For a 
detailed description of results in municipal elections in Guatemala see (Mack 2006). 
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Alternative Explanations  
 
Attachment to the nation 
When Guatemalans are asked directly about the lack of political success of the 
indigenous movement in the country, a very common explanation of the weak 
engagement of indigenous people in national politics is the supposedly weak sense of 
national belonging that indigenous Guatemalans have when compared to ladino citizens. 
“Indigenous people don’t feel Guatemalan” is an expression that is part of the discourse 
of many Guatemalans.  
This argument is consistent with the alleged permanent political and cultural 
struggle between Indians and the State in Guatemala, which might also be the source of 
indigenous participation in the armed conflict (Adams 2001; Smith 1990b). 
Discrimination is a very pervasive feature of Guatemalan society. Indigenous people are 
discriminated at many levels by the ladino population; there are several accounts of 
ethnic discrimination and hatred (Hale 2005). Discrimination against indigenous people 
permeates as a practice even within state official activities (Casaús Arzú 1998), and for 
the state, oftentimes, the indigenous population is only a tourist attracting face of 
Guatemala (Hendrickson 2001). This is what has made Richard Adams name Guatemala 
a ‘ladinocratic’ state (Adams 2001). Along the lines of contemporary cultural studies 
theory, and to put it in Cojti’s words, the Guatemalan state is ‘prisoner of the 
homogenizing vision of a mono ethnic and mono cultural nation’ (Cojti 1998). 
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As the theoretical insight indicates, attachment to the nation is a condition for 
political participation (Linz, Stepan and Yadav 2007; Rustow 1970). Is it possible, then, 
that indigenous people participate less in Guatemalan politics, and thus are less 
successful in it, because they feel less attached to Guatemala as a nation? That is the logic 
behind hypothesis #4 presented as an alternate explanation in this chapter. 
 
Protestantism 
Guatemala has witnessed a growing importance of Protestantism during the last 
decades, with thousands of churches and high rates of conversion (Garrard Burnett 1989; 
Garrard Burnett 1998; Gill 1994; Stoll 1990). Many leaders and public personalities are 
converted Protestants, and the proportion of people who are members of some non 
Catholic Christian group has been increasing steadily during the past four decades. Rios 
Montt, the dictator who ruled the country between 1982 and 1983 and whose government 
was responsible for a large number of deaths and an increase in the violence against 
indigenous communities, was himself a born-again Christian.  
In contrast, while it is true that the proportion of non-Catholic Christians has been 
growing in Bolivia during the last two decades, it has being doing so at a much lower 
rate. This is true for both people who identify as indigenous and for those who identify as 
mestizo and white. The Bolivian population remains still primarily Catholic, and the 
traditional forms of organization and participation prevail in many indigenous 
communities. 
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Table 7 below shows the proportion of people who are members of some non-
Catholic Christian group in Bolivia and Guatemala, specifying indigenous vs. non-
indigenous. Data come from the 2006 round of surveys conducted by LAPOP in the two 
countries. 
 
Table 7: Proportion of non-Catholic Christians in Bolivia and Guatemala,  
by ethnic group 
Bolivia Guatemala  
Indigenous Non-
indigenous 
Total Indigenous Non-
indigenous 
Total 
Non-catholic Christian 23.3 18.6 19.8 37.5 32.1 34.2 
Other religion 76.7 81.4 80.2 62.5 67.9 65.8 
Source: LAPOP 2006 
 
Considering the country as a whole, the proportion of people with a non-Catholic 
Christian faith is 75% greater in Guatemala than in Bolivia. When only individuals who 
identify as indigenous are considered, the difference is evident; almost 2 out of every 5 
indigenous people in Guatemala are Protestant, while less than 1 in 5 are in Bolivia. If we 
add the fact that conversion into the Protestant faith might have a negative effect on the 
chances that a person identifies as indigenous in Guatemala, then the importance of non-
Catholic Christians among indigenous people in Guatemala could be even greater. 
Could it be, then, that the much lower profile of indigenous people in Guatemalan 
politics is a consequence of a larger number of indigenous people converted into 
Protestantism than in Bolivia? The empirical evidence regarding this alternative 
hypothesis is discussed in the results section. 
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Hypotheses Testing 
 
Data and measurement  
Data employed in this chapter come from the Latin American Public Opinion 
Project (LAPOP) database. The surveys conducted by LAPOP in Bolivia in 2006 and in 
Guatemala in 2004 and 2006 are employed here; these surveys were implemented on 
nationally representative samples following rigorous scientific standards37. The total 
number of observations for Bolivia is 3,008; the Guatemalan sample has an N of 1,498 
interviews. 
 
Dependent variables 
Three dependent variables are considered alternatively for the analyses; these 
variables refer to how actively a citizen exercises his or her citizenship rights. The 
variables are a) a measure of participation in municipal activities; b) a measure of 
whether the person talks about politics as part of his or her everyday life; and c), a 
dummy variable for having voted in the most recent presidential election (2005 in Bolivia 
and 2003 in Guatemala). 
Having participated in a municipal meeting during the last year is measured with 
the item: During the last year, have you participated in an open municipal meeting? 11% 
of all respondents claimed to have participated in such meeting over the last year. 
                                                 
37 For more information on LAPOP and the surveys visit www.lapopsurveys.org; for more information on 
the Bolivian and Guatemalan studies see (Azpuru and Pira 2006; Azpuru, Pira and Lucas 2004; Seligson, et 
al. 2006). 
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Talking politics is measured with: ¿Con qué frecuencia habla usted de política 
con otras personas? (How frequently do you talk about politics with other people?). The 
variable is measured using a 5 point 0 to 4 scale in which 0 means ‘never’, 1 ‘rarely’, 2 ‘a 
few times a month’, 3 ‘a few times per week’, and 4 ‘daily’. Mean value of the scale is 
1.2, and standard deviation is 1.12. 
Finally, a dichotomous variable, voted in national election, is coded with the 
value of 1 if the person voted in the most recent presidential election and 0 if he or she 
did not vote. 78% of all respondents voted in the respective election. I excluded as 
missing cases those respondents who were not yet old enough to vote in the previous 
election. 
 
Independent variables 
Participation in community activities is measured with a dichotomous variable 
resulting from this item in the LAPOP questionnaire: En el último año usted ha 
contribuido para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad? (During the last year 
have you contributed to the solution of a problem in your community?).  
Indigenous: A dichotomous variable coded 1 if the person identifies as indigenous 
(or as indígena and originario in Bolivia38). 
A measure of violence experience, defined by whether the respondent lost a 
family member during the armed conflict (only asked in Guatemala).39 
                                                 
38 Indígena is the word used in the eastern lowlands of the country for indigenous people; in the Andes, 
originario is more commonly used (Calla 2003); see chapter II of this dissertation. 
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Measures of fear of participating as candidate in an election and fear of voting in 
an election are also included (only asked in Guatemala).40 
National pride, measured with the item: How proud do you feel of being Bolivian 
/ Guatemalan? on a 10 point 0 to 9 scale. 
Non-Catholic Christian, a dummy variable coded 1 if the person has a Protestant 
or other non-Catholic religious preference, and 0 otherwise. 
Also included as socioeconomic controls are: gender; age (in years); wealth 
measured in household goods in the respondent’s home; level of education attained; 
estimated family income. 
 
Results 
 
Participation in local politics and communal activities 
An implication of hypothesis 2 discussed is that the participation in national 
politics should be higher in countries in which citizens are active in local politics than in 
countries where citizens are more passive at the local level. As a consequence of being 
more involved in local politics, Bolivian citizens should participate more in local politics 
than an average Guatemalan citizen. 
                                                                                                                                                 
39 The question asked was ¿Ud. ha perdido algún miembro de su familia o pariente cercano, a 
consecuencia del conflicto armado que sufrió el país? (Have you lost any family member or close relative 
as a consequence of the armed conflict that the country suffered?). 2004 was the last year in which this 
question was employed in the LAPOP questionnaire, so data from that year are used. 
40 The questions employed were ¿Con cuánto temor se postularía para un cargo de elección popular? 
(How much would you fear participating in the solution of problems in your community?) and ¿Con cuánto 
temor votaría en una elección nacional? (How much would you fear voting in a national election?); 
options are coded into a three point scale corresponding to without fear, with some fear, with a lot of fear. 
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Data from the 2006 AmericasBarometer by LAPOP show that this is in fact the 
case. The percentage of people who claim to have participated in some type of municipal 
meeting during the last year in Bolivia is 13%, while in Guatemala is only 7.5%. When 
people who identify as indigenous are compared in the two countries, 16% of Bolivian 
indigenous participate in municipal meetings, while only 9% of Guatemalan indigenous 
do. Both differences are statistically significant (p<.01) employing the appropriate 
standard errors for complex sample data analyses41.  
Hypothesis 2 implies differences in participation in national politics; an average 
Bolivian should show higher levels of participation in politics at the national level than an 
average citizen from Guatemala, and the difference should be even higher among 
individuals who identify as indigenous. The analyzed data seem to support this argument: 
Bolivians seem to be more interested and more engaged in politics than Guatemalans. 
Official turnout data confirms that proportionally more Bolivians voted in the most recent 
national election (2005) (84.5%) than compared to Guatemalans (54.5%).  
Among respondents to the LAPOP national surveys in each country, the 
proportion of citizens who voted in each case is not very different from the official 
figures (91% in Bolivia and 57% in Guatemala). An advantage of survey data is that it is 
possible to determine the characteristics of citizens who voted and of those who did not.  
A serious obstacle for political participation in some Latin American countries is 
that many citizens simply do not have a valid identification, and thus are not registered to 
                                                 
41 Analyses of data from complex samples requires that larger than usual standard errors be computed due 
to clustering and stratification procedures (Kish and Frankel 1974; Knott 1991; Rust 1985; Skinner, et al. 
1989).  
 104
vote. Ineffective registration systems have been shown to be a factor reducing electoral 
turnout (Perez-Liñan 2001). The proportion of people who are not registered to vote is 
greater in Guatemala than in Bolivia, and is also much larger among indigenous citizens. 
Table 8 below presents the percentage of people registered to vote in each of the two 
countries, comparing the indigenous and the non-indigenous respondents. 
 
Table 8: Percentage of people registered to vote in Bolivia and Guatemala,  
by ethnic group 
Bolivia Guatemala  
Indigenous Non-
indigenous 
Total Indigenous Non-
indigenous 
Total 
Registered to vote 87.1 84.8 85.3 68.6 77 83.7 
Not registered 12.9 15.2 14.7 31.4 23 26.3 
Source: LAPOP 2006 
 
The final model for political participation, Table 10, shows the effect on 
participation in national politics that participating in communal activities and in 
municipal politics has. 
 
Violence and fear 
Evidence from the 2004 survey conducted by LAPOP in Guatemala (these items 
were questioned in the Guatemala surveys only until 2004) confirms the assumption that 
the armed conflict had a larger toll among the indigenous population. When asked 
whether the respondent had lost any family member during the armed conflict, 11% of 
non-indigenous families had lost a member; while the percentage among indigenous 
families rises to 16% (difference between the proportions is statistically significant at the 
.01 level). While this sad figure is remarkably high for the whole country (in average, 
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13.5% of all respondents claim to have lost a family member during the conflict), 
violence seems to have affected indigenous families at a higher rate than non-indigenous 
families. This relationship is robust even after controlling for socioeconomic factors, 
including area of residence (armed conflict was more wide-spread in rural areas than in 
the cities); when a logistic regression is fit on the 2004 data, the probability that the 
respondent lost a family member during the armed conflict is 65% higher among 
individuals who identify as indigenous when compared to non-indigenous respondents42. 
The effect that the direct experience with violence has on levels of local and 
national political participation is large and relevant, though contrary to what was 
expected. Table 9 below shows the results of logistic regressions fit on two dependent 
variables, one of them local: whether the respondent participated during the last year in a 
municipal meeting; and the other, a measure of participation in national politics: whether 
he or she voted in the last national election. Under the assumption that fear would also 
have a negative effect on political participation, the models include the fear measures 
discussed above. Age, gender, and education are also included as socioeconomic 
controls. 
 
                                                 
42 The percentage of increase in the probability that the outcome is positive is obtained from the odds ratios 
produced in the logistic regression model (Hoffmann 2004; Long 1997).  
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Table 9: Effect of experience of violence in local and national participation. 
Guatemala 2004 
Voted in elections Participates in municipio  
Odds ratio T Odds ratio t 
Violence experienced 1.54* 2.16 2.29* 4.18 
Fears voting .75* 2.39 -- -- 
Fears participating as candidate -- -- .76* -2.20 
Indigenous 1.14 .95 1.44 1.83 
Age 1.02* 3.51 1.01 .64 
Gender   .71* -2.45 .63* -2.78 
Family income .99 0 1.00 .24 
Education 1.08* 4.32 .99 -.23 
N  /  Nagelerke R Square 1110 .04 931 .04 
*: p<.05 
Source: LAPOP 2004. Standard errors adjusted for design effects. 
 
Surprisingly, having experienced violence has a large positive effect on political 
participation, both at the national and at the local level. The relationship is 
straightforward and clear: Individuals who experienced violence during the armed 
conflict are more engaged in both local and national politics than those who did not lose a 
family member during the armed conflict. The probability that a person who lost a family 
member during the internal war voted in the most recent election is 54% higher than the 
same probability for someone who did not experience violence directly. Likewise, the 
same experience of violence increases the probability that the person participated in a 
municipal activity by 129%. 
Fear has the expected effect on political participation. Every additional step in the 
three point fear of voting scale reduces the probability that a person voted in an election 
by 25%. Consistently, fear of participating as a candidate reduces the probability that a 
person participates in municipal meetings by a similar proportion. 
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After socioeconomic factors are controlled for, indigenous and non-indigenous 
Guatemalans react in a similar way to the variables considered here. Having an 
indigenous identity does not seem to affect the level of political participation at the two 
levels. Women, on the other hand, are significantly less likely to participate than men 
both in national elections and at municipal meetings. Age and education increase the 
chances that a person voted, but have no effect on municipal participation. 
 
Final models 
Table 10 below shows the results for the final equations for the three dependent 
variables using the LAPOP 2006 data. Municipal meeting and vote in election show odds 
ratios from the exponentiation of the coefficients resulting from the logistic regressions 
fitted on the data. Talking politics presents the odds ratios from the ordered logistic 
regression ran on the 5 point ordinal scale of the dependent variable43. T values are 
presented in parentheses. Results are presented with the appropriate standard errors that 
account for design effects of the sampling procedures. 
 
                                                 
43 An LM test was ran and the data do not violate the proportionality of odds across response categories 
assumption required for this statistical model (Hoffmann 2004; Long 1997; Williams 2006). 
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Table 10. Results of the final models for the three dependent variables 
Municipal meeting Talking politics Vote election Variable 
Pooled 
dataset 
Bolivia Guate
mala 
Pooled 
dataset 
Bolivia Guate
mala 
Pooled 
dataset 
Bolivia Guate
mala 
Municipal meeting -- -- -- 1.84* (5.36) 
1.79* 
(4.43) 
1.82* 
(2.57) 
1.52* 
(2.63) 
1.64* 
(2.51) 
1.23 
(.69) 
Talking politics -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.3* (5.56) 
1.20* 
(3.26) 
1.62* 
(4.48) 
Fears voting -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- .84 (-1.38) 
Fears participating as 
candidate -- -- 
1.03 
(.19) -- -- 
.77*  
(-2.55) -- -- -- 
Community 
participation 
3.96* 
(11.90) 
3.88* 
(10.10) 
3.79* 
(5.48) 
1.78* 
(7.18) 
1.74* 
(5.32) 
1.96* 
(4.52) 
1.42* 
(3.28) 
1.36* 
(2.10) 
1.55* 
(2.9) 
National pride 1.02 (.41) 
1.04 
(.61) 
.96  
(-.47) 
1.12* 
(3.84) 
1.19* 
(3.69) 
1.06 
(1.43) 
1.04 
(1.22) 
1.07 
(1.48) 
1.01 
(.26)  
Indigenous 1.42* (2.66) 
1.27 
(1.55) 
1.9* 
(2.39) 
.89 
(-1.23) 
.97  
(-.23) 
.76  
(-1.50) 
1.44* 
(3.25) 
1.57* 
(2.67) 
1.27 
(1.50) 
Non-Catholic 
Christian 
.81  
(-1.34) 
.71  
(-1.65) 
1.03 
(.13) 
1.08 
(.95) 
1.13 
(1.11) 
.95 
(-.41) 
.95  
(-.51)   
Age 1.01 (1.86) 
1.01 
(1.72) 
1.01 
(1.13) 
.99 
(-1.42) 
.99 
(-.92) 
.99 
(-.99) 
1.05* 
(10.97) 
1.06* 
(8.94) 
1.03* 
(4.90) 
Gender .54* (-5.28) 
.51*  
(-5.13) 
.89  
(-.39) 
.62* 
(-7.68) 
.61* 
(-6.05) 
.67* 
(-3.58) 
.69* 
(-4.06) 
.75*  
(-2.32) 
.59*  
(-3.92) 
Wealth .88* (-2.86) 
.83*  
(-3.66) 
1.08 
(.97) 
1.09* 
(3.23) 
1.06 
(1.68) 
1.15* 
(3.12)  
1.10* 
(3.16) 
1.14* 
(2.69) 
1.05 
(1.09) 
Education 1.25* (2.73) 
1.27* 
(2.63) 
1.22 
(1.02) 
1.71* 
(10.27) 
1.82* 
(9.84) 
1.35* 
(3.04) 
1.63* 
(6.96) 
1.78* 
(6.12) 
1.44* 
(3.47) 
Guatemala .54* (-4.06) -- -- 
.56* 
(-5.55) -- -- 
.64* 
(-4.23) -- -- 
N 4030 2733 988 3951 2700 967 3845 2696 1079 
*: p<.05 
Odds ratios / (t value) 
Source: LAPOP 2006. Standard errors adjusted for design effects. 
 
The predictor that presents a very strong and robust effect on the three dependent 
variables across the board is participation in community activities. This variable increases 
the chances that a person participates in municipal meetings by almost 300% (the 
probability that a person who participates in community activities also participates in 
municipal meetings is almost four times that of someone who does not participate). The 
variable also significantly increases the odds that someone will talk about politics, and 
increases the probability of voting in a national election by 55% in Guatemala and 36% 
in Bolivia. 
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As it was noted before, the levels of participation are much lower in Guatemala 
than in Bolivia. After controlling for the effect of all other variables in the table, the 
probability that a respondent from Guatemala participates in a municipal meeting is only 
54% of the same probability for a Bolivian respondent. A similar effect of the Guatemala 
dummy variable can be evidenced in the models for the other dependent variables. 
In the additive logic of the statistical models discussed here, participating in a 
municipal meeting increases the likelihood that a person will engage in conversations 
about politics on a regular basis. In the same logic, both variables – participating in a 
municipal meeting and talking politics – have a positive effect on the probability that the 
citizen votes in a national election. The only exception is participating in a municipal 
meeting, which does not have any significant effect on voting in Guatemala. 
Indigenous people are more likely to participate in municipal meetings than non-
indigenous in Guatemala, but not in Bolivia. Conversely, Indians are more engaged in 
national politics than people who have other ethnic identities in Bolivia but not in 
Guatemala. 
Being part of a non-Catholic Christian religious faith does not have any effect on 
any of the three dependent variables considered in the analyses. Employing the same 
statistical model discussed here, I tested this relationship for the subpopulation of those 
who identify as indigenous separately, and the relationship also misses any statistical 
significance. It seems safe to conclude that this alleged relationship is nonexistent. 
Table 10 shows that attachment to the national political community has a relevant 
effect on how often people talk about politics, at least in Bolivia; national pride, as part of 
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the attachment to the national political community, is a relevant predictor for system 
support and, in general, a condition for the well-functioning of democracy44. Could it be 
that indigenous people in Guatemala are less attached to the nation and that is why they 
are less active in politics? I have tested this relationship in different multiple regression 
models, and once socioeconomic factors are controlled for, there is no relationship 
between indigenous identity and any measure of attachment to the nation. This finding 
confirms what is presented in the multi-country analysis in chapter V of this dissertation. 
Among the socioeconomic controls included in the models, gender has a robust 
effect across the table. Women are systematically less likely to participate in the political 
activities discussed here, and that is valid for both Guatemala and Bolivia. Education has 
a positive effect for all cases too; higher educated people are more likely to participate in 
politics. The only exception for both gender and education are municipal meetings in 
Guatemala, the dependent variable for which both predictors miss statistical significance. 
The effect of every additional household good available at the respondents home 
is positive for talking politics and for voting in a national election, but is negative for 
participation in municipal meetings in Bolivia. This finding suggests that municipal 
spaces are used much more frequently by individuals of lower socioeconomic status than 
by wealthier people. 
 
                                                 
44 On this subject, see chapter V of this dissertation and (Moreno 2007a). 
 111
Discussion 
 
Violence, fear, and political participation 
Guatemala systematically shows much lower levels of participation in local and 
national politics than Bolivia; this difference is particularly noticeable when indigenous 
populations are considered. The sequels of fear and violence resulting from the armed 
conflict that Guatemala suffered seem to have some relationship with the differences in 
political participation in general, but also in the participation of indigenous people in 
particular. 
The effect of fear on voting turnout and participation in local politics confirms the 
expectations I had about this variable, and gives empirical support to hypothesis 1: fear 
reduces political participation. The relationship presents itself with much more strength in 
the 2004 Guatemalan data (Table 9) than in those of 2006 (Table 10). This difference 
might be related to the fact that fear has been decreasing across time, as has been the 
memory of the armed conflict, particularly among the younger generations. 
However, and contrarily to what I had expected, having had a family member 
killed during the armed conflict in Guatemala increases the chances that a person 
participates both at the local and at the national level. This type of experience with 
violence does not seem to deter political participation, but to encourage it. This surprising 
result could have two explanations. First, it is possible that families who are more 
politically active were the ones who experienced violence more directly than less active 
families; as a result, those who participate more now are members of the same families 
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who lost a member decades ago. Second, having experienced violence could be triggering 
a motivation for participation in politics as an altruistic desire for solving the problems 
that caused the loss of a family member before. These two hypotheses should receive 
further attention in specific research. 
 
Participation in local politics 
All variables related to participation in local and municipal activities show a very 
strong positive effect on participation in national politics. Consistently with Putnam’s 
social capital theory (Putnam 2002), participating in communal activities drastically 
increases the chances that the person will be engaged actively in political activities both 
at the municipal and at the national level. The more active a person is in trying to solve 
the problems in his or her community, the more likely that she will also practice her 
political rights as a citizen; in the results discussed here, it is the indigenous people as the 
group of citizens who precisely practice the least of these political rights. 
The frequency in which people talk about politics is also another relevant 
predictor of participating in a national election. If we consider that talking politics usually 
takes place among neighbors, family members, or members of the local community, then 
this is another variable that refers to civic engagement in the local space. Participating in 
politics locally, including engaging in conversations about political issues increases the 
chances that the citizen will be active at the national level. 
Participating in municipal meetings increases the probability that the person also 
participates in national politics; that happens clearly in Bolivia, but not in Guatemala. 
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The fact that, in Guatemala, participation in municipal meetings does not have a 
significant effect on the probability that citizens vote in a national election is also 
meaningful. The lack of a positive effect can be interpreted as another sign of the 
weakness of the municipal decentralization process in Guatemala, which does not seem 
to make individuals more interested in political activities. Despite the finding that 
indigenous people tend to have a better relationship with the municipios than ladinos45, 
participating in Guatemalan municipal spaces does not increase the chances that a person 
also participates in national politics. This result (the lack of a relationship), is another 
‘smoking gun’ signaling the different role of municipal spaces in the formation of a 
participatory culture among citizens. 
 
Discussing the alternative hypotheses 
Since the ground-breaking study of Protestantism by Max Weber in the early 20th 
century (Weber 1946 (1905)), we know about the effect of religious visions on personal 
ethics and behavior. It seems at least plausible that a change from more community-based 
Catholicism to a preeminently individually-based Protestantism would also bring along 
consequences to the way people interact, organize themselves, and participate in 
community activities, including politics. This religious change would be particularly felt 
on the prevalence of local indigenous traditions, including organizational ones (Cleary 
and Steigenga 2004; Eber 2000); this idea was also mentioned often during the interviews 
I conducted in Guatemala. 
                                                 
45 This relationship has been noted previously in LAPOP studies (Azpuru and Pira 2006). 
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However, this relationship, implied in hypothesis 3 does not seem to exist in the 
data from the two countries. Individuals who converted to Protestantism are no different 
at all in their political participation than citizens who are Catholics or members of other 
religious group. This is the case for the two countries and for the subpopulation of those 
who identify as indigenous. These results suggest that the alleged negative effect of 
Protestant conversion on indigenous people’s political capacities should be, at the very 
least, revised. 
Hypothesis 4, the second alternative hypothesis presented here, also fails in 
finding support in the data. Confirming what is discussed at a more general level in 
chapter V, there is no empirical evidence supporting the claim that indigenous people feel 
less attached to the national political community in Guatemala. Attachment to the nation 
in both countries has been shown in previous studies to be affected more by 
socioeconomic status than by ethnic identity (Moreno 2008); it is not that indigenous 
people feel less attached to the nation, but that occupying a disadvantaged socioeconomic 
position significantly reduces the strength of the bond between citizens and the State, 
independent of their ethnic identity. 
Indigenous communities in Guatemala do not include autonomy and self-
determination as part of their usual demands46; on the contrary, they demand from the 
Guatemalan State and society more inclusion and policies aimed at equalizing society in 
the larger framework of multicultural recognition (Bastos 2006; Bastos and Camus 
2003b; Cojti, Son Chonay and Rodriguez Guajan 2007). The fact that indigenous 
                                                 
46 On the implications of inclusion versus self-determination demands and policies see, among others, 
(Barry 2001; Kymlicka 2001; Taylor and Gutmann 1994). 
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communities demand inclusion in the Guatemalan society instead of self-determination 
seems to reinforce, from a different point of view, the finding that the indigenous in 
Guatemala do not feel less attached to the nation than do other Guatemalans. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
NATIONAL AND ETHNIC MINORITY IDENTITIES IN THE 
AMERICAS47 
 
This chapter focuses on the connection citizens have to their national political 
community. In particular, it explores the relationship between ethnic identity and the 
sense of national belonging, testing different hypotheses and integrating levels of analysis 
in the search for a comprehensive explanation of the relationship in the Americas. 
The relationship between ethnic identities and the nation has become more 
relevant in the last two decades, during which ethnic identities have become more 
important as part of a trend that could very well be called global (Brysk 2000; Connor 
1994; Kymlicka 1995)48. In the 1990s, the breakdown of Yugoslavia and the civil war in 
Rwanda were the most visible signs, albeit not the only ones, of the potentially negative 
consequences of the exacerbation of identity on political stability in those countries. 
In this chapter responses are sought for the following questions: Following a 
world-wide trend of politicization of ethnic identities, do ethnic minorities feel less 
attached to the nation than majority groups? What variables might explain the relative 
strength of the link between the citizen and the national political community? In order to 
perform this analysis, data from LAPOP’s AmericasBarometer for the year 2006-07, 
comprising 22 countries in the Americas, are used. 
                                                 
47 An earlier version of this chapter was published in a comparative volume prepared by the Latin 
American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) (Moreno 2007a). 
48 The extent by which the emergence of indigenous movements in Latin America is a product of the 
globalization process has been recently questioned  by some authors (Yashar 2007). 
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The National Political Community and the Citizens 
The sense of national belonging is one of the most important conditions for 
democracy. In order to feel motivated to participate in democracy as well as to abide by 
the law, citizens need to recognize the State they live in as legitimate (Linz and Stepan 
1996; Linz, et al. 2007). From this insight, and following the line drawn by Mill (1993), 
Rustow suggests that the strength of the bond between citizen and State is an 
indispensable condition for democracy (Rustow 1970). 
Being part of a nation in some way implies that one’s own destiny is joined to that 
of the rest of that nation’s citizens. It also implies that all citizens accept and recognize 
the legitimate power of the State. The national political community, the nation of citizens, 
can therefore be understood as an imaginary community, as it has been defined in 
Anderson’s (1991) seminal work; that is, as a community of persons who, without 
knowing each other, imagine they share the same bond of fraternity and equality. 
In spite of the importance of this area of study, comparative politics has paid very 
little attention to this matter, and empirical studies based on quantitative information have 
been scarce or nonexistent (Juviler and Stroschein 1999). Notable exceptions are the 
Smith and Jarkko study (2001), and the recent Elkins and Sides paper (2006) (See also 
(Dowley and Silver 2000)). 
Most studies that deal with national identity do so only tangentially, often 
stemming from the greater concept of system support, as part of what has been called 
“diffuse support” (Dalton 1999; Dalton 2004; Easton 1965; Easton 1975; Muller, Jukam 
and Seligson 1982; Norris 1999). In this chapter, an explicit distinction is made between 
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the concepts of support for the system and that of belonging to a national political 
community. Although it seems clear that feeling oneself part of a political nation is a 
necessary condition for showing support for the political and institutional system, it 
should not be considered part of the same theoretical construct. 
 
Measuring attachment to the national political community 
 
This chapter empirically analyzes two variables that refer to the strength of the 
bonds that link citizens to the national political community. The first stems from the 
following question used in the LAPOP surveys: How proud are you of being (Mexican, 
Guatemalan, etc.)? The second variable comes from the question that reads In spite of 
our differences, as (Mexicans, Guatemalans, etc.) we have values that unite us as a 
country. To what extent do you agree with this statement? Both questions were initially 
measured on a 1 to 7 scale, in which 1 means “Not at all” and 7 “Very much”; values 
were recoded into a zero to 100 scale to present the results more easily. These questions 
are normally used in studies regarding this topic, and are supported in the literature 
(Norris 1999; Sinnott 2005)49. 
The two variables measure two different dimensions of the bond between 
individuals and the national political community (a multidimensional concept 
(Kosterman and Feshbach 1989)). The first one directly addresses the level of pride that a 
person feels for his or her nationality and is based on the idea that the feeling of 
belonging to a national community is reflected in the pride of being a part of it; this 
                                                 
49 On the discussion about different dimensions in attachment to the nation see (de Figuereido and Elkins 
2003). 
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variable is thus called National Pride throughout this chapter. The second focuses on the 
idea that the nation exists beyond the territory of the State, in the values shared by its 
citizens (or at least in the belief that these values exist); I refer to this variable as 
Common Values in this paper. These two variables have a correlation of .247 (p<0.001), 
which means that they are related but not very highly, which suggests that the variables 
do indeed measure different dimensions of the concept. 
Figure 7 below illustrates the average values for both variables in each of the 
countries in the dataset. 
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Figure 7: National averages for common values and national pride 
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It can be seen that national pride averages are relatively high in all countries in the 
study, while the variation is much higher for the item that measures the level of 
agreement with the idea of common values. The United States is the country with the 
highest national average for this variable, and seems to stand out among the rest. 
Following the U.S. is the group including the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Jamaica, 
Canada, Venezuela, Uruguay, and Mexico. Next is the group made up of Colombia, 
Guyana, Honduras, Ecuador, Chile, El Salvador, Paraguay, Brazil and Guatemala. Much 
lower values belong to Bolivia and Nicaragua, whereas Panama has an even lower 
average which sets it apart from any other country in the series. 
 
Ethnic Minority Status and Attachment to the National Political Community 
One of the central defining characteristics of individuals, which in theory, at least, 
can become a focus point for strengthening the bond between the citizen and the state or 
nation, is ethnic identity. There are authors for whom ethnic diversity represents an 
obstacle to liberal democracy (Chua 2003; Horowitz 1985; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; 
Snyder 2000); the main argument for this point of view is that ethnic identities, 
understood as the “primordial” identity (Geertz 1963; Stack 1986; Van Evera 2001), 
create stronger alliances among members than those bonds created by national states that 
are made up of different ethnic groups. Tragic examples such as Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
in the 1990s are commonly used as evidence for this supposed contradiction between 
democracy and strengthened ethnic identity. 
However, this position has been increasingly debated, primarily using a less 
“essentialist” conception of ethnic identity, in which identities are understood as 
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complex, fluid, and malleable social constructs. This means that for some authors, ethnic 
diversity is not necessarily a problem for the democratic stability of a country (Abizadeh 
2002; Chandra 2006; Gutmann 2003; Kymlicka 2001) and that ethnic differences are 
relevant only when they go hand in hand with social and economic differences that 
systematically transform ethnic patterns into mechanisms for social stratification. 
One implication of the “primordialist” position in this debate is that ethnic 
identities would tend to be stronger than national identity (Davis and Brown 2002; 
Dowley and Silver 2000; Sidanius, et al. 1997). This means that ethnic minorities in the 
countries studied should exhibit a weaker feeling of belonging to the national community 
than individuals who belong to the majority ethnic group. In order to test this theory, a 
dichotomous variable, ethnic minority, was created assigning a value of 1 to individuals 
who identify themselves as part of a minority group in the country and 0 to those who 
identify as part of the majority ethnic group.  
 
Measuring ethnic minority status 
The ethnic minority variable was generated from the question: How do you 
describe yourself? This question was included as an item in the LAPOP questionnaire 
with slight variations in question wording and adjustments to the possible categories 
listed for each country. In most Latin American countries the majority was considered to 
be a group constituted by a combination of respondents who identified themselves as 
“white” and “mestizo” (mixed Native American and European), whereas “indigenous” 
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(Native American) and “afro descendants” are coded as part of the minority category;50 in 
the United States those who identify themselves as “white” were classified as the 
majority, whereas in Canada the individuals classified as part of the majority did not 
identify themselves with any other category except Canadian (principally French-
Canadian). In Brazil, individuals who identified as ‘branco’ and ‘pardo’ where coded as 
non-minorities. In Haiti, those identified as “white” were classified as the minority. Three 
of the twenty-two countries surveyed by LAPOP in 2006 were not included in the 
analysis: Paraguay, where there were no questions regarding ethnic identification on the 
questionnaire, as well as Jamaica and Guyana, where classifying individuals according to 
the options on the questionnaire is particularly complicated.51  
Table 11 below presents the proportion of respondents coded as ‘minorities’ in 
each of the countries included in the study. 
 
                                                 
50 Although it is true that in the particular cases of Guatemala and Bolivia the majority population is 
“indigenous” (Gurr 1993; Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005), the national governments that have historically 
been in power have been comprised of citizens who can be classified as “mestizos” or “white” Of course, 
the recent election of Evo Morales in Bolivia represents a substantial change in these power relations, and 
this has had important effects on citizen opinions and attitudes vis-à-vis the State, as confirmed by LAPOP 
studies (Seligson, et al. 2006). 
51 Details of those questionnaires applied in the surveys for each of the countries are available on the 
LAPOP internet web page (www.lapopsurveys.org). For a more extensive discussion of ethnic identity 
measurement see chapter II of this dissertation. 
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Table 11: Minority status by country 
Minority                   Total 
Country No Yes  
N 1251 158 1409 
Mexico % 88.8% 11.2% 100% 
N 873 593 1466 
Guatemala % 59.5% 40.5% 100% 
N 1089 196 1285 
El Salvador % 84.7% 15.3% 100% 
N 1391 98 1489 
Honduras % 93.4% 6.6% 100% 
N 1451 49 1500 
Nicaragua % 96.7% 3.3% 100% 
N 1174 310 1484 
Costa Rica % 79.1% 20.9% 100% 
N 1179 317 1496 
Panama % 78.8% 21.2% 100% 
N 1295 172 1467 
Colombia % 88.3% 11.7% 100% 
N 1362 114 1476 
Ecuador % 92.3% 7.7% 100% 
N 1125 299 1424 
Bolivia % 79.0% 21.0% 100% 
N 1306 147 1453 
Peru % 89.9% 10.1% 100% 
N 1403 76 1479 
Chile % 94.9% 5.1% 100% 
N 1399 78 1477 
Uruguay % 94.7% 5.3% 100% 
N 1190 269 1459 
Brazil % 81.6% 18.4% 100% 
N 1265 226 1491 
Venezuela % 84.8% 15.2% 100% 
N 997 492 1489 
Dominican Rep. % 67.0% 33.0% 100% 
N 1409 55 1464 
Haiti % 96.2% 3.8% 100% 
N 411 189 600 
Canada % 68.5% 31.5% 100% 
N 536 73 609 
USA % 88.0% 12.0% 100% 
N 22106 3911 26017 
Total % 85.0% 15.0% 100% 
Source: LAPOP 2006 
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Is there any relationship between ethnic minority status and the strength of the 
attachment to the national political community? There are relevant differences in the 
strength of attachment to the nation when ethnic majorities and minorities are considered 
in several of the countries for which data are available.  Figure 8 below gives an account 
of this. 
 
-.2
0
.2
.4
.6
M
ex
ic
o
G
ua
te
m
al
a 
*
E
l S
al
va
do
r
H
on
du
ra
s*
^
N
ic
ar
ag
ua
C
os
ta
 R
ic
a*
P
an
am
a*
C
ol
om
bi
a
E
cu
ad
or
B
ol
iv
ia
P
er
u*
^
C
hi
le
U
ru
gu
ay
B
ra
zi
l
V
en
ez
ue
la
D
om
in
ic
an
 R
ep
.
H
ai
ti
C
an
ad
a*
^
U
S
A
Positive differences imply higher values for non-minorities
Differences in National Pride and Common Values by Country
Common values National pride
* Dif. in National pride sig <.05; ^ Dif. in Common values sig<.05
Source: AmericasBarometer2006, by LAPOP
 
Figure 8: Differences in National Pride and Common Values by Country 
 
In a bivariate relationship, minorities tend to feel, in general, a weaker attachment 
to the national political community than ethnic majority groups. In the pooled dataset 
with 19 countries, minority status has a significant negative effect both on the measure of 
national pride and on the agreement with the idea of common values. In the individual 
countries included in the dataset, the statistically significant relationship holds 
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consistently in Canada, Peru, and Honduras, and is partially evident in Guatemala and 
Panama where national pride is lower among minorities. Only in the case of Costa Rica a 
positive, though very small in substantial terms, significant relationship can be observed 
(minorities appear to have stronger national pride). 
The key question that arises from these observations is: What factors cause ethnic 
identity to have a significant effect on the sense of belonging to the national political 
community in some countries and not in others? Why are ethnic differences relevant in 
these survey results in Peru but not in Ecuador, relevant in Honduras but not in 
Nicaragua? In other words, what do Canada, Honduras and Peru have in common that 
differentiates them from the rest of the countries in the sample?  
 
Seeking answers at the national level 
In order to answer the questions above, and following the available literature, four 
different hypotheses are tested focusing on the mean differences for the two variables at 
the national level: The level of development hypothesis, the ethnic fractionalization 
hypothesis, the institutional design hypothesis, and the discrimination hypothesis. 
 
1. The ethnic fractionalization hypothesis 
The ethnic fractionalization hypothesis points to the level of ethnic and cultural 
fractionalization in each country as the source of differences. Different authors have 
argued that ethnic and cultural fractionalization are factors that cause disunity in a 
national society; a larger number of ethnic and cultural groups implies less cooperation 
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between members of society, and has been pointed out as an obstacle for development 
and the provision of public goods (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly 1997; Easterly and Levine 
1997)52. Contradicting evidence has also been found (Arcand, Guillaumont and 
Jeanneney 2000; Collier 2001), and this topic remains hotly debated in the discipline 
(Cederman and Girardin 2007; Fearon 2003). 
There are two clear logical implications of this theory for the strength of the 
national political community that are considered in this chapter. First, countries with 
higher levels of ethnic and cultural and ethnic fractionalization should show lower 
averages in citizens’ strength to the national political community. Second, the relative 
size of the minority population should be negatively related to the strength of the 
attachment that minorities have to the nation.  
 
2. The institutional design hypothesis 
The institutional design hypothesis follows the theory of consociationalism within 
the comparative institutionalism line of research developed among others by Lijphart 
(1999) and tested extensively in the literature (Lijphart and Waisman 1996; Lustick, et al. 
2004; Norris 2004; Saideman, et al. 2002; Sartori 1994). The argument behind this theory 
asserts that the electoral rules, particularly the type of electoral system, have a direct 
effect on the legitimacy of the State and the stability of the political system. Proportional 
representation, and the sharing of power derived from it, is signalled as a source of 
legitimacy for the political system in plural societies. 
                                                 
52 For an ample discussion on this see (Fearon 2003) and (Cederman and Girardin 2007). 
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The central implication of the theory being tested here is whether higher 
proportionality decreases the differences between majority and minority groups. The 
basic hypothesis derived is that more proportional electoral systems should produce 
smaller differences in the strength of the attachment to the nation between majority and 
minority groups; in other words, the relative gap in attachment to the national political 
community between majorities and minorities should be smaller in countries with high 
proportionality in the electoral system. 
 
3. Discrimination hypothesis 
The discrimination hypothesis argues that political and economic discrimination 
is the cause of ethnic conflict (Gurr 1993; Horowitz 1985). This line of research is related 
to Social Identity Theory, and is based on the idea of stable patterns of dominance 
established along ethnic and racial lines (Sidanius, et al. 1997; Sidanius, et al. 1999; 
Tajfel 1978). Put simply, this theory suggests that people who feel discriminated against 
will have lower levels of system support than other individuals; also, ethnic cleavages in 
a hierarchical society can be associated with consistent discrimination patterns, resulting 
in that ethnic minority groups will be more discriminated against than non-minority 
groups. 
For the case of the attachment to the national political community, one clear 
implication of this theory can be formulated as a hypothesis to be tested: In countries 
where discrimination is more common, the relative difference between majorities and 
minorities in the attachment to the national political community will tend to be larger. 
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4. Level of development hypothesis 
Since Almond and Verba’s classic work (Almond and Verba 1963), different 
accounts of the positive relationship between the level of socioeconomic development 
and the legitimacy of the political system have been offered through time (Hagopian 
2000; Inglehart 1997; Jackman 1973; Norris 2004; Przeworski, et al. 2000).  
The level of development hypothesis claims that more developed countries will 
have stronger national political communities because the state has been able to provide 
enough benefits for society in general and that has a positive effect on its legitimacy. 
Legitimacy of the State is linked to its perceived neutrality and its capacity for providing 
development to all groups (Brown 1998). Evidence supporting this claim has been 
presented previously (Smith and Jarkko 2001). Two implications of this theory can be 
formulated as empirically testable hypotheses for this research: First, countries with 
higher levels of socioeconomic development should show higher averages for the 
Common Values and the National Pride variables. Second, differences between 
majorities and minorities in the strength of the attachment to the nation should be smaller 
in more developed countries. 
 
Data and Analysis 
 
1. Ethnic fractionalization hypothesis 
The two central dependent variables considered here are the national averages of 
National Pride and the agreement with the idea of Common Values. As the measure of 
ethnic and cultural fractionalization, I use the ethnic and cultural fractionalization indices 
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developed by Fearon (2003)53. These indices have a relatively high correlation with other 
measures of ethnic fractionalization, and are reliable estimates of the amount of diversity 
in each country. While the ethnic fractionalization index focuses on the country’s relative 
share of the population by minority ethnic ‘groups’54, the cultural fractionalization index 
focuses on the linguistic ‘distance’ between groups. As the measure of the relative size of 
the minority population in each country I use the proportion of people coded in each 
country as minority in the LAPOP database as described above. 
Is ethnic and cultural fractionalization related to the mean attachment to the 
national political community? A series of bivariate linear regression models were fitted 
on the database consisting of 19 observations, and no evidence of any relationship 
between the national averages and the two measures of fractionalization is evident. 
Consistently, and contradicting previous findings (Elkins and Sides 2006), the size of the 
minority population resulting from the survey data coding does not show any relationship 
with the national averages of National Pride and Common Values. In other words, more 
diverse countries do not necessarily have weaker average attachments of their citizens to 
the national political community. 
The level of fractionalization has, however, a clear effect on the difference 
between ethnic majority and minority groups. In the 19 countries database, the more 
diverse a country is, the larger the differences between the ethnic majority and minorities 
in the attachment to the nation. The effect of the cultural fractionalization index on 
                                                 
53 Fearon recognizes that it cannot be assumed that the existence and size of relevant ethnic “groups” is 
exogenous from political and economic processes. This issue is treated at length in chapter III of this 
dissertation; the use of the fractionalization measures in this chapter does not imply assuming such 
independence either. 
54 For a discussion on the ‘groupness’ of ethnic categories see (Brady and Kaplan 2000; Brubaker 2004; 
Chandra 2006).  
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differences in the Common Values measure related to ethnic minority status is large and 
statistically significant (R square=.22, sig. p<.05); when differences in National Pride are 
considered, the effect is also relevant (R square=.23, sig. p<.05). Both relationships hold 
significant even when the level of development of each country is controlled for. Figure 9 
below shows the effect of ethnic fractionalization on the differences between minorities 
and majorities in the Common Values dependent variable. 
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Source: Fearon 2003 and AmericasBarometer 2006 by LAPOP 
 
Figure 9: Effect of cultural fractionalization on differences between ethnic 
majorities and minorities 
 
The size of the minority population also seems to have some effect on the 
differences in National Pride; the larger the size of the minority population, the larger the 
difference in National Pride between non-minority and minority groups. In the 19 
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observation dataset, a bivariate regression of differences in National Pride on relative size 
of the minority population produces marginally significant results (R square=.17; sig. 
p<.1). 
 
2. Institutional design hypothesis 
The dependent variables considered here, are, once again, the relative difference 
in Common Values and National Pride between ethnic majorities and minorities in each 
country. Data come from the aggregated AmericasBarometer 2006 dataset, by LAPOP. 
The independent variable is a measure of Mean District Magnitude (MDM) as a proxy for 
proportionality of the electoral system55. Data for this variable were obtained from 
different sources, considering the most recent for each country56.  
Is there any relationship between MDM and the relative gap in the attachment to 
the national political community of majorities and minorities? The evidence appears to be 
inconclusive. After the deletion of Peru from the database (Peru has a MDM of 120, 
much higher than any other country in the database; its deletion was necessary in order to 
avoid the high leverage that the country exerted over the analysis), and with only 17 
observations, proportionality has a marginally significant negative effect on differences 
in the Common Values dependent variable (R square=.17; sig. p<.1), but no effect 
whatsoever on the National Pride one.  
                                                 
55 This strategy has been used repeatedly in the literature (Amorim Neto and Cox 1997; Elkins and Sides 
2006). 
56 Sources considered are: Mexico, Peru, Paraguay, Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador 
(Morgenstern and Vásquez-D'elia 2007); Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, Venezuela 
(Golder 2005); Bolivia, Nicaragua (Jones 1997); Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Guyana (Jones 1995). No 
reliable information was found for Haiti. 
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Figure 10 below illustrates the effect of MDM on the differences in Common 
Values. 
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Figure 10: Effect of District Magnitude on differences between ethnic majority and 
minorities 
 
Whether proportionality in electoral systems by itself improves representation of 
different minorities or not is something very much debated in contemporary political 
science, and the evidence is not yet conclusive (Lustick, et al. 2004; Norris 2004).  For 
example, it has also been shown that, under conditions of geographical concentration of 
ethnic minorities, Single Member District (SMD) systems can improve representation of 
minorities (Van Cott 2005). 
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3. Discrimination Hypothesis 
Data for levels of political discrimination were obtained from the Minorities At 
Risk project database updated until 2003 (MAR 2007). The political discrimination 
variable has a 0 to 4 ordinal scale in which 0 means no discrimination; 1 implies the 
existence of explicit neglect remedial policies; 2 means that no policies have been 
implemented to solve a historical condition of neglect of some minority group, but no 
deliberate exclusion is present; 3 implies substantial underrepresentation of minority 
groups; and 4 signifies that public policies explicitly restrict some of the groups’ political 
participation (MAR 2007).  
A second measure of discrimination used here is the difference between the 
perception of discrimination by ethnic majorities and minorities. This variable is 
produced by subtracting the average level of discrimination felt by minority groups from 
the average level of discrimination reported by members of the ethnic majority in the 
LAPOP surveys in each country. The measure of discrimination is the discrimination 
index described in the individual level of analysis section of this chapter. In other words, 
this is a measure of the distance in perceptions of discrimination felt by ethnic minorities 
and majorities.  
Is there a relationship between the national level of discrimination as measured by 
the MAR project and the differences between majorities and minorities? The bivariate 
lineal regression models fitted with the data show no evidence of any relationship 
between differences in attachment to the nation and the national values for political 
discrimination. Differences in the attachment to the nation of minorities and majorities 
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cannot be explained by the societal amount of discrimination, at least as measured by the 
MAR political discrimination index. Consistently, the difference in the perception of 
discrimination does not explain differences in attachment to the nation. 
 
4. Level of development hypothesis 
The measure of socioeconomic development I used in this chapter is the Human 
Development Index as measured by the UNDP for the year 2006 (UNDP 2006). This 
measure combines indicators of income per capita, life expectancy, and average levels of 
education for each country. It has a maximum value of 1. Alternatively, I use the gross 
domestic product measurement also calculated by the UNDP for the same year. While the 
HDI is a more comprehensive measure of socioeconomic development, GDP focuses 
only on the economic side of it. 
The first testable implication proposed for the analysis is whether people who live 
in more developed countries tend to feel a stronger attachment to the nation than people 
living in less developed countries. The evidence supports this relationship at least for the 
National Pride variable employed here. The level of development significantly increases 
the average pride in nationality that people have (R square=.21; sig. p<.05; N=22). This 
effect is robust even when the level of democracy is controlled for. Figure 11 below 
shows this relationship.  
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Source: UNDP 2006 and AmericasBarometer 2006, by LAPOP 
 
Figure 11: Effect of HDI on Average National Pride 
 
The Common Values dependent variable does not seem to be influenced by the 
Human Development Index, but shows some relationship with the purely economic GDP 
measure. GDP increases the national average for Common Values, and this relationship is 
statistically significant (p<.05). 
The second testable hypothesis of this theory suggests that the difference between 
minorities and majorities in attachment to the nation should be smaller in more developed 
countries. While the Common Values measure shows no relationship at all, differences in 
National Pride seem to be related with the level of development but in the opposite way it 
was expected: in the 19 case database, more developed countries tend to have larger 
differences than less developed countries (R square=.19; sig. p<.1; N=19). 
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Is this difference really due to the level of socioeconomic development or is there 
some other possible explanation? Unfortunately, with only 19 observations in the dataset, 
the inclusion of additional covariates at the right side of the equation is problematic.  
It can be argued, however, that what increases the differences is not 
socioeconomic development itself, but the amount of democracy available in each 
country. Democracy, with the liberties it gives, can result in an exacerbation of ethnic 
identities as opposed to the identity of the national political community (Chua 2003; 
Snyder 2000). The data discussed here seem to suggest that this explanation is plausible. 
Figure 12 below illustrates the empirical relationship between the Freedom House scores 
and the differences in the national pride dependent variable between ethnic minorities and 
majorities. 
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Figure 12: Effect of the level of democracy on differences between ethnic 
majority and minorities 
 
While the lineal relationship fails to be statistically significant, the pattern shown 
in the graph suggests that the likelihood of having differences in National Pride increases 
with the level of democracy. In other words, more democratic countries seem to give 
their citizens the opportunity to be critical of the state, and that does not seem to happen 
in more authoritarian countries.  
Considering national averages at the country level, the different independent 
variables employed weigh heavily when predicting both the country averages for 
National Pride and Common Values, as well as the differences between ethnic majorities 
and minorities. Using national averages in this type of analysis is helpful when 
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comparing countries or registering the effects of contextual variables on matters germane 
to this study. However, national averages do not tell the whole story; the great differences 
among citizens within each country are best explained by individual characteristics, and 
not those of the country. This problem in the analysis is known as the “ecological fallacy” 
and is a common failing in the analysis of cross-national survey data (King 1997; 
Seligson 2002).  
 
An Individual Level Analysis of Attachment to the National Political 
Community 
 
What characteristics of the individuals can predict the level of attachment to the 
national political community? This chapter focuses on the potential differences caused by 
ethnic minority status, and one of the central hypotheses discussed here is that minorities 
will, in general show weaker attachment to the nation than national ethnic majorities. 
Does this have empirical support? This section presents the results of a series of 
multivariate models fitted on the LAPOP database consisting of 26,017 observations in 
19 countries for which the minority status information was available. 
A list of statistical controls was included in the analyses: a discrimination index, 
age, gender, level of education, and level of interpersonal trust. The discrimination index 
counts the number of scenarios in which a person claims to have felt discriminated 
against, and ranges from 0 to 3; the logic behind the inclusion of this item is that people 
who feel discriminated against will feel a weaker attachment to the nation. Following the 
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logic discussed in the national level of analysis section, an interaction term of minority 
status and the discrimination scale was included in the equations as well. 
Age, gender, and the level of education that the person has were also included as 
statistical controls. Additionally, a measure of interpersonal trust was included in the 
models testing the assumption implied in the social capital theory (Putnam 2002), that 
higher interpersonal trust is likely to produce a stronger link with the national political 
community. 
Table 12 below presents the results of the linear regression models for the two 
dependent variables of attention for this chapter. 
 
Table 12: Results of the individual level models  
for national pride and common values 
National Pride Common Values Dependent Var. 
Independent Var.   Coeff. Beta T value Coeff. Beta T Value 
Minority status -.96* -.015 -2.14 -.22 -.003 -.42 
Discrimination Scale -1.65* -.058 -8.03 -.39 -.012 -1.66 
Minority X Discrimination 1.85* .031 3.9 -.21 -.003 -.39 
Gender (Women) .08 .001 .3 .77* .015 2.35 
Age (years) .05* .033 4.83 .042* .026 3.82 
Education level .22 .008 1.18 1.74* .055 8.0 
Interpersonal trust -2.38* -.103 -15.71 -3.02* -.114 -17.22 
Constant 93.67*  113.7 78.56*  82.39 
R square .0163 .0168 
N 23,142 22,760 
* Sig. p<.05 
 
When the pooled 19 country LAPOP database is employed, both the ethnic 
minority status and the discrimination scale variables seem to have the expected effect on 
the two dependent variables, i.e., they decrease the strength of the attachment that 
citizens have to the national political community. However, the effect is only statistically 
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significant for the measure of national pride (though the T value for the discrimination 
scale index approaches statistical significance for the common values measure).  
The interaction term between minority status and the discrimination scale also 
finds statistical significance, but only for the national pride variable. This means that the 
effect of perceived discrimination on the attachment to the national political community 
is conditional of ethnic minority status; in other words, when compared with citizens of 
the ethnic majority group, the link that binds ethnic minority citizens to the nation seems 
to suffer more with perception of discrimination. This is a relevant finding for the 
purposes of this chapter, and it is consistent with the argumentative line suggested in the 
hypotheses discussed early. 
Of the statistical controls included in the models, age and interpersonal trust 
appear to be robust predictors of the attachment to the nation. The older the person is, the 
stronger her link to the nation will be, and this claim is valid for both the national pride 
and the common values measure of attachment to the national political community. 
Another variable which seems to exert a strong effect on the attachment to the 
nation is the measure of interpersonal trust included in the LAPOP dataset57. In the 
statistical models discussed here, this variable is, in fact, the strongest predictor of 
attachment to the national political community, as the beta coefficient shows in both 
models. In other words, the level of trust among citizens is a very relevant explanation of 
a strong attachment to the national political community. 
                                                 
57 This variable was originally measured in an inverted four point scale in which 1 means that the 
respondent finds other people in his or her community very trustworthy, while 4 means that she finds 
members of her community to be very untrustworthy. 
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Two other control variables have some effect only on one of the two dependent 
variables, the measure of agreement with the idea that there are common values that unite 
citizens of each country; these variables are gender and the level of education. Women 
seem more convinced of the existence of common values for national societies than men, 
as do more educated people. The level of education, then, is the second variable that 
increases the average agreement with the idea of the existence of common values in the 
nation. 
It is also worth noting that the alpha coefficients (or constants) are relatively high 
for the two equations, particularly for the one with national pride as the dependent 
variable. As shown in Figure 7, the average level of national pride is high for most 
countries, and the variables discussed here tend to have a negative effect on attachment to 
the nation. In numerical terms, once the factors presented in this section are controlled 
for, the average respondent in the dataset has a score of almost 94 out of 100 for the 
recoded national pride scale. 
 
 
Building a Multi-Level Explanation: Integrating Individual and Country 
Level Variables  
 
Until now, I have analyzed different hypotheses at the national level, finding 
support for the ethnic fractionalization hypothesis and the level of development 
hypothesis. I have also presented an individual level analysis of the causes of strength in 
the attachment to the national political community, pointing out that minority status, 
perception of discrimination, and interpersonal trust are the most important predictors of 
National Pride and Common Values. But, is there a way of integrating these two 
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approaches and building an empirical account of the factors that explain attachment to the 
nation that considers both individual level characteristics and nation level features? 
There are statistical tools available to researchers that allow us to do exactly that; 
it is possible to determine the influence that national factors, such as the Human 
Development Index or the gross national product, exert simultaneously with the effect 
that individual factors have, such as the person’s gender and age, or personal status as a 
member of an ethnic majority or minority. Multi-Level statistical analysis, also called 
Hierarchical Linear Modelling, allows for the combining of information regarding 
national and individual factors (Gelman and Hill 2006; Luke 2004; Raudenbush and Bryk 
2002; Singer and Willett 2003). A multi-level analysis model is basically a generalized 
linear regression model (GLM) in which the independent variable effects are allowed to 
vary randomly, that is to say, that they are not constant.58 
According to the previous results in the individual level and the national level 
analyses, I expect to find significant interaction effects in the multi-level combinations of 
ethnic fractionalization and minority status (the cultural fractionalization variable is the 
only one that proved to have a statistically significant relationship with the differences 
between ethnic majorities and minorities in the national level analyses of this chapter). To 
test for this effect I followed a series of steps for multi-level modelling59, concluding with 
the fitting of a series of random-intercept random-coefficient models on the data using 
                                                 
58 The model used is known as Random Effects Maximum Likelihood (REML). 
59 The basic steps to be followed for hierarchical lineal modeling are 1) understanding the multi-level 
nature of the data; 2) establishing whether enough variance of the dependent variable lies within countries; 
3) fitting random intercept models in which the variables of interest show statistical significant effects on 
the dependent variable. 
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STATA 10.0. (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2005). The results for the model applied to 
each of the two dependent variables are presented in Table 13 below. 
 
Table 13. Results of the multi-level model for national pride and common values 
Dependent Var.
Independent Var.   
National Pride 
Coefficient (z value) 
Common Values 
Coefficient (z value) 
Minority status .629 (.62) .178 (.18) 
Educational Level .013 (.07) 2.04 (10.08)* 
Age (Years) .037 (4.36)* .041 (4.13)* 
Interpersonal trust -1.86 (13.67)* -2.37 (14.91)* 
Cultural Fractionalization Index -.699 (-.14) -7.96 (-1.13) 
Gender (Women) -.06 (-.24) .781 (2.7)* 
Minority X Cultural fractionalization -5.84 (-1.86)+ -5.11 (-1.67)+ 
Constant 93.5* 79.2* 
SD Minority/ Constant / Residual++ 2.43 / 4.73 / 20.62 2.16 / 6.47 / 23.92 
N individuals / country 28,276 / 19 27,696 / 19 
++ Random Effects Parameters 
+ p<.1; * p<.05 
 
In the two-level model that interacts ethnic minority status and the cultural 
fractionalization index, both single-level independent variables (i.e.: ethnic minority 
status at the individual level and the cultural fractionalization index at the national level) 
show no significant effect on either dependent variable considered here; these two 
variables proved to have a significant effect on the attachment to the national political 
community in the single level analyses.  
 The variable that has a relevant effect on both dependent variables is the 
interaction term formed by the multiplication of minority status and the cultural 
fractionalization index60. In other words, the effect that being part of an ethnic minority 
has on the attachment to the national political community is conditional to the level of 
                                                 
60 As the number of observations for level 2 (or country level) is low in the statistical analysis (19), I have 
accepted the .1 threshold for statistical significance. 
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cultural fractionalization in each society. Members of an ethnic minority group tend to 
feel less attached to the nation in countries where cultural fractionalization is higher than 
in more homogeneous countries. This applies for both measures of attachment to the 
national political community considered. 
This finding is novel for the literature, and its theoretical implications are relevant 
insofar as they signal the latent fragility of highly diverse multi-cultural societies. In more 
fractionalized societies, ethnic minorities tend to feel less attached to the nation, and this 
could potentially lead to the generations of tension between ethnic minorities and 
majorities, and to a crisis of legitimacy of the national State as perceived by the 
minorities. 
Why are members of ethnic minority groups less attached to the nation in highly 
fractionalized societies than in more homogeneous countries? A possible answer for this 
dazzling question is that, being a larger proportion of the population than in other 
countries, ethnic minorities actually conceive the idea of having some form of 
government relatively autonomous from the dominant ethnic group. In these cases, the 
possibility of forming a particular political community, either within the State or as a 
separate one, could be deemed as real by members of minority groups. The political 
movements aimed at giving Quebec some autonomy from Canada or the Zapatista 
movement in Mexico seem to be empirical examples of this logic. However, a more 
thorough understanding of this relationship should be produced through further specific 
studies. 
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Other factors that prove to be relevant predictors of both measures of attachment 
to the nation in the multi-level model are the age of the respondent, and the measure for 
interpersonal trust. Older people tend to feel more proud of their nationality and more 
convinced of the idea of common values than younger individuals, and people who trust 
other citizens more are also more attached to the nation. Confirming what was discussed 
previously, agreement with the idea of Common Values uniting the country is also 
affected by the level of education (more educated people tend to agree more with this 
idea), and by gender (women seem more convinced of this proposition).  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
Using the Latin American cases of Bolivia and Guatemala, this dissertation has 
produced findings in four different areas of the relationship between ethnic identities and 
national politics. The learnings obtained from this research are useful for understanding 
the general relationship between indigenous people and the national states in the 
Americas, and might also give clues about the general relationship between ethnic 
minority identities and the national political sphere. 
The first area in which conclusions can be drawn is the definition and 
measurement of ethnic identities. This area of knowledge has advanced with the finding 
of empirical evidence supporting a particular theoretical definition of ethnic identities (a 
constructivist definition), and with the comparison of different commonly used indicators 
of ethnic identity; this comparison has allowed me to point out the indicator that performs 
better. In a context in which only two opposed ethnic categories exist, as in Guatemala, 
different measures seem to produce relatively consistent results; under a context which 
allows for the mid-point mestizo option, as in Bolivia, results vary substantially from 
measure to measure. This area of the research has also produced a methodological tool 
which allows for the combination of qualitative information with the quantitative data 
obtained from survey research. 
The second area of findings has been the relationship between ethnic 
identification and political processes. Individuals have a repertoire of ethnic identities 
available to them, which is defined by their possession of certain descent-based attributes 
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related to identity categories. People choose their ethnic identity from that repertoire, and 
this choice seems to be influenced by political factors. A highly politicized ethnic 
category can become appealing for individuals, who identify with it and gain psychic 
gains when a political movement based on the category becomes successful. This seems 
to be the case in Bolivia where identification as indigenous has been proportionally 
growing since the election of an indigenous leader as president for the first time. This is 
possibly due to the existence of the mid-point mestizo category, which, in essence means 
being both indigenous and white. This category is absent in Guatemala, where the ethnic 
identity alternatives are the bipolar ladino and indigenous, making identity change less 
likely and fluid. 
The conditions in which a political movement based on a particular identity 
category can thrive is the third area in which this dissertation has produced relevant 
findings. Participation in local organizations and in community activities seems to be a 
very important predictor of political engagement at the national level. Guatemala’s armed 
conflict has had a large toll on the organization capacities of indigenous communities, 
and on citizens’ interest for participating in local and national level political processes. 
Bolivia’s decentralization process, on the other hand, has generated massive participation 
of indigenous grassroots organizations into local politics, and has generated the basis for 
the formation, consolidation, and electoral success of an indigenous party. 
Finally, the relationship between ethnic minority status and attachment to the 
national political community is the fourth area in which this dissertation contributes to 
the understanding of the relationship between ethnic identities and national politics. 
People who identify as part of an ethnic minority group do not necessarily feel less 
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attached to the nation than members of ethnic majority groups, though these differences 
can sometimes be affected by the level of development, the institutional design, and the 
level of ethno-linguistic fractionalization on the country. 
 
On the Definition and Measurement of Ethnic Identities 
Findings obtained in this research corroborate the constructivist definition of 
ethnic identity, i.e., a socially constructed identity category based on the idea of descent 
which is fluid and might change across time. The finding that all else being equal, people 
who identify as part of ethnic minority categories do not necessarily feel less attached to 
the nation than members of the majority groups can finally reject the primordial 
understanding of ethnic identities, whose direct implication would suggest the opposite. 
The finding that suggests that people do sometimes change their identity category choice 
as a result of the political context reinforces the idea of fluidity of identities. 
Measuring identification with ethnic identity categories in survey studies is a 
tricky methodological task. This research has shown that no single indicator is able to 
validly and reliably measure the concept of ethnic identity; results obtained using 
different measures of ethnic identity vary substantially, particularly when no opposite 
bipolar identities exist. Results of official measures of identity, usually through national 
censuses, are employed in policy making and are also used as a political resource. That is 
why measures of ethnic identity are so hotly contested and debated by different political 
and social actors. 
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There are noticeable differences in the structure of ethnic categorization in the 
two countries. There are two relevant categories in Guatemala, indigenous and ladino 
(which basically means non-indigenous); in Bolivia, there are three categories: 
indigenous, white, and mestizo, which refers to a racial and cultural mixture of 
indigenous and white ancestors. Indigenous is the only relevant category shared by the 
two countries, despite the large linguistic and cultural differences between members of 
indigenous groups; this is a broad category enclosing different identities particular to 
ethno-linguistic groups assumed to be descendent of the inhabitants of the Americas 
before the Spanish conquest, and large proportions of the population identify with it.  
Different measures of ethnic identity perform in a more consistent way in 
Guatemala than in Bolivia. The reason for this is the intermediate mestizo category, 
existent in the Andean nation but not in the Central American one. Ethnic identification 
has a bipolar structure in Guatemala, and individuals have their options restricted to 
identifying either as indigenous or as ladino. Additionally, there is a high correspondence 
between the use of an indigenous language and indigenous identification in Guatemala, 
where speaking a Mayan language is restricted almost exclusively to those who identify 
as indigenous. In Bolivia, on the other hand, the existence of the mestizo category – 
which is the category with which the majority of Bolivians identify – produces 
substantial differences among various indicators of ethnic identity that include or exclude 
this category. 
Among different measures commonly used in surveys, the best option seems to be 
a simple categorical variable in which the respondent ‘chooses’ an identity category from 
a list of possible options; however, in order for this to be a valid measure of the concept 
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of ethnic identity, choosing multiple options should be available for the survey 
respondent.  
The definition of the list of available categories seems to be crucially important 
for the quality of any categorical measure of ethnic identity. Evidence shows that the 
inclusion or exclusion of a single relevant category can produce variations of grand 
magnitude in the results. A profound knowledge of the relevant ethnic categories in a 
particular context, as well as their content, seems to be a requisite for the researcher 
designing questions aiming at measuring ethnic identity. 
The best methodological strategy for understanding ethnic identities seems to be 
the combination of quantitative analyses of survey data with qualitative methods which 
allow for a more in-depth view of what identity categories mean for people. However, the 
literature offers few methods that actually combine qualitative and quantitative 
approaches in survey settings. Using focus groups techniques, I have developed a 
methodological strategy which produces qualitative information about how people 
understand identity categories, and why they choose the answers they give in a survey 
interview; this is done without compromising the power of generalizability derived from 
large N survey studies. This methodological strategy, Survey Responses Interpreted by 
Groups, has performed satisfactorily in fieldwork activities, and could be employed in 
other research areas and settings. 
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On the Relationship Between Ethnic Identification and Political Processes 
Although the strength of the attachment of indigenous citizens to the nation is 
similar in Bolivia and in Guatemala, this research has found noticeable differences 
between the two cases in the way in which indigenous identities relate with the nation; 
these differences also extend to the role of indigenous identities in national politics. 
Evidence supports the hypothesis that the indigenous identity category was highly 
politicized in Bolivia 2006, but not in Guatemala during the same year nor in Bolivia in 
1998. It has also been shown that there has been a positive quantitative change in Bolivia, 
but not in Guatemala, in the proportion of people who identify as part of the indigenous 
identity category. 
If the proportion of people identifying as indigenous has been growing in Bolivia, 
it is because the indigenous movement has been politically successful in the country; in 
Guatemala, the poor electoral performance of the indigenous candidates seems to be 
related with the decline in the proportion of people identifying as indigenous (though this 
decline is less evident for the absence of the mestizo category).  
While there are no evident material benefits of indigenous identification in 
Bolivia after the electoral triumph of Evo Morales (e.g., the Government does not have a 
redistributive policy based on ethnic identification which benefits indigenous people), 
qualitative information gathered during fieldwork suggests that people who identify as 
indigenous have ‘psychic gains’ related to the image of the President and the ethnic-
based discourse of his Government. These psychic gains are particularly relevant if the 
election of Evo Morales is filtered through a discursive logic which emphasizes the 
 152
historical domination of indigenous people in the country. Along these lines, people 
‘gain’ something out of sharing the identity of a president who is often seen – and who 
also often plays the role of – a leader of high symbolic transcendence in the emancipation 
of indigenous people. 
Political factors can play a relevant role in the formation of ethnic identities; in 
the case of Bolivia, political success of the indigenous movement seems to increase the 
chances that a person identifies as indigenous, provided that the person possesses some of 
the attributes required for this identification. People can, thus, ‘choose’ their ethnic 
identity from among the repertoire of categories available to them. This does not mean 
that any person could potentially choose any identity category just because it is politically 
appealing; being in possession of the attributes defined as constitutive in the 
(permanently contested) content of the identity category is a requirement. 
In Bolivia, the mestizo category implicitly involves descending from both the 
Native American peoples, and from the Spanish colonizers who ruled the territory of the 
country until 1825 (or from other European immigrants). Mestizo is a category that 
bridges indigenous and white; meaning being neither indigenous nor white, but also being 
potentially indigenous or white; in other words, many of the individuals who identify as 
mestizos could potentially identify as whites, while many others could identify as 
indigenous. And this is precisely what seems to be happening in Bolivia, with the 
proportion of ‘whites’ decreasing across time, while the proportion of indigenous 
increases and the proportion of mestizos remains stable.  
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The possibility of something similar happening in Guatemala appears to be 
limited by the inexistence of the mestizo category. The bipolar construction of ethnic 
identities in the Central American nation, with only indigenous and ladinos as the 
relevant identity categories, makes the possibility of identity change much more remote 
for Guatemalans. Additionally, the overlapping of ethnic identities with cultural 
attributes, such as use of an indigenous language, contributes to the relative lack of 
fluidity of ethnic identification in Guatemala. 
 
On the Success or Failure of Ethnic Politics 
This research finds evidence in public opinion data for an explanation of the 
differences in the success of indigenous politics in Bolivia and Guatemala based on two 
elements. The first one has to do with the internal war suffered by Guatemala, which I 
argue has decimated civil society, particularly indigenous organizations, leaving behind 
people disengaged from political activities. In fact, many Guatemalan citizens, 
particularly those who identify as indigenous, claim to be afraid of participating in 
politics, and refer to the violence, both past and present, as the explanation for this fear. 
The second factor refers to the profound process of municipal decentralization 
experienced by Bolivia, which generated the opportunity for indigenous citizens to 
organize, participate locally, and network into larger organizations which later defined 
the success of indigenous politics in the country.  
Searching for evidence for this explanation, two hypotheses are operationalized 
and tested: First, that fear and violence reduce political participation. Second, that 
participation in local politics makes people more prone to participating in national 
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politics. The statistical analyses discussed here have found mixed evidence for the fear 
and violence hypothesis, suggesting that fear reduces participation, but experience of 
violence seems to increase it in the Guatemalan case. This finding should receive more 
attention in the future, clearly establishing the causal mechanism linking experience of 
violence and higher political participation. 
The hypothesis about local and national political participation has found plenty of 
empirical support; the more active a person is at the local level, the more likely that 
person will also be active in national politics. The alternative hypotheses, an increase in 
Protestantism and weaker attachment to the nation in Guatemala, found no empirical 
support whatsoever in the data.  
These findings suggest that the explanation given here for the differences in the 
success of indigenous politics in Bolivia and Guatemala is at least plausible. The legacy 
of civil war and violence in Guatemala seems to play a relevant role in the weakness of 
civil society, particularly among indigenous people, in the Central American nation. The 
lack of a similarly violent event in Bolivia, plus a deep process of municipal 
decentralization, seems to explain the conditions in which indigenous politics were 
allowed to thrive in Bolivia. 
It is also possible that the existence of the mestizo category in Bolivia is also 
involved in the electoral success of Evo Morales. The logic behind this is that people who 
identify as mestizo would find it easier to vote for an indigenous (or a white) candidate 
than in the Guatemalan case, where the two categories have a larger distance between 
each other; however, the fact that Guatemalan indigenous vote for ladino candidates 
 155
suggests that the explanation might have more to do with the politicization of particular 
identities than with the existence of intermediate categories. 
One of the most important learnings that can be obtained from this research is the 
relevance that local spaces have for increasing the levels of participation of traditionally 
disadvantaged social groups. Participation in local community activities and in local level 
politics greatly increases the chances that the person will also participate in national 
politics. A theoretical model of political engagement, then, should look at the local space 
as a one of its more relevant predictors. Making use of local social capital can create a 
dynamic of political participation that can exceed the limits of local spaces and become a 
national phenomenon. 
 
On the Relationship Between Ethnic Minority Status and the National 
Political Community 
 
Among the similarities shared by Bolivia and Guatemala, indigenous people do 
not feel less attached to the nation than the rest of the national population. While in a 
handful of countries in the Americas ethnic minorities feel less attached to the nation, this 
is not the situation in the two cases studied here (nor is it in most of the other countries in 
the region). Once other factors are controlled for, indigenous Bolivians and Guatemalans 
feel like citizens of their nations, so their attachment to the national political community 
seems to be as strong as that of other citizens. 
Among the research goals of this dissertation, I have attempted to develop an 
explanation of the strength of the attachment that citizens, particularly members of ethnic 
minorities, have in relation to the national political community of which they are a part. 
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This explanation has departed from several theoretical perspectives, and has empirically 
tested different hypotheses emerging from them. The process of hypotheses testing was 
based on both national and individual level theories, and also integrated the two levels of 
analysis in a statistical model that allows for the interaction of individual level variables 
and variables that measure certain characteristics of the countries in which they live.  
When countries are used as the unit of analysis, no evidence supporting the 
societal discrimination hypothesis is found; in countries where discrimination is higher, 
ethnic minorities do not necessarily feel less attached to the nation. Mixed evidence is 
found for the level of development and the institutional design hypotheses, suggesting 
then, that in some cases, these two conditions are relevant predictors of the differences in 
national pride between ethnic minorities and majorities. On the other hand, empirical 
support is found for the hypothesis that suggests that in more fractionalized countries the 
difference between minorities and majorities is larger than in more homogeneous 
countries.  
The multi-level statistical analyses in which individual and country level variables 
are interacted confirm that the effect of being part of a minority is conditional to the level 
of ethno-linguistic fractionalization that a country has. Ethnic minorities feel less attached 
to the nation in more culturally heterogeneous countries, and that probably has to do with 
their relative size and the possibility of conceiving cultural communities as alternative 
political communities to the one existing at the national level. 
Despite its relatively high levels of ethno-linguistic fractionalization, evidence 
discussed in this research suggests that indigenous people in Guatemala do not feel less 
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attached to the nation than other Guatemalans. The causes of this apparent anomaly 
should receive particular attention in specific studies before a general theory about the 
relationship between ethno-linguistic fractionalization and attachment to the nation is 
elaborated.  
Supporting the theory of social capital, a variable that proves to have a very large 
effect on both measures of attachment to the nation is interpersonal trust: independently 
of ethnic minority status and other considerations, people who trust their neighbors more 
tend to fell a stronger attachment to the nation than people who feel their neighbors are 
less trustworthy. The fact that this variable has the strongest effect of all covariates in the 
analyses suggests that, if policy makers are interested in strengthening the legitimacy of 
the State in a particular society, they should focus on increasing social capital and the 
sense of trustworthiness among its members as a realistic way of convincing people to 
become more attached to their nation. 
The sample of countries employed in this study is representative of the region of 
the Americas, and covers countries with widely different levels of development and 
democratic consolidation. However, it is still a truncated sample of all countries in the 
world. That means that the results found for this sample could reflect more general 
relationships, and that further studies using a larger number of countries as observations 
could be performed to test them. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SRIG Focus Groups in Bolivia 
Results and instruments used 
May – August 2006∗ 
 
                                                 
∗ Focus groups were conducted and systematized with the kind help of Miguel Villarroel from Ciudadania 
in Cochabamba. 
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Municipality: YANACACHI, Provincia Sud Yungas, Department of La Paz, Bolivia 
Organized with support from Fundación Takesi, Yanacachi. 
June 19, 2006 
 
Results: 
 
Apoyo a la democracia 
Tribunales de justicia garantizan un juicio justo: La calificación que otorgan no es muy 
alta porque antes del actual gobierno, la mayor parte de las personas en Bolivia era 
discriminada por el propio sistema democrático. En el tema específico de la justicia, ésta 
sólo funciona para las personas que tienen plata debido al gran índice de corrupción 
dentro del sistema de justicia –incluida la Policía-. Otro aspecto que se critica es que los 
jueces no son “nombrados de manera democrática” y, por lo tanto, no son “justos”, entre 
otras cosas debido a que por lo general discriminan a las personas de bajos recursos y 
siempre tienden a volcarse del lado de su “propia clase”, es decir, de los de “cuello 
blanco”. Otro aspecto negativo de la justicia boliviana es que es muy lenta, pues los 
trámites tardan demasiado. 
 
Los talleristas tienen la esperanza de que los aspectos negativos arriba mencionados van 
paulatinamente a mejorar debido, principalmente, a que las personas están ahora más 
informadas y “capacitadas”, además, la población ya no es tan pasiva como antes y hace 
sentir sus reclamos mediante marchas, que es la “única forma” verdadera en que el 
pueblo logra hacerse escuchar. Por otro lado, gracias al nuevo gobierno –de carácter 
indígena- la justicia ordinaria está cambiando para bien. Se espera que la Asamblea 
Constituyente contribuya a mejorar el sistema de justicia de Bolivia. 
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Respeto por las instituciones políticas:  El respeto por estas instituciones es importante 
porque, si bien son instituciones de índole político, también son “públicas”, es decir que 
son ellas las que nos gobiernan, por lo tanto deben ser apoyadas. 
 
¿Derechos básicos del ciudadano son protegidos?  La calificación es baja porque las 
instituciones tardan mucho en reaccionar cuando algún derecho de alguna persona ha sido 
violado. El sistema es corrupto y lento, además existe discriminación. 
 
Orgullo de vivir bajo el sistema político boliviano:  Un motivo de orgullo es que 
actualmente las personas indígenas y originarias pueden acceder a cargos públicos de 
importancia. Se destaca el hecho de que puedan ejercer sus cargos vistiendo sus 
indumentarias tradicionales. También en la administración pública ha disminuido la 
discriminación hacia las personas pobres, “del pueblo”. También se expresa que se 
sienten orgullosos porque ahora gran parte del Estado estará manejada por personas de 
origen aymará. El actual presidente Evo Morales es otro motivo de orgullo debido a que 
él es indígena y por tanto está más dispuesto a escuchar las demandas de los campesinos 
y los pobres. Otro motivo de orgullo: los pobladores de Yanacachi están bien organizados 
como sociedad (y en general en todo el país), Bolivia es un país rico en recursos 
naturales, los bolivianos son muy trabajadores 
 
Motivos para no estar orgulloso: Tradicionalmente ha existido mucha discriminación y 
falta de respeto entre los bolivianos (entre hombres y mujeres, entre caballeros y 
campesinos, etc.). La discriminación existe a todo nivel, incluso dentro de un “pueblo 
chiquito”. La culpa de la discriminación en Bolivia es de ambas partes (clase alta y media 
vrs. baja-campesina-indígena), porque ninguna respeta a la otra. Gracias al actual 
presidente este panorama va a cambiar paulatinamente. Otros motivos para no estar 
orgullosos: Elevado índice de corrupción a todo nivel –la corrupción empieza por 
nuestras casas-, la educación es pésima, no existen industrias. 
 
Se expresa que, en comparación con otros países, en Bolivia las personas se sienten 
menos orgullosas de pertenecer a su sistema político, debido quizá a que en esos otros 
países la gente es mejor tratada por su propio gobierno, y tienen “mayor respeto e 
igualdad”, en cambio en Bolivia esto no ocurre. También influye que Bolivia esté 
subdesarrollada y no exista trabajo para todos, sobre todo en comparación con otros 
países. 
 
Identidades particulares 
En Bolivia existe mucha discriminación entre las regiones y los departamentos, sin 
embargo, afirman que los Yungueños son más tolerantes que la gente del resto del país. 
El cuartel es una institución importante porque permite que los bolivianos se conozcan 
entre sí y que conozcan otras regiones del país. El respeto debe ser el valor primordial 
para la convivencia entre los bolivianos y esta debe ser la principal meta hacia delante. 
 
Las divisiones entre los bolivianos, incluso a nivel municipal, tienen su origen en la 
Colonia, han sido impuestas por los españoles y ahora son difíciles de erradicar porque 
forman parte de “las costumbres” de las personas. 
 161
 
Valores que nos unen como país:  La división de Bolivia perjudicaría a todos los 
departamentos, sobre todo porque el nuestro es un país pequeño, si fuera grande quizá no 
afectaría tanto. Uno de los principales temores en cuanto a la posible división del país es 
que los recursos generados por los recursos naturales del Oriente ya no serían 
redistribuidos en el Occidente. Se tiene la visión que el departamento de La Paz no cuenta 
con recursos naturales suficientes y que depende necesariamente de los recursos 
provenientes del resto del país. 
 
La Guerra del Chaco es vista como un hito importante de integración nacional, puesto 
que fueron bolivianos de todas las regiones a defender el país y el petróleo. Por esto la 
división del país es inadmisible y los recursos económicos generados por la explotación 
de los hidrocarburos pertenecen a todos los bolivianos. 
 
Identidad regional vrs. departamental y nacional:  Expresan que lo primero que se 
sienten es yungueños antes que paceños, sin embargo, a medida que conocen las ciudades 
(La Paz y El Alto) empiezan a “modernizarse” y por tanto a sentirse mucho más 
orgullosos de ser paceños que de ser yungueños. En Yungas, al parecer, muchas personas 
provienen de diferentes provincias, sobre todo del departamento de La Paz, y esto influye 
en que, a la larga, el sentimiento que predomine sea el de sentirse paceños. Otras 
autoidentificaciones dependen del lugar donde uno se encuentre (en el extranjero, en otro 
departamento, etc.). 
 
Identidad aymará:  Se basa sobre todo en el uso de la lengua aymará, lo cual es un 
motivo de orgullo para los talleristas, sin embargo, el uso de este idioma se está 
perdiendo entre los más jóvenes debido que ellos prefieren hablar exclusivamente en 
castellano, además que en sus casas tampoco les hablan en aymará. Por otro lado, en las 
escuelas se privilegia el uso solamente del castellano. Otras cosas que los identifican con 
la cultura aymara son las costumbres ancestrales que aún se practican en la región. 
Expresan que “lo aymará” son sus raíces. 
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El mantener el uso y conocimiento del idioma nativo es como tener un arma para 
combatir contra el sistema. El uso de otros idiomas es positivo y quisieran que sus hijos 
los aprendan, sobre todo el inglés, ya que esto ayuda a facilitar la comprensión de las 
personas. También es importante para ellos que sus hijos aprendan y domínenle 
castellanos, ya que esto también es un arma la cual les va a facilitar entrar en el dominio 
de las instituciones (públicas y privadas), en las cuales el idioma principal que se usa es 
el castellano. 
 
¿Qué es ser originario, indígena o mestizo?  Es aquél que conoce el lugar donde está, 
conoce sus costumbres, lo que produce, cómo es la región y hasta dónde llega, etc. 
Originarios también son las personas cuyas familias han vivido en la misma región por 
muchísimas generaciones. Indígena, en cambio, hace referencia sobre todo a los pueblos 
originarios del Oriente. Hay dentro el taller opiniones al respecto que todas las 
autodenominaciones son falsas, ya que todos los seres humanos son iguales sin importar 
su color de piel, cultura o procedencia. Estas diferencias únicamente tienen el propósito 
de dividir a los bolivianos. 
 
66.67% 16.67%
16.67%
Originario
Indígena
Mestiza
Ud. se considera 
una persona de 
raza blanca, chola, 
mestiza,  indígena, 
negra u originario?
 
 
Los mestizos son los descendientes de los españoles, y son quienes actualmente 
discriminan a los indígenas y originarios. Pero son descendientes de españoles mezclados 
con sangre indígena, ya que la mayor parte de los que vinieron era hombres quienes 
eventualmente se juntaron con mujeres del lugar y tuvieron descendencia. 
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gfocal: 1.00
Guaraní
Aymara
¿Se considera 
perteneciente a 
alguno de los 
siguientes pueblos 
originarios o 
indígenas?
 
 
También mencionan que los jóvenes que se van a estudiar o a trabajar a las ciudades 
eventualmente pierden las tradiciones de sus lugares de origen y se “modernizan”, ocurre 
entonces que estos jóvenes empiezan a identificarse con los mestizos y ya no quieren 
saber nada de su propia gente a la cual incluso empiezan a discriminar o ignorar. 
 
Participants: 
- Segundo Quispe 
- Antonio Mamani 
- Néstor Quispe 
- Aurelio Sirpa 
- Lucio Mendoza 
- Marina Chávez 
- Betzabé Argandeña 
- 2 people did not sign list 
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Participants at the Yanacachi Focus Group, June 19, 2006 
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Municipality: EL ALTO, Provincia Murillo, Department of La Paz, Bolivia 
Organized with support from Asamblea Permanente de Derechos Humanos de El 
Alto. 
June 22, 2006 
 
Results: 
 
Apoyo a la democracia 
Argumentan los talleristas que uno de los problemas de vivir en la Sede de Gobierno (de 
la cual son vecinos) son los constantes bloqueos, marchas y protestas sociales que 
ocurren. Estas cosas no ocurren en otras formas de gobierno y son exclusivas de la 
democracia, pues esta permite que ocurran. También dicen que las personas “se 
aprovechan de la democracia”, es decir, se exceden en sus libertades (como las de 
protestar). Sin embargo, por otro lado, las protestas sociales son un derecho de las 
personas y una de las formas que tiene la gente para hacerse escuchar por el gobierno. 
 
Expresan que la democracia es preferible a otras formas de gobierno principalmente 
porque les permite expresarse libremente. 
 
Apoyo al sistema político boliviano: En el tema político nacional, mencionan que algunas 
cosas estás bien y otras no lo están, y en muchas ocasiones los políticos no dicen la 
verdad a la población. Una de las cosas que no está bien es el sistema de justicia, pues 
esta solamente funciona para las personas que tienen dinero. 
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El sistema político actual merece tener mayor apoyo que los anteriores debido sobre todo 
a que el presidente es indígena como ellos, y también porque la mayor parte de la 
población de El Alto votó por el MAS. El actual gobierno les permite participar y 
expresarse, lo cual no ocurría con anteriores gobiernos ya que ni siquiera les permitían 
ingresar a las instituciones o hablar con las autoridades, es decir, la discriminación a la 
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gente del pueblo ha disminuido, sobre todo por parte del Estado, lo cual a su vez va a 
ayudar a generar un proceso en el cual la discriminación que aún persiste hacia ellos en 
otros sectores de la sociedad vaya poco a poco disminuyendo. 
 
Otro aspecto positivo del actual gobierno es que el Presidente se ocupa de visitar los 
rincones y poblaciones más olvidados y pobres del país, lo cual no sucedían con 
anteriores gobiernos. 
 
Entre los cambios positivos que observan con el nuevo gobierno mencionan la 
nacionalización de los hidrocarburos y el apoyo a los pobres. Sin embargo, expresan que 
en el tema de la justicia y los derechos democráticos las cosas siguen igual que antes, 
pero esperan que con el tiempo estas cosas van cambiando poco a poco. Otros aspectos 
negativos son: falta de fuentes de trabajo, cuoteo político dentro las instituciones. Desde 
la perspectiva de los talleristas, la gente que trabaja en las instituciones del Estado es la 
misma que en otras gestiones de gobierno, no se ha producido el cambio que proclamaba 
el MAS durante su campaña política. Debido a estas razones el apoyo al gobierno de Evo 
Morales en El Alto ha bajado. 
 
Discriminación: Desde la opinión de los talleristas ningún tipo de discriminación es 
buena, y ni los quechuas ni los aymaras tienen por tradición discriminar otras formas de 
cultura o de ser. El origen de la discriminación se halla en la conquista y la colonia –es 
decir en el blanco, el español-, así como en las instituciones y prácticas que estas 
originaron. Desde este punto de vista, los aymarás jamás van a discriminar a otros 
pueblos o culturas en Bolivia o donde sea. También mencionan que no tienen nada en 
contra de personas o empresas que vienen del exterior, siempre y cuando las mismas 
tengan la voluntad de trabajar en beneficio del pueblo boliviano. Quienes sí discriminan 
son las élites, sobre todo aquellas personas que ahora viven en Bolivia pero proceden de 
otros países (los croatas de Santa Cruz por ejemplo), y lo mismo las trasnacionales y 
algunas ONGs. Según los talleristas, la mayoría de la población de la ciudad de Santa 
Cruz procede de otros países. 
 
Los verdaderos cambas son otros y no la gente que ha llegado de afuera. Los verdaderos 
cambas (originarios) siempre han estado unidos al resto de los pueblos indígenas de 
Bolivia y a todo el país en general. Arguyen que el desarrollo del Oriente ha sido posible 
gracias al aporte y esfuerzo de departamentos como Potosí y Oruro. Entre los verdaderos 
cambas y el resto del país no existirían verdaderas diferencias. En este sentido, la 
propuesta autonómica cruceña es tan sólo de las élites y de los inmigrantes. 
 
Si bien la cultura aymara no promueve la discriminación hacia los otros, debido a la 
historia de abusos cometidos en contra de los campesinos por parte de los patrones y 
hacendados, existe cierto resentimiento por parte de la gente humilde hacia las personas 
de “cuello y corbata”, y esto ocasiona que también exista cierta discriminación hacia ellos 
por parte de los aymaras u otros pueblos oprimidos. En general Bolivia es una sociedad 
donde la discriminación es practicada en todos los niveles y por todos los grupos y clases 
sociales. 
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También en la conformación de los representantes ante la Asamblea Constituyente 
existen procesos discriminatorios, ya que a ella no asisten, desde el punto de vista de los 
talleristas, personas “originarias”, es decir, que vivan en el campo. Los representantes 
electos son personas que viven en las ciudades y no saben nada del campo. En relación a 
temas de género también existen diferencias, ya que las mujeres que irán a la Asamblea 
Constituyente lo hacen únicamente como “pantallas”, por que la Ley obliga, pero estas 
mujeres van a estar “calladitas”, ya que es normal que sólo los hombres participen, 
hablen y decidan. 
 
Respeto por las instituciones:  El respeto a las instituciones no es muy elevado debido a 
que los talleristas creen que las mismas juegan con la población y les mienten. Las 
instituciones, y las autoridades, únicamente “utilizan” a la población como un medio para 
llegar o tener poder, luego “se olvidan” de la gente. Esta desconfianza es sobre todo 
respecto a los partidos políticos, dentro de los cuales inclusive incluyen al MAS ya que 
también este partido los “ha defraudado”. 
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Orgullo de vivir bajo el sistema político boliviano: Un motivo para no sentirse totalmente 
orgulloso es que los bolivianos no han logrado entender del todo qué es Bolivia, quiénes 
son los bolivianos, cómo viven los bolivianos y hacia dónde vamos como país, y la 
principal causa para que esto ocurra es la discriminación y las divisiones entre los propios 
bolivianos. También a los bolivianos les falta motivación para hacer y promover cambios 
que incidan sobre el bien común. 
 
Orgullo de ser boliviano: Las opiniones de los talleristas están divididas, mientras 
algunos expresan que se sienten igual de orgullosos de ser bolivianos con este gobierno 
que con los anteriores, otros dicen que desde el año 2003 (Guerra del Gas en El Alto, 
caída del gobierno del MNR, etc.) la gente, sobre todo los más excluidos, se sienten más 
orgullosos de ser alteños, de ser bolivianos, ya que han demostrado ser un pueblo que 
lucha y que logra hacer cambios. Otros motivos de orgullo: porque Bolivia es un país rico 
en recursos naturales, porque los bolivianos son trabajadores. 
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Algunos motivos por los cuales los bolivianos no se sienten tan orgullosos de ser de su 
país están relacionados con la corrupción y al hecho que tradicionalmente los gobiernos 
no trabajaban por el bien del pueblo, así como tampoco nunca se han proporcionado 
buenos servicios en educación y salud. Esto ha ocasionado que la gente crea que Bolivia 
“no sirve” y que “nunca vamos a salir de esta situación” o que en Bolivia “no existe 
futuro”, lo cual a su vez incentiva el deseo de las personas a emigrar a otro país. Otra 
razón para no sentirse orgulloso son las drogas y el narcotráfico, ya que esto da una mala 
imagen de los bolivianos en el exterior y hace que las personas se avergüencen cuando 
están en el extranjero pues allá creen que todos los bolivianos son narcotraficantes y por 
eso somos discriminados. 
 
Identidades particulares 
La mayor parte de los alteños no son oriundos de esta ciudad pues han nacido en 
diferentes provincias de los departamentos de La Paz, Oruro, etc. De esta manera, su 
autoidentificación como alteños, en cierto sentido ha sido impuesta por las circunstancias, 
sin embargo, el sentimiento de alteño es más fuerte que el de paceño o de boliviano 
 
¿En qué medida se siente 
usted parte de la cultura 
Aymara?
¿En qué medida se siente 
usted ciudadano boliviano?
¿En qué medida se siente 
usted... paceño?
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Valores que nos unen como bolivianos:  Una de las cosas comunes a todos los bolivianos 
es que cada región tiene su propia cultura (vestimentas, comidas, tradiciones, etc.). Estas 
diferentes culturas son apreciadas y respetadas por todos los bolivianos. Otra cosa que 
une a los bolivianos es el hecho de que en todos los departamentos hay inmigrantes 
provenientes de otras partes de Bolivia, es decir, Bolivia es una gran mezcla de personas 
de todos los orígenes, por lo tanto, también las culturas y tradiciones están mezcladas. 
 
¿Quiénes son bolivianos?  Hay personas que han nacido en Bolivia pero son de 
ascendencia extranjera, más aún, sus valores culturales están orientados al extranjero. 
Estas personas tienen la nacionalidad boliviana pero no pueden en verdad ser 
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considerados “verdaderos bolivianos” en tanto no aprecian la gente y la cultura 
verdaderamente bolivianas, en otras palabras, “no les interesa el país” (ejemplo: Goni). 
Para ser un verdadero boliviano no interesan factores como el color de la piel, de los ojos 
o el apellido, y sí que la persona quiera, respete y acepte las culturas tradicionales y 
originarias de toda Bolivia. El aprendizaje de una lengua originaria debería ser una 
obligación para todos los bolivianos. 
 
Existen extranjeros, incluso turistas, que han llegado a Bolivia, han gustado de nuestras 
tradiciones, han trabajado por el desarrollo del país y finalmente se han asentado en 
nuestro territorio; estas personas se sienten “más bolivianas que los propios bolivianos” y 
por lo tanto deben ser considerados como “verdaderos bolivianos”. 
 
¿Qué es ser parte de la cultura aymara?  Lo aymara es lo antiguo –miles de años-, lo 
ancestral de la cultura de los talleristas. Forman parte de esta cultura: el idioma, ayudarse 
el uno al otro, trabajar de forma solidaria –ayni-, y en general la forma de vida propia de 
las zonas donde viven los aymaras. 
 
¿En qué medida se siente 
usted parte de la cultura 
Camba?
¿En qué medida se siente 
usted parte de la cultura 
Quechua?
¿En qué medida se siente 
usted parte de la cultura 
Aymara?
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La noción de “Nación Aymara” no es usada en gran medida por los pobladores de El 
Alto, y sí más bien por aquellos que viven fuera de los límites de esta urbe o por gente 
que vive en las provincias del Altiplano. Los talleristas no están muy de acuerdo con el 
uso de esta noción con fines separatistas, ya que según ellos “Bolivia es una sola”. A 
medida que los inmigrantes de las provincias llegan al El Alto, se urbanizan y van 
perdiendo poco a poco la fuerte autoidentificación aymara que traen consigo. La “Nación 
Aymara” implica una no identificación con el Estado ni con sus instituciones, y ello 
debido fundamentalmente porque los aymaras, como cultura, no han participado de la 
creación del Estado boliviano. La “Nación Aymara” no se compone de territorio, sino 
que engloba el lenguaje, identidades, cultura y raza. 
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16.67%
83.33%
Grupo focal: El Alto
Ninguno
Aymara
¿Se considera 
perteneciente a 
alguno de los 
siguientes pueblos 
originarios o 
indígenas?
 
 
Razones por las cuales se identifican con otras culturas, como la camba:  Sobre todo 
porque en otras regiones también hay gente campesina, hay indígenas y originarios. En 
diferentes luchas sociales han conocido a esta gente originaria de otras regiones y se han 
dado cuenta que ellos también luchan por temas comunes como la tierra, etc. 
 
Diferencias entre: mestizo, indígena y originario:  Las diferencias entre los 
denominativos: indígena, originario, hermano, compañero, campesino, etc. son falsas, el 
uso de una o otras depende de las preferencias y las costumbres de cada lugar, pero en el 
fondo remiten a lo mismo. En Bolivia casi la totalidad de la población es mestiza, en el 
sentido de la mezcla de sangres, sin embargo, cuando las personas se autoidentifican 
como originarias lo hacen en alusión a las costumbres que han adoptado, a las tradiciones 
y culturas ancestrales que practican, al apego a la tierra (cuya propiedad se remonta a los 
abuelos de sus abuelos), y no a la mezcla de su sangre. La palabra mestizo, y la 
autoidentificación de la personas como tales, está mal vista, sobre todo en el campo, 
debido a que ella hace referencia a la Colonia y a la discriminación racial que ella 
instauró. 
 
Participants: 
 
- Maritza Salazar Vargas 
- Aleja Aguilar Zabala 
- Elizabeth Zabala 
- Rafael Mamani Q. 
- Virginia Ugarte Condori 
- Luís Villca Garincha 
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Participants at the El Alto Focus Group, June 22, 2006 
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Municipality: TAPACARI, ProvinciaTapacarí, Department of Cochabamba, 
Bolivia 
Organized with support from Ayllu Majasaya and Álex Fernández in Cochabamba. 
July 5, 2006 
 
 
Results 
 
Apoyo a la democracia 
Justicia y apoyo a las instituciones:  No hay justicia para todos porque los comunarios no 
conocen los reglamentos. También porque hay corrupción y sobornos (coimas). 
 
En cuanto al respeto a las instituciones políticas, ellos sólo respetas aquellas que ven 
convenientes para sus propios fines, es decir, que les sean beneficiosas (que les quieran 
ayudar). De principio hay desconfianza a cualquier institución pública o privada que 
entre a la zona. Mencionan que, por lo general, no permiten a las instituciones políticas 
trabajar en su zona.  
 
En el tema jurídico, falta redactar nuevas leyes que correspondan a las expectativas de la 
comunidad. Las leyes que en este momento existen sólo son para los ricos y la gente de la 
ciudad. Las trasnacionales son una de las principales trasgresoras de las leyes. Sin 
embargo esto está cambiando con este gobierno, y esta comunidad apoya estos cambios. 
 
legend
Puede que la democracia tenga 
problemas, pero es mejor que 
cualquier forma de Gobierno. 
¿Hasta qué punto está de 
acuerdo?
A pesar de nuestras diferencias, 
los bolivianos tenemos muchas 
cosas y valores que nos unen 
como país.  ¿Hasta qué punto está 
de acuerdo?
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Entre las nuevas leyes que deben redactarse se mencionan salud y educación, en cierta 
manera también se debe tocar el tema de los recursos naturales, agua entre otros. El lugar 
donde se debatirán estas nuevas leyes y visiones es en la Asamblea Constituyente, pero 
dentro de ella esperan muchas peleas y discusiones. 
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El tema de los derechos, en general, está mejorando a partir del gobierno de Evo Morales, 
pero aún faltan muchas cosas (salud, vivienda, agua potable, etc. –no se escucha-). Entre 
las cosas que han mejorado están el tema del gas y el seguimiento o juicios de 
responsabilidades a los ex presidentes –otros no se escuchan-. Ahora ellos se sienten más 
seguros de caminar en las ciudades y de ir a las instituciones públicas con sus propias 
indumentarias, es decir, se sienten menos discriminados por su apariencia. Actualmente 
sienten que se les respeta más en los ámbitos públicos. 
 
Mencionan que a las personas diferentes a ellos mismos (blancos, extranjeros, etc.) las 
respetan siempre y cuando estas personas las respeten a ellos primero. Dicen que la 
marginación y la discriminación no es buena de ningún lado y son cosas que deben 
desaparecer poco a poco y ceder lugar al respeto mutuo, debe primar la igualdad y el 
derecho de todos a plantear y defender sus propias ideas. 
 
Orgullo de vivir bajo el sistema político boliviano:  Ahora se sienten más orgullosos, ya 
que antes de este gobierno se sentían discriminados. Antes la política era sólo de los 
ricos, pero esto ahora está cambiando. Hay que apoyar al actual sistema político 
boliviano porque por primera vez hay un gobierno de izquierda, del pueblo; los que 
quieren separar al pueblo son los gobiernos tradicionales de derecha. 
 
No hay nada en común entre los diferentes pueblos y culturas de Bolivia; todos somos 
diferentes.  
 
En el Oriente las personas tienen grandes extensiones de terrenos, en occidente estos 
comunarios dicen no tenerlas, a lo máximo unas pocas hectáreas. Arguyen los talleristas 
que ellos tienen derechos, o por lo menos sus hijos, a ser dotados –de manera gratuita- de 
tierras en el Oriente. 
 
legend
¿En qué medida se siente usted... 
[paceño, cruceño, cochabambino, 
orureño, chuqisaqueño, potosino, 
pandino, tarijeño, beniano]?
¿En qué medida se siente usted 
ciudadano boliviano?
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Orgullo de ser boliviano: Se sienten muy orgullosos sobre todo porque son “antiguos”, es 
decir, originarios de las tierras donde viven. Otro motivo de orgullo es la existencia de 
gran cantidad de recursos naturales dentro el país – Bolivia es un país rico-. 
 
En otros países las personas, la gente del lugar u originarios, no son tan discriminados 
como en Bolivia. Por eso en otros países las personas se sienten más orgullosas de ser de 
su país. 
 
¿Quines son originarios? Algunos dicen que sobre todos los indígenas/originarios, es 
decir los nacidos en el lugar igual que sus abuelos y los abuelos de sus abuelos, pero otros 
talleristas mencionan que, incluso los que tienen ascendientes del extranjero, por el hecho 
de haber nacido aquí, ya son “bolivianos” –en todo caso la opinión está dividida-. 
Coinciden, sin embargo, en que los derechos deben ser iguales para todos. También se 
dice que para ser originario, se debe contar con la aprobación de la asamblea de la gente 
del lugar, es decir, con la aceptación de la comunidad de la cual uno pretende ser 
originario. Otro requisito para ser originario es cumplir con las obligaciones comunales, 
tales como: asistir a las asambleas, participar de las tareas y trabajos comunales, etc.; en 
otras palabras, se debe mantener vigente el vínculo con la comunidad. 
 
Otro motivo por el cual los talleristas se sienten originarios de Tapacarí, es que ellos 
confeccionan sus propias indumentarias, además que tienen su “propia y ancestral 
cultura”. 
 
Arguyen que no hay diferencia entre indígena y originario. Por tanto, las personas que 
emigran, como los citadinos, ya no son indígenas ni originarias, son “residentes”. 
 
La gente que ha migrado al Chapare, por ejemplo, sobre todo los nacidos allá, tienen una 
manera de pensar y valores muy diferentes a los de estos comunarios, y por ellos ya no 
hay mucho “entendimiento” con ellos y sí muchos problemas y diferencias. 
 
La autoidentificación es primero del ayllu, luego la provincia, luego el departamento y 
después el país, pero esto depende sobre todo del lugar donde uno esté. Sin embargo, 
arguyen que se sienten con más fuerza de Tapacarí antes que bolivianos. 
 
Identidades particulares: 
Se sienten de igual manera quechuas y aymaras debido sobre todo a que ambas culturas 
conservan y practican su lengua. También se sienten parte de la cultura camba porque la 
gente de esas regiones también es originaria y tiene su propia cultura, al igual que ellos, 
los “quechuas”. 
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¿En qué medida se 
siente usted parte de 
la cultura Camba?
¿En qué medida se 
siente usted parte de 
la cultura Quechua?
¿En qué medida se 
siente usted parte de 
la cultura Aymara?
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La experiencia del Cuartel –Servicio Militar-, según ellos, es un gran estímulo para el 
sentimiento de “unidad nacional”, porque les sirvió para conocer y dar a conocer otras 
culturas. 
 
Parte de la cultura tradicional, sobre todo la referida a la confección de textiles se está 
perdiendo, debido a que los jóvenes ya no tienen la voluntad de preservar este 
conocimiento. 
 
Las sectas religiosas están afectando de alguna manera la cohesión de las comunidades, 
ya que obligan a los individuos a dedicarse primero a sus deberes “espirituales” antes que 
a las obligaciones “comunitarias”. Por otro lado también satanizan algunas prácticas 
culturales tradicionales, así como debilitan el “respeto” a los demás –sólo existe Dios, ya 
no la comunidad-. 
 
Participants: 
- Francisco Chipata Mina 
- Martín Espeinoza 
- Leonardo Choque Mamani 
- 2 persons did not sign list 
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Participants at the Tapacari – Cochabamba Focus Group, July 5, 2006 
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Municipality: CAMIRI, Provincia Cordillera, Department of Santa Cruz, Bolivia 
Organized with support from Asamble del Pueblo Guaraní, Camiri 
August 1, 2006 
 
 
Results 
 
 
Apoyo a la democracia 
Justicia y apoyo a las instituciones: Poca confianza en la Policía debido a los altos 
niveles de corrupción dentro de esta institución, además de que a las provincias son 
asignados los peores policías, muchas veces incluso como castigo. Tampoco los fiscales 
provinciales funcionan adecuadamente debido sobre todo a las distancias. La justicia no 
funciona: quien que no tiene plata no consigue justicia. En los altos niveles de justicia 
(Corte superior, Suprema, etc.) no existen ni habrán personas que conozcan la 
cosmovisión de los pueblos originarios, por ello jamás funcionará el sistema judicial. En 
Bolivia, un problema es que se somete a las minorías a la decisión de las mayorías; para 
los guaraníes este sometimiento no es democracia. Como solución a este problema 
proponen la descentralización de la justicia, en el sentido de justicia comunitaria de 
acuerdo a usos y costumbres de cada región y pueblo. La justicia comunitaria no se la 
puede impartir como una clase universitaria; las personas nacen dentro de ella, es parte de 
la cultura. 
 
Apoyo al sistema político boliviano:  El apoyo es muy fuerte, pero, es al actual sistema 
político boliviano, es decir, desde la asunción a la presidencia por parte de Evo Morales. 
Antes de este gobierno no existían sentimientos de apoyo al sistema. Los pueblos 
originarios han apoyado al actual presidente para que llegue al poder debido sobre todo a 
que es indígena y para que logre cambiar el sistema para hacerlo más justo. La confianza 
que tienen en el actual sistema político (léase gobierno) es sólo hasta cierto punto y está 
supeditada a los cambios que puedan producirse, y estos no se dan, este apoyo y 
confianza inmediatamente serán retirados. Los cambios son esperados en un plazo de 1 a 
4 años. El gobierno sólo no puede realizar los cambios, para ello necesita el apoyo de 
todo el pueblo. En este momento la clave del cambio es la Asamblea Constituyente, y si 
el Presidente Morales trata de cambiar o no respeta los planteamientos del pueblo 
Guaraní en torno a cómo debe ser la nueva CPE, entonces ellos le retirarán su confianza. 
Otras posibles fuentes de desconfianza son o podrían ser: la actual política del gobierno 
de enfrentamiento con las religiones;  si el gobierno no lucha por la defensa de las tierras 
(léase territorio – reconstitución de los territorios perdidos) a favor de las comunidades 
originarias;  si el gobierno no apoya un sistema educativo acorde a los planteamientos y 
realidades del pueblo guaraní; y otros temas relacionados con los recursos naturales y el 
IDH. 
 
Para los guaraníes no es válida la propuesta de que las comunidades indígenas se 
reconstituyan a partir de las TCOs; para ellos el Chaco es el territorio guaraní. No 
demandan la creación de un décimo departamento igual a los otros nueve, sino como la 
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reconstitución de un territorio perdido. Los pueblos guaraníes plantean también la 
protección del medio ambiente a partir de la reconstitución de los territorios. 
 
Para los guaraníes, las personas que conforman el Movimiento Sin Tierra, son 
principalmente oriundos del occidente del país (Potosí, Oruro), y por tanto no saben del 
manejo de los bosques ni entienden los ecosistemas del Chaco, así como tampoco 
entienden la noción de territorio, pues lo único que ellos quieren es su parcela. En este 
sentido el gobierno debe cambiar sus políticas, pues no se tata de dotar de tierra  a 
cualquier persona, así sea esta originaria (pero del occidente), antes se debería enseñar a 
los migrantes cómo son las normas y cómo se maneja el suelo en el Chaco; los 
originarios occidentales no pueden imponer su propias normas en la región del Chaco, y 
si lo hacen serían considerados extranjeros en este territorio. 
 
Expresan que, antes de la democracia, los pueblos originarios no tenían el derecho a decir 
lo que pensaban. Sin embargo, la democracia de los últimos años no ha sido una 
democracia tan plena como la que actualmente se está viviendo a partir del nuevo 
gobierno. La democracia previa estaba plagada de marginamiento, discriminación y hasta 
represión a los pueblos indígenas. La democracia debe ser la senda, el camino, para 
lograr una participación plena del pueblo, de los pueblos, bolivianos, y de esta manera 
lograr los cambios que sean necesarios en el país. 
 
legend
¿Hasta qué punto 
tiene confianza en el 
Presidente?
Piensa que debe 
apoyar el sistema 
político boliviano?
¿Hasta qué punto 
cree Ud. que los 
tribunales de justicia 
de Bolivia garantizan 
un juicio justo?
M
e
a
n
6
5
4
3
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1
0
5.835.83
2.17
4.77
4.5
3.68
Camiri
.00
Grupo focal
 
 
Valores comunes de los bolivianos:  Bolivia es un país muy diverso en cultura, y gran 
parte de sus habitantes aprecian las manifestaciones culturales no sólo de sus propias 
regiones, sino las del resto. Para los guaraníes, la unidad del país significa mucho, ya 
ellos, si se aíslan o se separan del resto del país piensan que se debilitarían como pueblo. 
A los bolivianos, los que los une es la voluntad de luchar contra el sistema globalizador y, 
en última instancia, proteger el planeta. Lo que los guaraníes buscan es la igualdad, que 
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nadie sea más que nadie. El “pensamiento boliviano”, según los guaraníes, es reconocer 
los valores culturales tradicionales. 
 
Antes no se tomaba en cuenta a los “verdaderos bolivianos”, a los “dueños del lugar”, es 
decir, a los pueblos indígenas. Ahora, sin embargo, existen algunos progresos al respecto. 
 
Las marchas, como forma de protesta de los bolivianos, son vistas de mala manera o 
leídas de forma errónea por algunos grupos sociales en el país (p.ej.: la Unión Juvenil 
Cruceñista), ya que las marchas se constituyen en una herramienta para hacer llegar la 
voz de las personas hacia el gobierno, y por lo general esta es la única vía para lograrlo. 
Los grupos que critican las marchas tratan de dividir a los pueblos del oriente, 
haciéndoles creer que por realizar este tipo de protestas no son “cambas de verdad”. 
 
legend
A pesar de nuestras diferencias, 
los bolivianos tenemos muchas 
cosas y valores que nos unen 
como país.  ¿Hasta qué punto está 
de acuerdo?
Puede que la democracia tenga 
problemas, pero es mejor que 
cualquier forma de Gobierno. 
¿Hasta qué punto está de 
acuerdo?
M
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6.167
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5.208
4.973
Camiri
.00
Grupo focal
 
 
Respecto a la Media Luna, esto no corresponde al sentimiento de los pueblos originarios 
de estas regiones, sino que corresponde al pensamiento de un grupo de élite u oligarquía 
asentada en ellas. La supuesta apertura de las élites y grupos de poder cruceños hacia los 
pueblos y representantes guaraníes no es sincera y es un ardid para afianzarse en el poder. 
Mediante la unidad de los bolivianos, el pueblo guaraní plantea aislar a estos grupos de 
poder mezquinos y “convertirlos”, es decir, enseñarles cómo se debe vivir en esta tierra a 
partir de los valores de los pueblos originarios. 
 
La política educativa de los grupos dominantes no está pensada hacia Bolivia, sino que 
mira hacia fuera. Desde el colegio se forma a las personas con la visión de dejar el país y 
residir en el exterior. Cuando las élites contratan mano de obra, no es porque “quieren dar 
empleo”, sino porque necesitan de los trabajadores para su acumulación capitalista. La 
élite boliviana no tiene por objetivos el de irse a vivir a una provincia, o el de casarse con 
“una persona sencilla”, peor si es originaria. 
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Orgullo de ser bolivianos: Se sienten orgullosos sobre todo debido a la diversidad cultural 
de los pueblos bolivianos. Los guaraníes dicen no ser “inteligentes” sino “sabios”, y ello 
debido a su legado cultural, y por ello se sienten orgullosos. También se sienten 
orgullosos al saberse “originarios” de sus tierras, y porque sus ancestros pertenecían a 
ella desde muy atrás en el tiempo. 
 
El resto del mundo tiende a caracterizar a Bolivia como un país del tercer mundo, como a 
los más pobres; pero esto es mentira, porque Bolivia es riquísima, tanto en recursos 
naturales como en cultura. La educación, el sistema educativo, durante los últimos 50 
años ha tenido mucha influencia en la subvaloración de los bolivianos respecto a sí 
mismos y en el hecho de que muchas personas hayan querido dejar de ser lo que eran 
antes. La creación del décimo departamento está ligado a esto último pues supone 
autonomía indígenas, es decir, recuperación de los valores culturales tradicionales. Los 
guaraníes ya no van a permitir que nadie les venga a decir qué es lo que tienen que 
comer, o cómo se van a vestir o de qué manera se van a educar, etc. Muchos de ellos han 
empezado a abandonar sus nombres occidentales-castellanos y a cambiarlos por nombres 
tradicionales guaraníes, y esto no sólo de manera simbólica sino también jurídica, es 
decir, han comenzado los trámites legales para su cambio de nombre. 
 
Otro factor que incide en la mala imagen de Bolivia en el exterior y en la falta de orgullo 
de las personas por ser bolivianas, es que nuestro país es considerado uno de los más 
corruptos de la región e incluso del mundo. Se piensa que, con el nuevo gobierno, esta 
realidad va a ir cambiando para bien. 
 
Identidades particulares: 
¿Qué es ser guaraní y quiénes son guaraníes?: Los guaraníes se identifican como tales 
principalmente debido a su cultura ancestral (idioma, costumbre, etc.), la misma que es 
compartida por todos y desde tiempos inmemoriales. Los guaraníes siguen siéndolo sin 
importar dónde vivan o si se han ido a las ciudades o cuánto tiempo ha pasado, siempre y 
cuando sigan respetando y queriendo su cultura ancestral. 
 
Los guaraníes no se consideran indígenas pues este en un término impuesto por los 
occidentales, además que corresponde a un error histórico (Colón y Las Indias). Los 
guaraníes son una nación (y por tanto originarios) que está asentada en un territorio u 
espacio físico específico (Norte de Argentina, Uruguay Paraguay, Sur de Bolivia y Sur 
del Brasil). Otro equívoco se produjo cuando los antropólogos les pusieron el 
sobrenombre de Chiriguanos. 
 
Ser guaraní significa ser guerrero, ser astuto, ser sabio, y eso se ha demostrado 
históricamente. El guaraní debe poder leer el pensamiento de las personas (mediante 
cigarrillos), es el “superinteligente”. A pesar de las adversidades, un guaraní jamás está 
triste o lloroso, pues ellos son “gente siempre alegre y optimista”. 
 
Hay casos de pérdida de identidad o de sentido de pertenencia al pueblo Guaraní, y pasa 
sobre todo con jóvenes que se han ido de las comunidades a las ciudades por largos 
períodos de tiempo, y que al regresar ya no comparten los valores y costumbres 
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tradicionales pues han adoptado otras nuevas. Otro lugar donde los guaraníes tienden a 
perder con rapidez su identidad es el las fronteras. La castellanización forzada en las 
escuelas también contribuyó (y aún lo hace debido a que casi no existe educación 
intercultural-bilingüe) en gran medida a la perdida de identidad de los guaraníes. Por otra 
parte, actualmente son pocos los padres que les enseñan o hablen en guaraní a sus hijos 
(sobre todo en las familias que ya no viven en las comunidades), aunque esta tendencia se 
espera que vaya a cambiar. Desde hace aproximadamente un año se está impulsando, 
desde el sistema educativo y con la participación de todos sus miembros, la recuperación 
de los valores tradicionales del pueblo guaraní. 
 
Manifiestan que para los guaraníes es importante que, aparte de su lengua originaria, sus 
miembros (sobre todo los jóvenes) aprendan correctamente otras lenguas (castellano, 
inglés, etc.). Lo importante es que estas personas que aprendan otras lenguas no pierdan 
la “esencia de su ser”. 
 
En el caso específico de los jóvenes, mencionan que la mayor parte quienes han ido a 
estudiar a las ciudades en el lapso de un año dejan de sentirse o por lo menos de parecer 
guaraníes y adoptan las costumbres y el habla del lugar donde estén. Es muy frecuente 
que simultáneamente nieguen sus orígenes y se hagan pasar por “cambas” o “carays”. El 
motivo principal para este cambio es que los guaraníes tradicionalmente han sido 
discriminados por la sociedad boliviana. 
 
legend
¿En qué medida se 
siente usted parte de 
la cultura Camba?
¿En qué medida se 
siente usted parte de 
la cultura Quechua?
¿En qué medida se 
siente usted parte de 
la cultura Aymara?
M
e
a
n
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3
2
1
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3
2.8
3.4 3.363
4.004
3.376
Camiri
.00
Grupo focal
 
 
Si los guaraníes se sienten también identificados con otras culturas como la quechua y 
especialmente la aymara es debido a que esos pueblos, al igual que ellos, mantienen y 
practican sus valores culturales tradicionales y a donde sea que vayan siguen siendo ellos 
mismos y continúan hablando sus idiomas nativos. Los aymaras y los guaraníes tendrían 
visiones culturales similares a pesar de vivir en medioambientes muy diferentes. Estas 
visiones similares los unen en una sola causa. 
 
 182
¿Qué es ser originario?:  Los guaraníes piensan que las personas (de cualquier parte de 
Bolivia), en la medida en que han nacido en nuestro país “ya son bolivianos”, pero “no 
serían originarios”, sin embargo, esta distinción no implica ninguna forma de 
discriminación o privilegios para cualquiera de los dos. En la medida en que “los 
bolivianos” se identifiquen con su cultura (la guaraní), ellos los van a respetar. Por 
ejemplo, si bien todos los que viven en esta región (Chaco) pueden ser considerados 
“chaqueños”, no todos son originarios, sin embargo, debe existir igualdad de derechos 
para unos y otros. 
 
Relación entre raza e identidad:  A pesar de las diferencias de color y culturales “todos 
somos bolivianos”. Los guaraníes aceptan el hecho del mestizaje y, en este sentido, no 
creen estar “intactos” como raza, sin embargo, lo que no han perdido es la “esencia del 
ser guaraní”. 
 
Participants 
 
- Gonzalo Maratua Pedraza 
- Francisco Cuyupori Quezada 
- Manuel Pastillo López 
- Constanza Moreno 
- Edwin Cuellar A. 
- Edda Sambequiri Flores 
 
 
Some participants at the Camiri Focus Group, August 1, 2006 
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Map of Bolivia showing each of the municipalities where SRIG Focus Groups were 
conducted 
 
 
Source: SIGEL 2006 
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Plan para los talleres con grupos focales 
 
Fase introductoria (Total 45 min). 
 
1. Recepción de los participantes y realización de encuestas mientras se junta el 
grupo. 
a. Los dos responsables hacen las encuestas 
2. Presentación de los objetivos y metodología del taller. Presentación de los 
participantes. 
a. Uno presenta el taller y el otro responsable mete los datos comparados de 
los resultados.  
 
Discusión sobre apoyo a la democracia (Total 30 min.) 
 
3. Presentación de resultados comparados de asistentes del taller y el promedio 
nacional 
4. Discusión por ítems. Preguntas claves: por qué le damos esa valoración; qué 
habría que hacer para que esa valoración suba. 
a. B1.¿Hasta qué punto cree Ud. que los tribunales de justicia de Bolivia 
garantizan un juicio justo? 
b. B2.¿Hasta qué punto tiene respeto por las instituciones políticas de 
Bolivia? 
c. B3.Hasta qué punto cree Ud. que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están 
bien protegidos por el sistema político boliviano? 
d. B4.¿Hasta qué punto se siente orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político 
boliviano? 
e. B6.¿Hasta qué punto piensa que se debe apoyar el sistema político 
boliviano? 
f. ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que 
cualquier forma de Gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo? 
g. Otras instituciones: Congreso, CNE, Autoridad Originaria, Sindicatos (SI 
HAY TIEMPO) 
 
Discusión sobre pertenencia a la comunidad política (Total 45 min) 
 
5. Presentación de resultados comparados de asistentes del taller y el promedio 
nacional 
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6. Discusión por ítems. Preguntas claves: por qué le damos esa valoración; qué 
significa ser boliviano; cuáles son los valores que nos unen como bolivianos. 
a. B43. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente orgulloso de ser boliviano? 
b. PN2. A pesar de nuestras diferencias, los bolivianos tenemos muchas 
cosas y valores que nos unen como país.  ¿Hasta qué punto está de 
acuerdo? 
c. NEWTOL7. Suceda lo que suceda, el país debe permanecer unido o… 2) 
Las diferencias en el país son muy grandes, el país debería dividirse. 
d. ETID1 [BETID1]. ¿En qué medida se siente usted ciudadano boliviano? 
 
Discusión sobre identidades particulares (Total 60 min) 
 
7. Presentación de resultados comparados de asistentes del taller y el promedio 
nacional 
Discusión por ítems. Preguntas claves: por qué le damos esa valoración; qué significa 
ser del departamento? Qué significa ser indígena? Es lo mismo sentirse parte de la 
cultura aymara o quechua y ser indígena? Por qué hay personas que se identifican 
como indígenas en una pregunta y no en otras? Qué relación hay entre la percepción 
de los padres y su propia auto adscripción étnica? Qué relación hay con el lenguaje? 
Qué relación hay con la migración? Existe una cultura indígena en Bolivia? 
a. ETID3 [BETID2]. ¿En qué medida se siente usted... [paceño, cruceño, 
cochabambino, orureño, chuqisaqueño, potosino, pandino, tarijeño, 
beniano]? 
b. BOLETID3 [BETID3]. ¿En qué medida se siente usted parte de la cultura 
Aymara? 
c. BOLETID4 [BETID4]. ¿En qué medida se siente usted parte de la cultura 
Quechua? 
d. BOLETID5 [BETID5]. ¿En qué medida se siente usted parte de la cultura 
Camba? 
e. ETID. Ud. se considera una persona de raza blanca, chola, mestiza,  
indígena, negra u originario? 
f. ETID2. [Census] ¿Se considera perteneciente a alguno de los siguientes 
pueblos originarios o indígenas? (leer todas las opciones)   
 
Conclusiones (Total 30 min) 
 
8. Discusión de las conclusiones en torno a las siguientes preguntas clave: 
a. Cómo puede tenerse al mismo tiempo una identidad particular (regional o 
étnica) y ser parte del mismo país? 
b. Cómo deberían las propuestas de autonomías enfrentar estas diferencias en 
el país? 
c. Todos los bolivianos deberían tener la misma identidad o se deberían 
respetar las identidades particulares de cada quien? 
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Preguntas para los talleres focales 
 
Taller Focal: …………………………. 
 
Fecha: ……………………………………. 
 
Q1. Sexo (no pregunte): Hombre [1] Mujer [2] Q1 
Q2. Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?      __________ años Q2 
 
¿Alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado o tratado de manera injusta por su 
apariencia física o su forma de hablar en los siguientes lugares: 
 
DIS1: En la escuela, colegio o universidad 
Sí [1]  No   [2]  NS/NR [8] 
DIS1 
DIS2: En las oficinas del gobierno (juzgados, ministerios, alcaldías) 
Sí [1]  No   [2]  NS/NR [8] 
DIS2 
DIS3: Cuando buscaba trabajo en alguna empresa o negocio 
Sí [1]  No   [2]  NS/NR [8] 
DIS3 
DIS4: En reuniones o eventos sociales 
Sí [1]  No   [2]  NS/NR [8] 
DIS4 
DIS5: En lugares públicos (como en la calle, la plaza o el mercado) 
Sí [1]  No   [2]  NS/NR [8] 
DIS5 
 
IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica?  ¿Diría Ud. 
que es muy buena, buena, regular, mala o muy mala?  Muy buena  [1]   
Buena   [2]   Regular  [3]    Mala   [4]  Muy mala  [5]   No sabe    [8]  
IDIO1
IDIO2. ¿Considera Ud. que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o 
peor que la de hace doce meses?    Mejor  [1]   Igual   [2]    Peor   [3]     No 
sabe    [8] 
IDIO2
IDIO3.  Y en los próximos doce meses, ¿Cree Ud. que su situación 
económica será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora?    Mejor  [1]   Igual   [2]   
Peor   [3]     No sabe    [8] 
IDIO3
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VB1. Está usted inscrito para votar? 
Sí[1]     No [2]  (pasar a VB4)     NS [8] 
VB1 
VB2 [VBPRS05]. Votó Ud. en las elecciones presidenciales de 2005?  
Sí votó [1] (siga)   No votó [2] (pasar a VB4)   NS [8] 
VB2  
BOLVB3 [VBPTY05] . Si votó en las elecciones de 2005=> Por cuál partido 
o candidato votó para presidente? (No lea las alternativas) (Pasar a 
VBPRS02) 
FREPAB (Eliceo Rodriguez)[1]    
MAS (Evo Morales) [2]   
MIP (Felipe Quispe “Mallku”) [3]    
MNR (Michiaki Nagatani) [4]   
NFR (Gildo Angulo) [5]   
Podemos (Jorge Quiroga) [6]  
UN (Samuel Doria Medina) [7]   
USTB (Nestor Garcia) [8]  
Nulo, blanco[98]   
NS / No recuerda, El voto es secreto[88]  
INAP (no votó) [99] 
BOL
VB3 
 
 
Ahora (entregue tabla # 2) vamos a usar esta tabla... Esta tabla contiene una 
escalera de 7 gradas, cada una indica un puntaje que va de 1 que significa 
nada,  hasta 7 que significa mucho. Por ejemplo si yo le pregunto:”hasta qué 
punto le gusta ver TV?”, si a Ud. no le gusta nada elegiría el puntaje de 1; si 
por el contrario, le gusta mucho ver TV me diría el número 7. Si su opinión 
está entre nada y mucho, Ud. elegiría un puntaje intermedio. Hagamos la 
prueba. “hasta qué punto le gusta ver TV?” léame el número por favor. 
(ASEGURESE QUE ENTIENDA)  Usando esta tabla…..   
 
 
Escala 
Nada                    Mucho    
 
NS/
NR 
No 
co
no
ce 
 
 
B1.¿Hasta qué punto cree Ud. que los tribunales de 
justicia de Bolivia garantizan un juicio justo? 
 
 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
8  B1 
 
B2.¿Hasta qué punto tiene respeto por las 
instituciones políticas de Bolivia? 
 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
8  B2 
 
B3.Hasta qué punto cree Ud. que los derechos 
básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el 
sistema político boliviano? 
 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
8  B3 
 
B4.¿Hasta qué punto se siente orgulloso de vivir 
bajo el sistema político boliviano? 
 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
8  B4 
 
B6.¿Hasta qué punto piensa que se debe apoyar el 
sistema político boliviano? 
 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
8  B6 
B10A.¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el 
sistema de justicia? 
 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
8  B10A 
 
B21 [B30].¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los 
 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
8  B21 
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partidos políticos?  
B11. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Corte 
Nacional Electoral? 
 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
8  B11 
 
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el 
Congreso? 
 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
8  B13 
 
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la policía?
 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
8  B18  
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Iglesia 
Católica? 
 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
8  B20 
 
BOLB37 [B21]. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en 
los periodistas? 
 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
8  BOLB37 
 
B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el 
Presidente? 
 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
8  B21A 
 
BOLB22B [B22B]. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene 
confianza en la autoridad originaria? 
 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
8 9 BOLB22
B  
B23. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los 
sindicatos? 
 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
8  B23 
B43. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente orgulloso de ser 
boliviano? 
 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
8  B43  
 
 
(seguir con tabla 2) Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo 
con  cada una de las siguientes afirmaciones?. 
 
Escala 
Nada                           
Mucho 
 
NS/
NR 
 
ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero 
es mejor que cualquier forma de Gobierno. ¿Hasta qué 
punto está de acuerdo? 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 8 IN
G4 
 PN2. A pesar de nuestras diferencias, los bolivianos 
tenemos muchas cosas y valores que nos unen como 
país.  ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo? 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 8 PN
2 
 
NEWTOL7. Suceda lo que suceda, el país debe permanecer 
unido o… 2) Las diferencias en el país son muy grandes, el país 
debería dividirse  
El país debe permanecer unido [1]  
El país debería dividirse [2] NS [8] 
NEWTOL7  
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Bolivia es un país muy diverso y por lo tanto cada uno de nosotros puede 
identificarse con diferentes aspectos de nuestra cultura.  Por ejemplo, uno puede 
identificarse como boliviano y al mismo tiempo también como paceño o como 
camba.  En esta misma escala, en donde 1 significa “nada” y 7 significa “mucho”... 
(seguir con tabla 2) Escala 
Nada                              
Mucho 
NS
/ 
NR
 
ETID1 [BETID1]. ¿En qué medida se siente usted 
ciudadano boliviano? 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 8 ETI
D1  
Encuestador: Para la siguiente pregunta utilice la 
referencia de acuerdo al departamento donde realiza la 
encuesta: 
   
 ETID3 [BETID2]. ¿En qué medida se siente usted... 
[paceño, cruceño, cochabambino, orureño, 
chuqisaqueño, potosino, pandino, tarijeño, beniano]? 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 8 ETI
D3 
BOLETID3 [BETID3]. ¿En qué medida se siente 
usted parte de la cultura Aymara? 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 8 BOL
ETI
D3  
BOLETID4 [BETID4]. ¿En qué medida se siente 
usted parte de la cultura Quechua? 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 8 BOL
ETI
D4  
BOLETID5 [BETID5]. ¿En qué medida se siente 
usted parte de la cultura Camba? 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 8 BOL
ETI
D5  
BOLETID6 [BETID6]. Algunos periodistas se 
refieren a los departamentos de Santa Cruz, Beni, 
Pando, Chuquisaca y Tarija como la “región de la 
Media Luna”.  ¿Ha oido usted hablar de esta idea?  
Encuestador: si responde NO anote [9] y pase a la  
siguiente 
¿En qué medida se siente usted parte de la “Media 
Luna”? 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 [9]
 
 
 
8 
BOL
ETI
D6  
 
 
ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que Ud. aprobó [encierre en 
un círculo el último año que aprobó el entrevistado(a)]. [Para los que 
han tenido alguna educacíon ténica, agregar estos años al total. Por ej. si 
la persona terminó Básico y además hizo  dos años de educación técnica, 
marque el 7]  
- Ninguna :  0 
- Básico:  1  -  2  -  3  -  4  -  5  => Primaria 
- Intermedio:  6  -  7  -  8        => Primaria 
- Medio:  9  -  10  -  11  y  12  => Secundaria 
 - Universidad :  13  -   14  -   15   -   16  -   17  -  18 
- Pos grado:       18 – 19 -20 -21- 22 -23 -24 
E
D 
ED2. Si tuvo alguna educación => Estudió Ud. en escuela o colegio 
fiscal o particular? 
Escuela fiscal [1]  
Escuela privada [2]  
E
D
2 
 190
Estudió en los dos sistemas   [3] 
 
ETID. Ud. se considera una persona de raza blanca, chola, mestiza,  
indígena, negra u originario? 
Blanca [1]       Mestiza [3]  Indígena [4] Negra [5]     Originaria [6]          
Otra ________ NS/NR [8] 
 
ETID 
ETIDA. Considera que su padre es o era una persona de raza blanca, chola, 
mestiza,  indígena, negra u originario? 
Blanca [1]       Mestiza [3]  Indígena [4] Negra [5]    originario [6] Otra 
____________ NS/NR [8] 
ETID
A 
ETIDB. Considera que su madre es o era una persona de raza blanca, 
chola, mestiza,  indígena, negra u originario? 
Blanca [1]       Mestiza [3]  Indígena [4] Negra [5]    originario [6] Otra 
____________ 
NS/NR [8] 
ETID
B 
ETID2. [Census] ¿Se considera perteneciente a alguno de los siguientes 
pueblos originarios o indígenas? (leer todas las opciones)   
Quechua [1]         Aymara[2]        Guaraní[3]       Chiquitano[4]       Mojeño[5]     
Otro nativo[6] ninguno [7]          otros _____________ (especificar) 
 
ETID
2 
 
LENG1. Cuál es su lengua materna, o el primer idioma que ha 
hablado de pequeño en su casa? (acepte una alternativa) 
Castellano [1]     Quechua [2]    Aymara [3]    Otro (nativo) [4] 
__________   
Otro extranjero [5]__________  NS/NR [8] 
LENG1 
LENG1A. Se hablaba otro idioma más en su casa cuando usted era 
niño? Cuál? (acepte una alternativa) 
Castellano [1]  Quechua [2] Aymara [3] Otro (nativo) [4] __________  
Otro extranjero [5]__________     Ningún otro [7]    NS/NR [8]           Inap  
[9]   
 
LENG1
A 
LENG4.  Hablando del idioma que sus padres conocían, ¿sus padres 
hablan o hablaban  
(Encuestador: si uno de los padres hablaba sólo un idioma y el otro más de 
uno, anotar 2.) 
Sólo castellano [1] Castellano e idioma nativo [2]         Sólo idioma 
nativo [3]      Castellano e idioma extranjero [4]          NS/NR [8] 
 
LENG4 
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MIG2. ¿En qué departamento nació? 
La Paz              [1] 
Santa Cruz      [2]  
Cochabamba  [3]  
Oruro               [4] 
Chuquisaca     [5]   
Potosí              [6]  
Pando              [7]  
Tarija               [8]  
Beni                 [9]   
MIG2  
MIG3. ¿Nació en la ciudad capital del 
departamento o en alguna de las provincias? 
Ciudad capital [1] Provincia [2] 
MIG3  
 
 
Observaciones: 
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